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ABSTRACT
OLGA PERDIKAKI: Essays on Retail Operations.
(Under the direction of Dr. Jayashankar M. Swaminathan.)
The intensiﬁed competition that the retail industry faces with the increasing num-
bers of new players in both the local and global markets has forced retailers to critically
examine and redesign their operations and marketing strategies. To remain competi-
tive, many retailers have focused on the provision of enhanced customer experience and
pursued practices of diﬀerentiation. In this dissertation comprising of three essays, we
attempt to shed light on retail practices that enhance consumer valuation, on factors
that aﬀect store performance, and on temporal management of demand enhancing ac-
tivities using both analytical and empirical methodologies. The aim of this research is
to develop theoretical insights to help retailers understand their store performance and
eﬀectively manage strategies geared towards enhancing demand and consumer valua-
tion about their product oﬀerings.
In the ﬁrst essay, we focus on technology investments that can aﬀect consumer
valuation. We examine the impact of such investments in a duopoly setting in which
retailers compete in prices and consumers can search among the two retailers. In the
second essay, we focus on store performance and examine the impact of labor and
traﬃc characteristics on diﬀerent store performance metrics using proprietary data of a
retail chain. In the third essay, we focus on general services that retailers could provide
to enhance demand and examine their temporal management under competition and
demand uncertainty.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Motivation
The retail industry is one of the most dynamic and inﬂuential industries in developed
economies. In the U.S. the retail business represents about 40% of the Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) and is the largest employer (Fisher and Raman (2001)). The
intensiﬁed competition that the retail industry faces with the emergence of increasing
numbers of new players in both the local and global markets has forced retailers to
critically examine and redesign both their operations and marketing strategies. To re-
main competitive, many retailers have diﬀerentiated themselves by designing enhanced
customer experiences and other strategies to distinguish themselves from competition.
Such practices have provided a fertile ground and new contexts for research in the re-
tail operations arena. This dissertation comprising of three essays aims to shed light
to some important aspects of retail operations that have emerged due to the current
practices. The aim of this research is to develop theoretical insights to help retailers
understand their store performance and eﬀectively manage strategies geared towards
enhancing demand and consumer valuation about their product oﬀerings. In Chapter 2
we examine investments in technologies that can aﬀect consumer valuation and focus on
analyzing the factors that aﬀect retailers’ decisions to undertake such investments. In
Chapter 3 we study the impact of labor and traﬃc characteristics on store performance
using proprietary data of a retail chain. In Chapter 4 we focus on general services
that retailers could provide to enhance demand and examine their temporal manage-
ment under competition in the face of demand uncertainty. Chapter 5 concludes the
dissertation. A brief overview of each chapter of the dissertation follows.
1.2 Dissertation Overview
1.2.1 Chapter 2
With increased competition in the retail industry many retailers such as Best Buy are
investing in technology, employee training, and presentation in order to improve con-
sumers’ valuation of their product oﬀerings. Such investments in pre-purchase activities
to enhance consumer valuation are costly and are designed to increase the possibility
of purchase, but they do not lead to “stickiness”. In particular, increases in consumer
valuation through pre-purchase services are prone to free-riding since consumers receive
the beneﬁts of such activities oﬀered by a retailer, but may decide to purchase a prod-
uct at another retailer. Gateway’s Country Stores and their subsequent demise provide
a characteristic example of the free riding problems (Frei (2006)).
Chapter 2 investigates the factors that retailers should consider before investing
in pre-purchase activities in order to increase consumer valuation and examines their
eﬀect on retailers’ pricing and proﬁts. We develop a stylized model using ﬁrst princi-
ples on the distribution of consumer valuation and study a duopoly in which retailers
compete on the basis of price and consumer search is allowed between the two retailers.
In such a setting, a retailer may make investments to increase consumer valuation for
his product, but the ﬁnal sale could be made at the other retailer, who did not invest
in technologies, leading to free riding. We explore the Nash equilibria in terms of both
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investment and pricing through a computational study. Then we focus on the pricing
game only and establish the pricing Nash equilibria. We characterize the competitive
eﬀects under diﬀerent regimes related to market expansion, retailers’ physical proxim-
ity, direction of consumer ﬂow, and magnitude of change in consumer valuation for
two asymmetric investment structures. Next, we focus on a special case in which the
competing retailers are symmetric and characterize the possible Nash equilibria invest-
ment strategies depending on the investment cost. Finally, we present a model with an
endogenous level of investment and analyze the symmetric equilibrium for a symmetric
duopoly.
Our main results are as follows. When the investment decision is endogenous, we
establish the surprising result that in the majority of instances both retailers will decide
to invest in equilibrium but price the product in a manner to avoid consumer search
between them. We also ﬁnd that the proximity of retailers has an interesting non-
monotonic impact on their decisions to invest. Retailers tend to invest in technology
when they are either very close or very far away but refrain from investing in the in-
termediate range. When we further focus only on the pricing game, we ﬁnd two major
eﬀects related to improvements in consumer valuation. First, consistent with popular
belief, we ﬁnd that there is a threshold eﬀect whereby a retailer could overcome com-
petitive eﬀects by improving consumer valuation. However, there are situations where
a greater improvement in consumer valuation by a retailer could lead to lower proﬁts.
Second, we ﬁnd evidence for a free-riding eﬀect where a retailer who does not invest
in valuation enhancement practices could beneﬁt from an innovative competitor who
increases consumer valuation beyond a threshold. When we focus on symmetric retail-
ers we ﬁnd that as the investment cost increases the Nash equilibrium strategies shift
from both retailers investing, to only one retailer investing (either retailer 1 or retailer
2), and ﬁnally to neither retailer investing. Finally, for the extension where the level
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of investment is endogenous, we show that a symmetric duopolist’s optimal strategy to
cover his whole local market or part of his market depends on the eﬀectiveness of his
investment cost and the optimal price may indeed decrease with the per unit cost of
acquiring the product.
1.2.2 Chapter 3
The intensiﬁed competition in the retail industry has forced retailers to place enormous
importance on store performance metrics. Several retailers nowadays track two metrics
conversion rate, the percentage of incoming traﬃc who purchased, and basket value,
the average dollar amount spent by customers. Both metrics are important indicators
of store performance. Conversion rate, for example, has been found to be strongly
correlated with customer loyalty while basket value, on the other hand, is typically
linked to the proﬁtability of the retailer. Both conversion rate and basket value can
be correlated with traﬃc characteristics due to many factors including labor, consumer
purchase behavior, economic conditions, product availability, and merchandise assort-
ment.
In Chapter 3, we use proprietary data pertaining to a retail chain to conduct a
descriptive study of conversion rate and basket value. Speciﬁcally, we consider the
correlation between store performance and intra-day traﬃc variability and traﬃc un-
certainty. We also measure traﬃc-labor mismatches and study if they explain the
observed correlations in our sample.
The results of our study are as follows: First, we report the within-store results.
We ﬁnd that intra-day traﬃc variability is negatively correlated with both conversion
rate and basket value. A 1% increase in traﬃc variability is associated with a 0.094%
decrease in conversion rate in a store and 0.037% decrease in basket value. We also ﬁnd
that, for a given level of traﬃc, both conversion rate and basket value increase with
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an increase in store labor at a diminishing rate. A 1% increase in labor is associated
with a 0.102% increase in conversion rate and 0.066% increase in basket value. In
addition, we ﬁnd that conversion rates are higher during holidays but basket values are
lower suggesting that price promotions oﬀered during the holiday season cause more
customers to purchase but do not lead to higher levels of purchasing. Moreover, we
ﬁnd that both conversion rates and basket values exhibit signiﬁcant seasonality.
Next, we report the across-store results. We ﬁnd that stores with higher traﬃc
uncertainty have lower conversion rates but similar basket values. We also ﬁnd that
stores that have higher traﬃc variability and higher traﬃc uncertainty have higher
mismatches between required labor and actual labor. Furthermore, our tests reveal
that stores that have lower foot-traﬃc have higher traﬃc uncertainty, resulting in mis-
matches between required labor and actual labor. A surprising result of our analysis is
that competition as measured here does not aﬀect conversion rates and basket values.
Finally, we ﬁnd that stores located in neighborhoods with higher per capita income
have higher conversion rates but similar basket values.
1.2.3 Chapter 4
In Chapter 4 we focus on understanding the temporal management of investments in
activities that can enhance demand under competition in the face of demand uncer-
tainty. In many settings, retailer investments in experience activities are important
in inﬂuencing demand for a product. For example, a retailer can stimulate demand
through various ways such as provide training to its sales personnel to promote a given
product, create special areas to show case a product or even invest in technology that
oﬀers a unique experience for a product. All the above activities which we will be
referring to as “service” can aﬀect the purchasing decision of customers. The planning
of such costly activities can be very crucial especially when a new product is being
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launched in a market. In the case of new product introduction, the retailer needs not
only to decide the optimal price and service investments for the product but also when
to invest in such experience activities. Given that market demand could be highly
uncertain, a retailer may choose to wait until he receives some information regarding
the market state before investing in such activities or he may want to make all these
investments upfront to take advantage of possible reduced investment costs.
In this chapter we develop a two-stage model in order to examine two alternatives
that retailers typically have in terms of timing their investments under both monopoly
and symmetric duopoly settings. The ﬁrst alternative is to invest in service in advance
of the selling season without knowing the market state (i.e., invest in the ﬁrst stage) and
the second alternative is to invest in service after the market state realizes (i.e., invest in
the second stage). In both cases a retailer decides on pricing after observing the demand
(i.e., in the second stage). For the monopoly we further examine a hybrid strategy in
which a retailer can invest both before and after the demand state is known. Typically,
investing after the demand state is known is associated with higher investment costs.
We analyze these settings under both equal and diﬀerent investment costs across stages.
In addition, we investigate the deterministic demand case for the symmetric duopoly
and contrast our results with the stochastic demand case. In the case of a deterministic
demand these alternatives translate to making sequential decisions (i.e., ﬁrst service
and then price) as opposed to simultaneous decisions (both service and price).
Our major ﬁndings in Chapter 4 are as follows. For a monopolist who faces stochas-
tic demand and incurs diﬀerent investment costs across stages, we show that a hybrid
strategy always dominates a strategy in which a retailer invests only before or only
after the market state is known. In addition, we show that a monopolist would prefer
to delay investments until demand is realized only when the market variability is high
and the diﬀerential cost of investments across stages is low. In all other regimes, a mo-
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nopolist would prefer to invest before the demand is realized. This result is in contrast
to the case of equal investment costs in which a monopolist would always defer such
investments until after the demand is realized.
For a symmetric duopolist who faces deterministic demand and incurs the same
investments costs across stages we show that the dominant strategy is always to make
service investments in the ﬁrst stage. We ﬁnd that this is not always the case when
the duopolist incurs higher investment costs in the second stage. Interestingly, when
the intensity of competition of service is high, a symmetric duopolist could be better
oﬀ to invest in the second stage as the diﬀerential cost of investment in the two stages
increases. We also ﬁnd computationally that the equilibrium strategies for a symmetric
retailer can shift in a non-monotonic fashion as the diﬀerential cost of investment in
the two stages increases. In particular, a retailer could invest in the ﬁrst stage for high
and low diﬀerential costs and in the second stage for intermediate values of diﬀerential
costs.
For a symmetric duopolist who faces stochastic demand and incurs same costs across
stages, the dominant strategy is to invest in demand enhancing activities in the ﬁrst
stage in all regimes except for one characterized by high demand variability, low in-
tensity of competition in service, and high investment cost. This result shows that the
competitive dynamics could signiﬁcantly diminish the value of delaying investments af-
ter demand is realized. We further characterize some of the investment strategies when
a duopolist incurs higher investment costs in the second stage. Interestingly, we ﬁnd
that in the case of high intensity of service competition increase in demand variability
could make investing more preferable in the ﬁrst stage than in the second stage if the
diﬀerential costs of investments across stages exceeds a given threshold.
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CHAPTER 2
Improving Valuation Under
Consumer Search:Implications for
Pricing and Proﬁts
2.1 Introduction
The retail sector is a vital sector in most modern economies. In the U.S. for example,
the retail industry represents about 40% of the economy and is the largest employer
(Fisher and Raman (2001)). As a result, several researchers have examined diﬀerent
retail operations issues, which include inventory management and store execution (see
Eppen and Iyer (1997), Tsay and Agrawal (2000), Raman et al. (2001), Fisher et al.
(2006), Nagarajan and Rajagopalan (2008) for representative work).
With increased competition, retailers are trying to identify ways to diﬀerentiate
themselves. One strategy has been to invest in practices that increase consumer valua-
tion of their product oﬀerings. Our interactions with a former top executive at Magnolia
Home theater stores, specialized stores at Best Buy geared towards high end electronic
home theater items, gave us insights regarding the various practices that ﬁrms em-
ploy to improve consumer valuation of their product oﬀerings (Freeland (2007)). These
practices include improving the ambience of the store to enhance the presentation of
the product category as well as hiring well-trained experts as salespeople to explain
the product characteristics. Investments in strategies to increase consumer valuation
entail some risk because they are usually costly and may not pay oﬀ in increased sales.
Another risk is that a retailer may invest in an enhanced presentation to sell a prod-
uct, but the customer decides to purchase it at another retailer, who hasn’t made the
investment - leading to the free-riding phenomenon. Gateway’s country stores pro-
vides an example of free riding. As indicated by Frei (2006), “When Gateway’s new
stores opened in 1996, they were undeniably impressive. Employees were experienced,
helpful, and abundant (the employee-to-customer ratio was unusually high). Excellent
educational materials were on hand, and the stores were conveniently located to ensure
heavy foot traﬃc. Unfortunately, Gateway hadn’t guaranteed that the people receiving
the beneﬁts of all that pre-purchase accommodation would also bear the costs. Far too
often, customers took their newly acquired understanding of what they needed and
how the product worked and then placed an order with one of Gateway’s low-price
competitors”.
These observations suggest that in addition to managing inventory in stores (which
often is the focus of studies in operations management) there are other aspects of
store operations that determine eventual sales. Our work studies retailer initiated
increases in consumer valuation, which could aﬀect consumers’ purchasing decision and
the resulting impact on retailers’ proﬁtability. In particular, we focus on increases in
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consumer valuations that are experiential i.e., remain with the consumer even when
they go to another retailer. We do not consider retailer-speciﬁc (“sticky”) increases in
consumer valuations such as after-purchase services and coupon oﬀerings which are not
prone to free riding. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in addressing the following questions:
How do market characteristics aﬀect the retailer’s decision to invest in such practices?
How does the ability of a retailer to change consumer valuation for a product aﬀect his
retail price and proﬁt under competition? These questions address issues that retailers
need to be aware of when they engage in consumer valuation enhancement activities.
To answer these questions, we ﬁrst develop a stylized model using ﬁrst principles
on the distribution of consumer valuation. We assume that consumer valuation is uni-
formly distributed and an improvement is captured by a right shift of the distribution.
We consider a two-stage game in a duopoly setting, where consumers could search
among two retailers who oﬀer a single product. In the ﬁrst stage, the retailers decide
whether to invest in improvements in customer valuation. In the second stage, given
the investment decisions in the ﬁrst stage, the retailers engage in price competition. We
explore the Nash equilibria in terms of both investment and pricing through a compu-
tational study. Then we focus on the pricing game only and establish the pricing Nash
equilibria. We characterize the competitive eﬀects under diﬀerent regimes related to
market expansion, retailers’ physical proximity, direction of consumer ﬂow, and magni-
tude of change in consumer valuation for two asymmetric investment structures. Next,
we focus on a special case in which the competing retailers are symmetric and charac-
terize the possible Nash equilibria investment strategies depending on the investment
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cost. Finally, we present a model with an endogenous level of investment and analyze
the symmetric equilibrium for a symmetric duopoly.
Our main results are as follows. When the investment decision is endogenous, in
the majority of instances both retailers decide to invest in equilibrium but they price
the product in a manner to avoid consumer search between them. We also ﬁnd that
the proximity of retailers has an interesting non monotonic impact on their decisions
to invest in that retailers tend to invest when they are very close or very far away but
refrain from investing in the intermediate range. When we further focus on only the
pricing game we ﬁnd two major eﬀects related to improvements in consumer valuation.
First, consistent with popular belief, we ﬁnd that a retailer could overcome competitive
eﬀects by improving consumer valuation beyond a certain threshold. However, there
are situations where a greater improvement in consumer valuation by a retailer could
lead to lower proﬁts. Second, we ﬁnd evidence of free-riding, where a retailer who
does not invest could beneﬁt from an innovative competitor who increases consumer
valuation beyond a threshold. When we focus on symmetric retailers we ﬁnd that as
the investment cost increases, the Nash equilibrium strategies shift from both retailers
investing, to only one retailer investing (either retailer 1 or retailer 2), and ﬁnally to
neither retailer investing. Finally, for the extension where the level of investment is
endogenous, we show that a symmetric duopolist’s optimal strategy to cover his whole
local market or part of his market depends on his investment cost eﬀectiveness and the
optimal price charged by him may indeed decrease with the per unit cost of acquiring
the product.
11
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the relevant
literature. In Section 3, we describe the two-stage game for the duopoly and provide
insights on the retailers’ investment decisions. Section 4 focuses on the pricing game.
Section 5 examines a special case in which both retailers are symmetric. In Section 6,
we present an extension to the basic model. Finally, we conclude by summarizing our
ﬁndings and provide future research directions in Section 7. We present a summary of
our mathematical notation in Appendix A. Proofs of all the results are in Appendix.
2.2 Literature Review
Our work relates to the retail price competition literature that has been extensively
studied by research in economics, marketing, as well as operations management. Initial
works in this stream focused on competition among brick-and-mortar retailers. In
addition to price competition among traditional retailers, there has recently been a
number of papers that focus on pricing in diﬀerent contexts such as multi-channel
supply chains and e-commerce. Cattani et al. (2004) and Tsay and Agrawal (2004)
provide extensive reviews of this literature.
There have also been works under retail competition that have incorporated a “ser-
vice” component as a decision variable for retailers in addition to pricing. Two diﬀerent
types of service are found in the literature: (i) service experience which can be con-
sumed by the customer without necessarily making a purchase at the retailer who oﬀers
it (e.g., informational type of service) and (ii) service experience whose beneﬁts are de-
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rived by making a purchase at the retailer who oﬀers it (e.g., generous warranties,
free-delivery, and installation).
Our work is related to the stream of literature that considers the ﬁrst type of
service. In settings where the pre-sale activities are conducted independently from the
actual sale of the product, the free-riding problem occurs. The main focus of the free-
riding literature has been the negative impact of free riding on the retailers’ incentive
to provide costly pre-sale service and the way that retailers and manufacturers could
prevent free riding (see Carlton and Perloﬀ (2000), Carlton and Chevalier (2001)).
From this literature the papers by Bernstein et al. (2006) and Shin (2007) are related
to our work.
Bernstein et al. (2006) also explore the idea that consumer valuation could be in-
creased by making appropriate investments. These authors consider manufacturer-
retailer competition and are interested in how free-riding aﬀects a manufacturer’s de-
cision to open a direct store. In contrast, we focus on retailer competition and are
interested in understanding - (1) how the market characteristics, customer search be-
havior, and magnitude of change in consumer valuation could aﬀect retailers’ investment
decisions; (2) how free-riding and proﬁt-loss to competition are aﬀected by the above
factors. Bernstein et al. (2006) ﬁnd that the direct store price is always higher than
the retail price as long as visiting the direct store increases consumer valuation. Our
computational study, on the other hand, shows cases where the retailer who invests to
increase consumer valuation but has a smaller market share could oﬀer a lower price
relative to the retailer who does not make such an investment, particularly when the
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proportion of searching consumers is high.
Shin (2007) considers two retailers selling the same product competing for the same
customers who are heterogenous in terms of their opportunity costs for shopping and
can be of two types: informed and uninformed. The author focuses on sales assistance
that resolves the matching uncertainty between the retailers’ product speciﬁcation and
consumers’ needs. In our work, we also consider two retailers selling the same product
but competing for customers who are heterogenous in terms of their valuation for the
retailers’ product. We focus on retailers’ investments which can increase customer
valuation of their product and model explicitly the impact of such investments on the
consumers’ valuation distribution.
Our work contributes to the existing literature in the following aspects. First, we
develop a model that allows us to study the impact of increasing consumer valuation.
Second, we provide managerial insights on how the market characteristics and con-
sumer search behavior could impact the retailers’ investment strategies. Third, we
provide insights on how the ability of retailers to inﬂuence consumer valuation impacts
competitive and free riding eﬀects under diﬀerent regimes related to market expansion,
retailers’ physical proximity, consumer search behavior, and magnitude of changes in
consumer valuation.
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2.3 Model
This section is organized as follows. In §2.3.1 we present a model of how consumer
valuation increases. Then, in §2.3.2 we present our duopoly setting and describe the
consumer search behavior. In §2.3.3 we describe the two-stage investment and pricing
model. Finally, we provide some computational insights in §2.3.4.
2.3.1 Modeling of Consumer Valuation Increase
We ﬁrst consider a risk neutral ﬁrm (retailer 1) which oﬀers one product in a market of
population size μ. Consumers are heterogeneous in the valuation of the product. We
denote the consumption value (alternatively called “willingness to pay”) by V which
is assumed to be uniformly distributed (across the population of consumers) between
0 and 1. The retailer oﬀers the product at price p1 and incurs cost per unit c1 for
acquiring the product. Consumers who visit the retailer incur a cost k1. “This cost
can include the opportunity cost of time, the real cost of travel, and the implicit cost
of inconvenience” (Balasubramanian (1998)). We will be referring to k1 as traveling
cost. Therefore, consumers whose valuation is greater than or equal to the sum of
retail price p1 and cost k1 (p1 + k1) buy the product from retailer 1. In that case, the
retailer’s expected demand and proﬁt are qN1 = μP (V ≥ p1 + k1) = μ(1− p1 − k1) and
πN1 = (p1 − c1)qN1 (superscript N refers to the scenario in which the retailer does not
invest to increase consumer valuation). We provide a summary of all the scenarios in
the Appendix (see Table A2). The retailer maximizes his expected proﬁt with respect
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to his retail price. The resulting optimal price, demand, and proﬁt are p∗N1 =
1+c1−k1
2
,
q∗N1 =
(1−c1−k1)μ
2
, and π∗N1 =
(1−c1−k1)2μ
4
, where 0 ≤ c1 + k1 ≤ 1.
If the retailer engages in consumer-valuation-enhancing activities, a consumer whose
valuation was v prior to visiting the retailer enjoys a valuation vˆ after visiting the
retailer. In the basic model, we assume that the investment leads to a ﬁxed linear
shift α (i.e., Vˆ will be uniformly distributed between α and 1 + α as illustrated in
Figure 1). In order to accomplish these activities, we assume that the retailer incurs
a ﬁxed cost I1. This assumption represents situations where ﬁxed investments lead to
a given increase in consumer valuation1. Note that a shift in the consumer valuation
distribution leads to an increase in the average consumer willingness to pay for the
product. As a result, for a price p1 the demand before investment is q
N
1 = μ(1−p1−k1)
while the demand after investment is qI1 = μP (Vˆ ≥ p1+k1) = μ(1+α−p1−k1), which is
identical to the demand expression obtained when oﬀering a price discount of α per unit.
Hence, a linear shift model of consumer valuation may seem similar to a price discount
model. However, there are critical diﬀerences. First, a linear shift model of consumer
valuation and a price discount model2 lead to diﬀerent proﬁt functions which will result
in diﬀerent optimal pricing, demands, and proﬁts. Second, and more importantly, a
price discount creates loyalty to the retailer who runs the promotion whereas increasing
consumer valuation for a product does not guarantee that the consumer would make
the purchase from the retailer who exerts such eﬀorts.
1We study an extension of this basic model in Section 6 in which α is endogenous and the investment
cost is dependent on α.
2In a price discount model the proﬁt function is π1 = (p1 − α − c1)μ(1 + α − p1 − k1) whereas in
our model the corresponding proﬁt function is π1 = (p1 − c1)μ(1 + α− p1 − k1)− I1.
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FIGURE 2.1: Consumer valuation before and after the investment.
The objective for the retailer is to maximize his expected proﬁt πI1 = (p1 − c1)qI1-
I1, by deciding on the price under the constraint that α ≤ p1 + k1 ≤ 1 + α. The
optimal price, demand, and proﬁt as functions of the mean shift α are p∗I1 =
1+α+c1−k1
2
,
q∗I1 =
(1+α−c1−k1)μ
2
, and π∗I1 =
(1+α−c1−k1)2μ
4
− I1, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 + c1 + k1.
2.3.2 Duopoly and Search
We now consider two retailers in the market (retailer 1 and retailer 2) who oﬀer the
same product at prices p1 and p2 and incur per unit costs of acquiring the product c1
and c2 respectively. Such diﬀerences in retailers’ costs may be a reﬂection of buying
power as well as their operational performance. Both retailers can invest to increase
consumer valuation by incurring investment costs I1 and I2. We assume that the change
in consumer valuation is identical for both retailers but the investment costs of the two
retailers are diﬀerent to allow for heterogeneity in the retailers’ investment eﬀectiveness.
We further assume that the two retailers are located at some distance from each other
and that the introduction of retailer 2 may bring additional people in to the market
(Mahajan et al. (1993), Huang and Swaminathan (2009)). We consider an additive
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expansion in the market and denote by  the additional people in the market (i.e., the
new market size will be μ + , where  ≥ 0).
We assume that γ proportion of the total population is located near retailer 1 and
as a result this proportion visits retailer 1 ﬁrst. The remaining (1-γ) visits retailer
2 ﬁrst. Consumers who visit retailer 1 and retailer 2 incur traveling costs k1 and k2
respectively. The search occurs as follows (see Figure 2.2). A consumer visits her local
retailer ﬁrst. She buys the product from that retailer provided that she obtains non-
negative consumer surplus i.e., v ≥ pi+ki. If the consumer surplus is negative she does
not buy the product at her local retailer. A fraction of such consumers δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1)
who have visited their local retailer and have not obtained positive consumer surplus
would be willing to search with updated consumer valuation the other retailer before
leaving the system. The cost that a consumer incurs traveling from one retailer to the
other is denoted by Δk. Similar to Lal and Sarvary (1999), when consumers visit their
local retailer i ﬁrst they incur a traveling cost ki associated with the cost of undertaking
the shopping trip, and when consumers go from one retailer to the other, they incur a
traveling cost Δk of visiting an additional retailer. Note that we are not modeling the
case where a consumer visits the other retailer after having visited her local retailer,
seeking price-matching guarantee refunds. Though price matching is common in the
retail industry, research shows that on average only about 5 to 7.4 percent of consumers
seek price matching guarantee refunds (Moorthy and Winter (2004), Kukar-Kinney
(2005)). We also do not consider the situation where, after visiting the second store
a consumer returns to the original store to make the eventual purchase. This is a
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FIGURE 2.2: Duopoly.
reasonable assumption when the price diﬀerential between the stores is not signiﬁcant.
Our search scheme is close to that of Anupindi and Bassok (1999) and Ahn et al.
(2002). In Anupindi and Bassok (1999) consumers buy the product from their local
retailer. In the event of a stock-out a fraction of the unsatisﬁed customers looks for
the product at another retailer. Since we assume that the demand is deterministic so
there is no stock-out, consumers buy the product from their local retailer provided that
they obtain positive consumer surplus. A fraction of consumers who have visited their
local retailer and have not obtained positive consumer surplus will continue their search
with updated consumer valuation. In Ahn et al. (2002) a manufacturer-owned store
(outlet) and an independent retail store are located in diﬀerent markets. Each consumer
makes the initial attempt to purchase at the store that is closer. All consumers who
have visited the independent retail store and did not obtain positive consumer surplus
travel to the manufacturer-owned store (i.e., one way movement of consumers). Our
search scheme generalizes the search scheme of Ahn et al. (2002) since: (i) consumers
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incur a cost when they visit their local retailer (in their case such cost is zero), (ii)
consumers can search both retailers (in their case there is one way ﬂow) and (iii) only a
proportion of consumers who encounters non-positive consumer surplus searches both
retailers, while the rest leave the system without making a purchase (in their case this
proportion is one). In addition, our work is diﬀerentiated from the above search related
literature in the incorporation of updated consumer valuations.
2.3.3 Investment Pricing Game
We consider two retailers engaging in an investment pricing game with the following
sequence of events.
1. The retailers simultaneously decide whether to invest in improvements in cus-
tomer valuation.
2. Based on their investment decision in event 1, the retailers simultaneously deter-
mine their prices.
The above events constitute a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage the retailers make
investment decisions to improve customer valuation. These decisions can lead to the
following possible investment scenarios.
(i) Neither retailer invests (denoted as (NI,NI)).
(ii) Retailer 1 does not invest but retailer 2 invests (denoted as (NI,I)).
(iii) Retailer 1 invests but retailer 2 does not invest (denoted as (I,NI)).
(iv) Both retailers invest (denoted as (I,I)).
In the second stage given the investment decisions made at the ﬁrst stage, the
20
retailers decide on their prices. Let xi ∈ {0, 1} denote retailer i’s decision to invest or
not in improving customer valuation. Then, retailer i’s problem in stage 1 is given by
max
xi∈{0,1}
πi(xi, xj , pi, pj) = (pi − ci)qi(xi, xj , pi, pj)− xiIi
where
qi(xi, xj , pi, pj) = (μ+ )γ(xi(1 + α− pi − ki) + (1− xi)(1− pi − ki))
+ (1− γ)δ(μ + )(1− xi)(1− xj)(pj − pi −Δk)+
+ (1− γ)δ(μ + )(1− xi)xj(pj − pi −Δk)+
+ (1− γ)δ(μ + )xi(1− xj)(pj + α− pi −Δk)+
+ (1− γ)δ(μ + )xixj(pj − pi −Δk)+
The ﬁrst term of the demand expression (i.e., (μ + )γxi(1 + α − pi − ki)) denotes
the demand from local consumers if retailer i invests. The second term (i.e., (μ +
)γ(1 − xi)(1 − pi − ki)) denotes the demand from local consumers if retailer i does
not invest. The remaining terms of the demand expression denote the demand from
searching consumers for the above four possible investment strategies (i)-(iv) chosen by
the retailers respectively.
We use backwards induction to solve this two stage-game. For each investment
scenario ((i)-(iv)) we need to solve the second-stage problem and identify the pricing
Nash equilibrium. In order to solve the second stage for a given investment scenario
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we distinguish four theoretically possible cases (because of the (·)+ operator) that
correspond to the following four possible consumer search schemes depending on the
retailers’ prices:
(1) Consumers do not search (denoted as (NS,NS)).
(2) Consumers search from retailer 2 to retailer 1 (denoted as (NS,S)).
(3) Consumers search from retailer 1 to retailer 2 (denoted as (S,NS)).
(4) Consumers search both retailers (denoted as (S,S)).
Speciﬁcally, for investment scenarios (ii) and (iii) we need to consider all four cases
(1)-(4) in the second stage whereas for investment scenarios (i) and (iv) we only need
to consider cases (1)-(3) as shown in Proposition 1. All proofs are in Appendix.
Proposition 1 In investment scenarios (ii) and (iii) both retailers can obtain sales
from the consumers who search between retailers. In investment scenarios (i) and (iv)
only one retailer can obtain sales from the consumers who search.
Hence, there are 14 possible cases in the second stage of the game that need to be
analyzed. However, we can indeed show that for a given combination of investment
and consumer search scheme, there exists a unique equilibrium in the pricing game.
Proposition 2 In the two-retailer pricing game a unique Nash equilibrium exists for
every combination of investment scenario and consumer search scheme.
Deriving the two-stage game Nash equilibrium (x∗i , x
∗
j , p
∗
i , p
∗
j) for an arbitrary set of
parameters is analytically intractable. Therefore, we ﬁrst explore the Nash equilibria
in terms of both investment and prices through a computational study and examine the
22
eﬀects of changing diﬀerent parameters such as γ, δ, Δk, and diﬀerent types of costs
on the Nash equilibria. Then, in the following section, we focus on the pricing game
only and theoretically characterize the pricing Nash equilibria for a given investment
scenario and consumer search scheme.
2.3.4 Computational Insights
We now describe our computational study and some of the interesting insights that we
obtained for the pricing and investment game. We used a full factorial design experi-
ment summarized in Table A3 in Appendix. We identify the Nash equilibria in terms of
the investment decisions of the two retailers in the two-stage game as follows: We start
backwards to solve the second stage of the game ﬁrst. For each of the four possible
investment scenarios ((i)-(iv)), we compute the pricing Nash equilibria of the retailers
assuming a given consumer search scheme ((1)-(4)). For each instance of a given in-
vestment scenario, we identify the consumer search scheme that is a Nash equilibrium
(i.e., the consumer search scheme that is being induced by the Nash equilibrium pricing
strategy of the retailers for a given investment scenario). We refer to this consumer
search scheme as search Nash equilibrium. During our computational study, we found
that there are instances that lead to two search Nash equilibria that cannot be ranked
because one retailer is better oﬀ with one consumer search scheme and the other retailer
is better oﬀ with the other search scheme. We did not consider such instances in the
ﬁrst stage of the game where the retailers make a decision on whether to invest or not.
Since the payoﬀs for both retailers for each investment scenario are known from the
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second stage of the game, we can identify the Nash equilibrium investment strategy for
the retailers.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide a summary on the types of Nash equilibria investment
strategies as well as the Nash equilibria search strategies which result from the retailers’
pricing decisions. Table 2.3 summarizes the frequency of occurrence in our experimental
setup of each consumer search scheme for a given investment equilibrium scenario.
TABLE 2.1: Characterization of investment Nash equilibria.
Type of strategies (NI,NI) (NI,I) (I,NI) (I,I) Two Nash equilibria
% 16.143% 22.125% 27.697% 33.16% 0.874%
TABLE 2.2: Characterization of search Nash equilibria.
Type of strategies (NS,NS) (NS,S) (S,NS) (S,S) Two Nash equilibria
% 30.948% 27.752% 25.239% 15.187% 0.874%
TABLE 2.3: Investment and Search Nash equilibria.
(NS,NS) (NS,S) (S,NS) (S,S)
(NI,NI) 57.699% 23.012% 19.289% NA
(NI,I) 8.519% 40.37% 22.716% 28.395%
(I,NI) 13.609% 20.513% 33.728% 32.15%
(I,I) 48.188% 28.418% 23.394% NA
Here are some interesting observations with respect to the impact of the retailers’
investments on the consumer search scheme.
(1) We notice that the most prevalent Nash equilibrium investment strategy cor-
responds to both retailers investing. There is a very small proportion of instances
(0.874%) that lead to two pure investment Nash equilibria (see Table 2.1). Interest-
ingly, the majority of instances lead to retailers pricing in such a manner so that there
is no search to either retailer (see Table 2.2).
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(2) When both or none of the retailers invest, then they price in such a manner
so as to discourage consumer search. Speciﬁcally, 48.188% and 57.699% of situations
where the resulting Nash equilibria is such that both retailers invest or neither retailer
invests, respectively, lead to no search between the retailers. This result is interesting
particularly in the case of both investing, because it enables the retailers to avoid price
competition due to search.
(3) In a number of cases, consumers may decide to search a retailer who invests.
For example, Table 2.3 shows that 20.513% of the cases where retailer 1 invests lead to
consumers searching that retailer and 22.716% of the cases where retailer 2 invests lead
to consumers searching that retailer. In those cases, it is quite possible that the retailer
who has made the investment decides to price lower than the other retailer, and this
eﬀect is more profound when the percentage of consumers willing to search increases.
Such an example is illustrated in Table 2.4 with parameter values γ = 0.2,  = 0.4,
μ = 1, c1 = c2 = 0.3, k1 = k2 = 0.1, Δk = 0.05, I1 = 0.02, I2 = 0.1, and α = 0.2.
Since I1 << I2 only retailer 1 has an incentive to invest. Note that retailer 1 is at a
disadvantage in terms of market share since γ = 0.2. At low values of δ, retailer 1’s
beneﬁt from consumers who search is low, thus, his incentive to attract consumers from
retailer 2 is low. Hence, retailer 1 prices higher than retailer 2. But as the proportion of
consumers who are willing to search increases, retailer 1’s beneﬁt from the consumers
who search is high. As a result, retailer 1 is willing to drop his price and prices lower
than retailer 2 (even though retailer 1 is the one who has invested).
We further examined the impact of the diﬀerent parameters on the investment
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TABLE 2.4: An example of the impact of δ on the pricing Nash equilibrium.
δ Investment NE Search NE p1 p2 q1 q2 π1 π2
0.2 (I,NI) (NS,S) 0.622 0.6 0.162 0.336 0.032 0.101
0.5 (I,NI) (NS,S) 0.583 0.6 0.238 0.336 0.047 0.101
0.8 (I,NI) (NS,S) 0.567 0.6 0.314 0.336 0.064 0.101
decisions of the retailers. Here are some of our key insights.
Eﬀect of Proximity: The proximity between the two retailers Δk has an in-
teresting non-monotonic behavior on the retailers’ investment decisions under certain
conditions. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that at low and high values of Δk both retailers have
an incentive to invest, yet for intermediate values of Δk, only one of the retailers has
an incentive to invest. Table 2.5 illustrates such an example with parameter values
γ = 0.8, δ = 0.8,  = 0.4, μ = 1, c1 = c2 = 0.4, k1 = k2 = 0.3, I1 = I2 = 0.02, and
α = 0.5.
TABLE 2.5: An example of the impact of Δk on the investment Nash equilibria.
Δk Investment NE Search NE p1 p2 q1 q2 π1 π2
0.02 (I,I) (S,NS) 0.8 0.64 0.448 0.282 0.159 0.048
0.1 (I,NI) (S,S) 0.778 0.542 0.509 0.177 0.173 0.034
0.2 (I,I) (NS,NS) 0.8 0.8 0.448 0.112 0.159 0.025
This can be explained because for low values of Δk, the retailers’ competition is very
intense which creates an incentive for both retailers to invest. For high values of Δk,
each retailer is actually acting as a monopolist who can make independent decisions
that do not have an impact on the other retailer. For the intermediate values of Δk, the
competition is not so intense and does not justify the retailer who is at a disadvantage
in terms of market share to commit to an investment decision. This insight suggests
that a retailer should reciprocate investment decisions of a very close competitor but
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could ignore the investments made by a retailer who is further away.
Eﬀect of Searching Consumers: In order to better understand the eﬀects of
the percentage of consumers willing to search δ, we considered three other values δ =
0.1, 0.5, 0.9 (see example in Table 2.6 with the following parameter values: γ = 0.2,
 = 0.8, μ = 1, c1 = c2 = 0.3, k1 = k2 = 0.1, Δk = 0.05 , I1 = I2 = 0.02, and α = 0.2).
TABLE 2.6: An example of the impact of δ on the investment Nash equilibria.
δ Investment NE Search NE p1 p2 q1 q2 π1 π2
0.1 (I,I) (NS,S) 0.636 0.7 0.169 0.576 0.037 0.210
0.5 (NI,I) (NS,S) 0.517 0.7 0.234 0.576 0.051 0.210
0.9 (NI,I) (NS,S) 0.502 0.7 0.335 0.576 0.068 0.210
Note that in this case γ = 0.2, so retailer 1 is at a disadvantage with respect to the
market share, and hence, needs to price lower in order to attract more consumers. As
a result, consumers always search retailer 1 at equilibrium. Therefore, for low values
of search (δ) both retailers invest at equilibrium. But as the proportion of search
population (δ) increases, retailer 1 does not have an incentive to invest anymore and
is better oﬀ free-riding from retailer 2. Therefore, only retailer 2 invests at equilibrium
and consumers search from retailer 2 to retailer 1. We ﬁnd a similar symmetric eﬀect
when γ = 0.8 since retailer 2 is at a disadvantage in that case with respect to the
market share.
Eﬀect of Market Share, Total Market, and Costs: As expected, market share
γ plays a critical role in the retailer’s decision to invest. As γ increases, retailer 1 is
more likely to invest and retailer 2 is less likely to make such an investment. The
impact of  and μ on the retailers’ investment decisions is very intuitive. As  and/or μ
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increase, the retailers have a higher incentive to invest because the market size increases.
An increase in the marginal cost ci results in retailer i having less incentive to invest.
Similarly, an increase in search cost ki forces the retailer to drop his price to make up
for such an increase which subsequently creates disincentives for him to invest. Finally,
as the investment cost increases, the retailers have less incentive to make an investment
in increasing consumer valuation.
2.4 Special Case: Pricing Game
In the previous section, we computationally explored the Nash equilibria in terms of
investment and pricing. We now focus on the pricing game between the retailers for
a given consumer search scheme assuming that the investment game has been played
and an equilibrium has been reached. Although we have analyzed the competitive
eﬀects for most of the investment scenarios we focus our discussion on two asymmetric
investment scenarios (ii) and (iii) (described in subsection 3.3) which create free-riding
opportunities for one of the retailers. Note that in our computational study in the
previous section, we ﬁnd that almost 50% of the situations lead to investment scenarios
(ii) and (iii) as the resulting Nash equilibria in terms of investment and pricing. In
addition, we focus our discussion on consumer search scheme (4) as it is the most
general search scheme. We defer the presentation of consumer search schemes (1)-(3)
in Appendix.
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2.4.1 Beneﬁting from Innovative Competition
In this subsection, we study how the proﬁts and prices of a retailer (who does not
invest to improve consumer valuation) under monopoly compare to the case where
there is another retailer in the market (retailer 2) who has decided to invest to improve
consumer valuation. We denote this duopoly scenario as NISS where the ﬁrst two
letters in the scenario acronym refer to the retailers investment decisions (N for “not
invest”, I for “invest”) and the remaining letters refer to the consumers search scheme
(N for “not search”, S for “search”). The expressions of expected demands and proﬁts
for the retailers are:
qNISS1 = (μ + )γ(1− p1 − k1) + (1− γ)δ(μ+ )(p2 − p1 −Δk) (2.1)
qNISS2 = (μ + )(1− γ)(1 + α− p2 − k2) + γδ(μ+ )(p1 − p2 −Δk + α) (2.2)
πNISS1 = (p1 − c1)qNISS1 (2.3)
πNISS2 = (p2 − c2)qNISS2 − I2 (2.4)
where p1 and p2 need to satisfy the following constraints which ensure nonnegative
demands: 0 ≤ p1 + k1 ≤ 1, α ≤ p2 + k2 ≤ 1 + α, α ≤ p2 + k1 + Δk ≤ 1 + α,
α ≤ p1 + k2 +Δk ≤ 1 + α, p2 − p1 −Δk > 0, and p1 − p2 −Δk + α > 0. The impact
of competition on retailer 1’s price, demand, and proﬁt is illustrated in Table A6 in
Appendix.
Proposition 3 Let π∗NISS1 be the optimal proﬁt of retailer 1 under duopoly, π
∗N
1 be the
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optimal proﬁt under monopoly, and α¯(1) be a threshold in the consumer valuation mean
shift (deﬁned in Table A5 in Appendix). Then,
a) if α < α¯(1) then π∗N1 > π
∗NISS
1 and
b) if α > α¯(1) then π∗N1 < π
∗NISS
1 .
Proposition 3 summarizes the competitive eﬀects on retailer 1’s proﬁt. Speciﬁcally,
there exists a threshold in the consumer valuation mean shift α¯(1) such that if the mean
shift is low (α < α¯(1)), the introduction of retailer 2 leads to retailer 1 losing proﬁt to
competition (π∗N1 > π
∗NISS
1 ); if the mean shift is high (α > α¯
(1)), retailer 2 creates a
positive externality and retailer 1 free rides (π∗N1 < π
∗NISS
1 ). The impact on retailer
1’s proﬁt due to retailer 2’s investments depends on how many consumers search and
what is their valuation level. When retailer 2 invests in a high level of improvement in
consumer valuation (α > α¯(1)), he is likely to price higher which leads to a higher ﬂow
of searching consumers with higher valuations for the product at retailer 1. Therefore,
the proﬁts of retailer 1 under duopoly are higher than those under monopoly.
Note that retailer 1 can still beneﬁt under competition even when retailer 2 does not
bring any market expansion, provided that retailer 2 has made a suﬃcient investment
to increase consumer valuation. Figure 3 illustrates such an example with parameter
values γ = 0.5, δ = 0.5,  = 0, μ = 3, c1 = c2 = 0.5, k1 = k2 = 0.3, Δk = 0.1.
Proposition 4 Let α¯1, α¯2, and α¯
(1) be thresholds in the consumer valuation mean shift
(i.e., the values of α deﬁned in Table A5 in Appendix that equate retailer 1’s prices,
demands, and proﬁts respectively under duopoly and monopoly regimes). Then,
30
00.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0 0.5 1 1.5
R
et
ai
le
r 1
's
 p
ro
fit
Mean shift
Retailer 1's profit 
(monopoly)
Retailer 1's profit 
(duopoly)
FIGURE 2.3: Retailer 1’s proﬁt versus mean shift in scenario NISS.
(i) ∂α¯1
∂Δk
> 0,
(ii) ∂α¯2
∂Δk
> 0, and
(iii) ∂α¯
(1)
∂Δk
> 0.
Proposition 4 shows that as Δk increases (retailers are located further away), it will
require higher levels of improvements in consumer valuation so that retailer 1 could
have at least the same price, demand, and proﬁt under duopoly as under monopoly.
If it is indeed true that a competitor could beneﬁt from an innovative retailer’s
investment, then how could the innovative retailer protect himself? In this context it
is interesting what Magnolia Home theater stores are doing. Magnolia Home theater
stores are a successful “arm” of Best Buy and contributed total sales of $46 million dur-
ing the quarter that ended in November 27, 2006 (Stock (2006)). Magnolia has placed
tremendous emphasis on practices that increase consumer valuation of their product
oﬀerings. Such practices include (1) oﬀering premium brands in a demonstration en-
vironment where consumers can actually try out the equipment and (2) employing
knowledgeable sales professionals who can interact one to one with the home theater
enthusiasts to guide them through the home theater experience. Magnolia investments
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to increase consumer valuation are signiﬁcant which could allow its competitors to
beneﬁt/free-ride based on the results of this section. To mitigate this eﬀect, Mag-
nolia oﬀers many unique assortments that are not available at other stores (Freeland
(2007)). For example, in the television section, they are currently oﬀering a special se-
ries of Samsung products like Samsung PN58A760 58” Class 1080p Flat-Panel Plasma
HDTV that are unique to Magnolia stores. As a result, a customer with an increased
valuation cannot purchase the same product at another store. Hence, one strategy
for an innovative retailer to mitigate free riding could be to oﬀer diﬀerent assortments
which is not captured in our single product model.
2.4.2 Implications of Competition for an Innovative Retailer
In this subsection, we study how the proﬁts and prices for an innovative retailer who
has decided to invest to improve consumer valuation under monopoly compare to the
case where there is another retailer in the market (retailer 2) who does not invest. In
that case the expressions of expected demands and proﬁts for the two retailers are
qINSS1 = (μ + )γ(1 + α− p1 − k1) + (1− γ)δ(μ+ )(p2 + α− p1 −Δk) (2.5)
qINSS2 = (μ + )(1− γ)(1− p2 − k2) + γδ(μ+ )(p1 − p2 −Δk) (2.6)
πINSS1 = (p1 − c1)qINSS1 − I1 (2.7)
πINSS2 = (p2 − c2)qINSS2 (2.8)
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where p1 and p2 need to satisfy the following constraints: α ≤ p1 + k1 ≤ 1 + α,
0 ≤ p2 + k2 ≤ 1, α ≤ p2 + k1 + Δk ≤ 1 + α, α ≤ p1 + k2 + Δk ≤ 1 + α, p2 + α −
p1 − Δk > 0, and p1 − p2 − Δk > 0. Table A8 in Appendix summarizes the impact
of competition on retailer 1’s price, demand, and proﬁt. Figure 2.4 summarizes the
impact of competition on retailer 1’s proﬁt according to diﬀerent regimes related to
market expansion, retailers’ physical proximity, and magnitude of change in consumer
valuation.
Proposition 5 Let π∗INSS1 be the optimal proﬁt of retailer 1 under duopoly, π
∗I
1 be the
optimal proﬁt of retailer 1 under monopoly, Δ¯k be a threshold of the retailers’ physical
proximity, α¯(2), α¯3, and α¯ be thresholds of the consumer valuation mean shifts and ¯ be
a threshold of the market expansion (deﬁned in Table A7 in Appendix). Then,
i a) if  > ¯, Δk > Δ¯k, and α < α¯(2), then π∗I1 > π
∗INSS
1 .
i b) if  > ¯, Δk > Δ¯k, and α > α¯(2), then π∗I1 < π
∗INSS
1 .
ii) if Δk > Δ¯k and α < α¯ = min{α¯(2), α¯3}, then π∗I1 > π∗INSS1 .
Proposition 5 provides the following insights:
i) When the market expansion is high and the retailers’ proximity is low, there
exists a threshold in the consumer valuation mean shift α¯(2) such that if the mean
shift is low (α < α¯(2)) the introduction of retailer 2 leads to retailer 1 obtaining lower
proﬁt (π∗I1 > π
∗INSS
1 ). Otherwise, if the mean shift is high (α > α¯
(2)) retailer 1’s proﬁt
is higher under duopoly (π∗I1 < π
∗INSS
1 ). Hence, retailer 1 can avoid proﬁt loss to
competition by making a suﬃcient improvement in consumer valuation.
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ii) In a low proximity regime, a low improvement in consumer valuation (α < α¯)
leads to retailer 1 obtaining lower proﬁt.
The remaining regions in Figure 2.4 cannot be characterized as clearly. We per-
formed a computational study in order to gain more insights about the remaining
regimes. The computational study leads to an interesting observation. For example,
for the same regime we can obtain qualitatively diﬀerent outcomes. Figure 2.5 demon-
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FIGURE 2.4: The impact on retailer 1’s proﬁt based on the analytical results in scenario
INSS.
Note min ≡ min{α¯3, α¯4} and max ≡ max{α¯3, α¯4}
strates an example of a low market and low proximity regime in which competition
can impact retailer 1 in diﬀerent ways. The parameter values for the left frame are:
γ = 0.45, δ = 0.8,  = 0.02, μ = 3, c1 = 0.5, c2 = 0.7, k1 = 0.3, k2 = 0.1, Δk = 0.01,
I1 = 0.05 and for the right frame are: γ = 0.45, δ = 0.8,  = 0.02, μ = 1, c1 = 0.4,
c2 = 0.6, k1 = 0.4, k2 = 0.2, Δk = 0.02, I1 = 0.05. Note that for this example the
value of α¯3 (i.e., the value of α at which the price of retailer 1 under monopoly and
under duopoly are equal) happens to be negative. In the right frame, higher levels of
improvement in consumer valuation by retailer 1 lead to higher proﬁts for that retailer.
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Interestingly, in the left frame lower levels of improvement in consumer valuation by re-
tailer 1 lead to higher proﬁts for that retailer. The diﬀerential role of the magnitude of
improvement in consumer valuation in these two instances can be explained by looking
at the rate of change of proﬁts with respect to the magnitude of improvements under
monopoly and duopoly regimes. Speciﬁcally, the following expression
∂π∗INSS1
∂α
− ∂π∗I1
∂α
can give some insights regarding this diﬀerence in behavior. The above diﬀerence can
be expanded as follows:
∂π∗INSS1
∂α
− ∂π∗I1
∂α
= (
∂p∗INSS1
∂α
q∗INSS1 − ∂p
∗I
1
∂α
q∗I1 )+(
∂q∗INSS1
∂α
p∗INSS1 − ∂q
∗I
1
∂α
p∗I1 )− (c1(∂q
∗INSS
1
∂α
−
∂q∗I1
∂α
)).
Note that the second term (
∂q∗INSS1
∂α
p∗INSS1 − ∂q
∗I
1
∂α
p∗I1 ) and third term (c1(
∂q∗INSS1
∂α
−
∂q∗I1
∂α
)) of this expression are respectively negative and positive for both instances whereas
the ﬁrst term (
∂p∗INSS1
∂α
q∗INSS1 − ∂p
∗I
1
∂α
q∗I1 ) is positive in the right frame and negative in
the left frame. Also note that the price of retailer 1 under duopoly increases at a higher
rate than his corresponding price under monopoly (
∂p∗INSS1
∂α
>
∂p∗I1
∂α
). Since the market
size in the left frame is higher than the market size in the right frame, retailer 1 gets
much higher demand in the left frame than in the right frame which leads to the ﬁrst
term being negative in the left frame and positive in the right frame. Subsequently,
this diﬀerence in the signs of the ﬁrst term leads to the diﬀerence in the signs of the
following expression
∂π∗INSS1
∂α
− ∂π∗I1
∂α
. The managerial implication of this result is that a
higher market size can enable a ﬁrm to extract signiﬁcantly more from consumer valua-
tion increases under monopoly than under competition. In such a situation if α > α¯(2)
the ﬁrm gets hurt from competition.
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FIGURE 2.5: Impact of competition in a low proximity and low market regime.
2.5 Special Case: Symmetric Retailers
In this section, we focus on symmetric retailers and examine the investment Nash equi-
librium. As we discussed in §2.3.3 asymmetry between retailers greatly confounds the
comparison of the proﬁt functions of the retailers across diﬀerent investment scenarios.
Hence, in this section we seek to obtain further insights by considering symmetric re-
tailers. Note that for the two symmetric investment scenarios ((i) and (iv)) discussed
in §2.3.3 since retailers are symmetric in all aspects including market share they will
price identically. It is easy to show that for these two investment scenarios there is no
demand from consumer search between the retailers. As a result, the retailers obtain
demand only through their local consumers. For the two asymmetric investment sce-
narios ((ii) and (iii)) we will consider the most general case where both retailers obtain
demand from searching consumers. Let π∗ji denote the optimal payoﬀ of retailer i for in-
vestment scenario j, where i = {1, 2} and j = {(NNNN), (NISS), (INSS), (IINN)}.
Recall that the ﬁrst two letters in the scenario acronym refer to the retailers investment
decisions (N for “not invest”, I for “invest”) and the remaining letters refer to the con-
sumers search scheme (N for “not search”, S for “search”). We provide the expressions
of the optimal proﬁts for each retailer for all the investment scenarios as well as the
feasible range of the parameters in Appendix.
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Note that since the retailers are symmetric they engage in a symmetric game where
the payoﬀs for playing a particular strategy depend only on the other strategies em-
ployed, not on who is playing them. This fact simpliﬁes the analysis to identify the
Nash equilibrium strategies. We next characterize the investment Nash equilibrium
strategies for diﬀerent ranges of investment cost I.
Proposition 6 Let A1 and A2 be two thresholds for investment cost I deﬁned in Ap-
pendix. Then,
a) if 0 < I < A1, the unique pure investment Nash equilibrium is both retailers to
invest.
b) if max{0, A1} < I < A2, the investment Nash equilibrium strategies are either
retailer 1 or retailer 2 to invest
c) if I > max{0, A2}, the unique pure investment Nash equilibrium is neither retailer
to invest.
Proposition 6 characterizes the two retailers investment strategies as a function of
their investment cost. If the investment cost is very low (i.e., 0 < I < A1) then the
optimal strategy for both symmetric retailers is to invest. If the investment cost is very
high (i.e., I > max{0, A2}) then the optimal strategy for the two retailers is not to
invest. For the intermediate values of investment cost retailer 1 investing but retailer
2 not investing or retailer 1 not investing but retailer 2 investing are two pure Nash
equilibrium strategies.
The above holds provided that A2 > A1 > 0. Finding an ordering between A1 and
37
A2 is analytically challenging. As a result, we resorted to a computational study. We
performed a full factorial analysis with parameters values described in Appendix (see
Table A4) and found that for all instances considered (1728 in total) A2 > A1 > 0.
This suggests that as the investment cost increases, the Nash equilibrium strategies
shift from both retailers investing, to only one retailer investing (either 1 or 2), and
ﬁnally to neither retailer investing.
2.6 A Variant With Endogenous Mean Shift
The analysis so far has assumed that α is exogenously given. We now explore a variant
of the basic model in which each retailer is in a position to decide on the optimal
mean shift and subsequent investment level. Our attempts to incorporate endogenous
investment levels in the asymmetric duopoly led to very cumbersome expressions that
were not amenable to analysis. Hence, we only analyzed the symmetric duopoly and
focused on the equilibrium where both retailers invest.
We consider two symmetric retailers in the market who compete on investments
and prices. We assume that when each retailer invests to increase consumer valuation,
he incurs an investment cost λα2, where λ corresponds to the investment cost factor of
that retailer. The parameter λ captures each retailer’s cost eﬀectiveness in operational
deployment of consumer-valuation-enhancing activities (i.e., a high value of λ denotes a
low-cost eﬀective retailer). In addition, we consider that the investment cost increases
quadratically in α to capture diminishing returns of increases in consumer valuation.
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The intuition behind the quadratic investment cost representation is as follows: In order
for a retailer to achieve a small translation of the mean of consumer valuation to the
right, some minimum services can be suﬃcient, and the resulting investment cost is low.
But when a retailer targets higher shifts of the mean valuation, he needs to provide a
greater level of services that will increase the cost signiﬁcantly. This behavior suggests
a convex type of investment cost. Similar approaches to modeling service eﬀort, which
can be broadly deﬁned as any demand-enhancing eﬀort activity, have been used in the
literature (e.g., Tsay and Agrawal (2000)).
We only consider symmetric equilibria (i.e., the optimal mean shifts and prices for
the two retailers are identical). As a result, there will be no demand from searching
consumers to either retailer, and each retailer decides on prices and investment levels
to serve his local consumers. Hence, each retailer acts as a monopolist in his own local
market. Note that for this section we will be using for simplicity the scenario acronym
(II) to refer to (IINN).
The expected demand for the product is given by qII = μˆP (Vˆ ≥ p + k) = μˆ(1 +
α− p− k), where μˆ = μ+
2
. The objective for each retailer is to maximize his expected
proﬁt πII = (p− c)qII-λα2, by deciding on the price under the constraint α ≤ p+ k ≤
1 + α. The optimal price, demand, and proﬁt as functions of the mean shift α are
p∗II(α) = 1+α+c−k
2
, q∗II(α) = (1+α−c−k)μˆ
2
, and π∗II(α) = (1+α−c−k)
2μˆ
4
− λα2, where
0 ≤ α ≤ 1+ c+ k. For the case in which p+ k < α, each retailer can increase his price
such that p+k = α, and he will be able to serve his whole local market (μˆ = μ+
2
). Thus,
when p + k < α the expected demand for the product qII = μˆ, and the optimal price,
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demand, and proﬁt as functions of the mean shift α are p∗II(α) = α − k, q∗II = μˆ,
and π∗II(α) = (α− c− k)μˆ− λα2, where α ≥ 1 + c + k.
The following proposition details how this strategy depends on the value of each
retailer’s investment cost factor λ. Let α∗IEIE be the optimal value of the mean shift.
The superscript IEIE refers to a duopoly scenario in which the level of investment is
endogenous (I for “invest”, E for “endogenous”).
Proposition 7 The optimal value of the mean shift α∗IEIE depends on the value of
each retailer’s investment cost factor λ as follows:
a) if λ < μˆ
2(1+c+k)
, α∗IEIE = μˆ
2λ
b) if λ > μˆ
2(1+c+k)
, α∗IEIE = (1−c−k)μˆ
4λ−μˆ .
Proposition 7 illustrates the existence of a threshold in the investment cost factor
that determines the optimal mean shift of the consumer valuation distribution. If the
investment cost factor is low (λ < μˆ
2(1+c+k)
), each retailer can price low, which allows
him to serve his whole local market μˆ, whereas if the investment cost factor is high
(λ > μˆ
2(1+c+k)
), each retailer serves only a part of his local market.
Table 2.7 presents a complete characterization of the optimal decisions of each
retailer depending on the value of the investment cost factor and comparative statics.
As anticipated, when the market is partially covered, an increase in the per unit cost
of acquiring the product, traveling cost, and investment cost factor leads to a decrease
in the optimal mean shift, demand, and proﬁt; whereas an increase in the market size
leads to an increase in the optimal mean shift, price, demand, and proﬁt. When a
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retailer serves the whole market, several of the above parameters have no impact on
the corresponding optimal mean shift, price, and demand.
TABLE 2.7: Impact of λ on a retailer’s strategy and comparative statics.
Best retailer strategy Serve part of his local market Serve his whole local market
λ ≥ μˆ
2(1+c+k)
0 < λ ≤ μˆ
2(1+c+k)
mean shift α∗IEIE (1−c−k)μˆ
4λ−μˆ
μˆ
2λ
price p∗IEIE c + 2(1−c−k)λ
4λ−μˆ
μˆ
2λ
− k
demand q∗IEIE 2(1−c−k)λμˆ
4λ−μˆ μˆ
proﬁt π∗IEIE (1−c−k)
2λμˆ
4λ−μˆ
μˆ(μˆ−4λ(c+k))
4λ
comparative statics c k μˆ λ c k μˆ λ
mean shift α∗IEIE - - + - n/a n/a + -
price p∗IEIE + /- - + - n/a - + -
demand q∗IEIE - - + - n/a n/a + n/a
proﬁt π∗IEIE - - + - - - + -
One of the important counterintuitive insights in Table 2.7 relates to how the op-
timal price changes with the per unit cost of acquiring the product when each retailer
serves part of his local market. We ﬁnd that when λ > max{ μ
2(1+c+k)
, μˆ
2
} = μˆ
2
, then
the per unit cost of acquiring the product has an intuitive impact on the price. The
price increases when the per unit cost of acquiring the product increases. However,
when μˆ
2(1+c+k)
< λ < μˆ
2
, the price surprisingly decreases when the per unit cost of
acquiring the product increases. We can explain this counterintuitive result from the
expression of the optimal price p∗IEIE = 1+α
∗IE+c−k
2
, where α∗IEIE = (1−c−k)μˆ
4λ−μˆ . The
impact of the per unit cost of acquiring the product on the optimal price is as follows:
∂p∗IEIE
∂c
= ∂α
∗IEIE
∂c
1
2
+ 1
2
, where ∂α
∗IEIE
∂c
= − μˆ
4λ1−μˆ < 0. Note that while the per unit cost
of acquiring the product increases price directly, it decreases the optimal mean shift
as well. This decrease in the optimal mean shift leads to a decrease in price. Hence,
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the per unit cost of acquiring the product aﬀects the optimal price directly and also
indirectly through the optimal mean shift. As a result, the net impact of the per unit
cost of acquiring the product on the optimal pricing depends on the relative magnitude
of these two eﬀects. When λ = μˆ
2
the two eﬀects cancel out (i.e., the rate of decrease of
the optimal mean shift is equal to the rate of increase of the per unit cost of acquiring
the product) resulting in ∂p
∗IEIE
∂c
= 0. When λ > μˆ
2
, each retailer’s cost eﬀectiveness
decreases, which results in a decrease in the optimal mean shift. As the per unit cost of
acquiring the product increases, the rate of decrease of the optimal mean shift is lower
than the rate of increase of the per unit cost of acquiring the product, which leads to an
eventual price increase (∂p
∗IEIE
∂c
> 0). But when λ < μˆ
2
, each retailer’s cost eﬀectiveness
increases, which results in an increase in the optimal mean shift. As the per unit cost
of acquiring the product increases, the rate of decrease of the optimal mean shift is now
higher than the rate of increase of the per unit cost of acquiring the product, which
leads to a price decrease (∂p
∗IEIE
∂c
< 0).
2.7 Conclusion
As retail competition becomes more intense with numerous entrants in the market,
several retailers have engaged in practices that aim to increase consumer valuation
about their product oﬀerings. Our primary objective has been to explore the eﬀect
of such practices. To enable detailed analysis, we have developed a stylized model
for changes in consumer valuation and how it aﬀects the eventual purchase decision.
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Our analysis has yielded a number of ﬁndings. Under duopoly, when the investment
decision is endogenous, surprisingly in the majority of instances both retailers decide
to invest in equilibrium but price the product in a manner to avoid consumer search
between them. We also ﬁnd that the proximity of retailers has an interesting non
monotonic impact on their decisions to invest in that retailers tend to invest when they
are very close or very far away but refrain from investing in the intermediate range.
When we further focus on the pricing game only we ﬁnd two major eﬀects related to
improvements in consumer valuation. First, consistent with popular belief, we ﬁnd that
a retailer could overcome competitive eﬀects by improving consumer valuation beyond
a certain threshold. However, there are situations where a greater improvement in
consumer valuation by a retailer could lead to lower proﬁts. Second, we ﬁnd that a
retailer who does not invest could beneﬁt from an innovative competitor who increases
consumer valuation beyond a threshold. When we focus on symmetric retailers we ﬁnd
that as the investment cost increases the Nash equilibrium strategies shift from both
retailers investing, to only one retailer investing, and ﬁnally to neither retailer investing.
Finally, for the extension where the level of investment is endogenous, we show that a
symmetric duopolist’s optimal strategy to cover his whole local market or part of his
market depends on his investment cost eﬀectiveness and the optimal price charged by
him may indeed decrease with the per unit cost of acquiring the product.
Our study has two implications for practitioners. First, our model suggests that an
equilibrium strategy could be both ﬁrms to invest in valuation enhancing practices but
price in such a way to prevent focal customer base buying from the competitor. The
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above strategy could work as a protective mechanism against free-riding. Such strategy
complements practices that are currently observed in the retail industry including the
oﬀering of unique assortments. Second, retailers need to take into account the physical
proximity to their competitor and the proportion of consumers who are willing to search
for better deals in the market in addition to the costs associated with such investments
prior to deciding whether to engage or not in such practices.
Our model is highly stylized however it provides insights into the success that Mag-
nolia Home theater stores have achieved by oﬀering customer valuation enhancement
activities for high-margin products targeting an aﬄuent customer base. Our analysis
also provides some insights into Gateway’s Country Stores demise. Gateway started
as one of the ﬁrst widely successful direct sales PC companies targeting initially price-
sensitive consumers. Hoping to grow in a diﬀerent market and attract top management
and engineers, Gateway opened a chain of retail stores called Gateway Country Stores
and made signiﬁcant investments in customer valuation enhancement activities with-
out having established ﬁrst the customer base who would be willing to bear the costs
associated with these activities.
Although our model and its analysis has provided several interesting insights related
to increasing consumer valuations, it has some limitations. To focus our attention on the
eﬀects of competition we use a deterministic demand that is more amenable to analysis
of competition. Embedding stochastic demand in a duopoly setting has been found
to dramatically complicate the analysis of even models that do not include increased
consumer valuation (cf. Tsay and Agrawal (2000)).
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In the asymmetric duopoly, we did not consider the retailers’ decision of how much
to invest to increase consumer valuation but explored such a decision only in the sym-
metric duopoly focusing on the symmetric equilibrium. Our preliminary attempts to
incorporate endogenous investment levels in the asymmetric duopoly led to very cum-
bersome expressions that were not amenable to analysis or deeper managerial insights.
There are several research avenues that could be explored in the future. A possible
extension is to consider the mixed impact of the practices employed by the retailers
to increase consumer valuation on heterogeneous populations. For instance, providing
enhanced informational services could reveal some positive and unique aspects of the
product and subsequently could increase their willingness to pay for some consumers.
On the other hand, enhanced informational services may also help some consumers
identify that the product is not a good ﬁt for them.
In our current model, we consider that consumers visit their local retailers ﬁrst. If
consumers do not obtain positive consumer surplus at their local retailer, they visit the
competing retailer. Our model captures one of the possible consumer search behaviors
but does not consider price sensitive consumers (i.e., consumers who search among
retailers and buy from the retailer who maximizes their utility). Embedding price
sensitive consumers in our model could be another direction to pursue in the future.
Another possible extension of our model relates to studying the supply chain impli-
cations of increased consumer valuation. In this area one could explore how increased
consumer valuation provided by manufacturer-owned stores could impact supply chain
performance, as well as each party’s performance and study coordination mechanisms.
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Although the above extensions are all interesting and relevant, the associated anal-
ysis is suﬃciently complicated and diﬀerent from the models included in the current
chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
The Impact of Labor and Traﬃc on
Store Performance
3.1 Introduction
In a bricks-and-mortar channel the last mile of a customer’s purchase occurs in the retail
store. In the store, customers may decide whether to purchase or not and also how
much to spend. Retailers track conversion rate, the percentage of incoming traﬃc who
purchased, and basket value, the average dollar amount spent by customers, to measure
their store performance and place enormous importance on these metrics. Conversion
rate, for example, has been found to be strongly correlated with customer loyalty1.
Basket value, on the other hand, would be linked to the proﬁtability of the retailer.
While the diﬀerence in conversion rates and basket values across retailers are to
be expected, we ﬁnd that both these metrics exhibit considerable heterogeneity across
stores as well as time. For example, in our proprietary data that pertains to an apparel
1Pat Conroy, vice chairman and national principal, consumer business practice at Deloitte and
Touche states that “Customer conversion–it’s the single most important thing that a retailer can do
to sustain long-term growth” (Zaino (2007))
retailer, we ﬁnd that conversion rate varies between 2% and 45.8% longitudinally and
basket value varies between $2.78 and $365.83. Also, average conversion rate across
stores vary between 9% and 18.9% and basket values vary between $72.4 and $127.9.
Such a wide variation in these performance metrics is surprising given that most retailers
tend to have uniform policies across their stores. Further, as Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show
conversion rate and basket value are independent measures of store performance both
within and across stores. Hence a study of the systematic factors that explain the
longitudinal and cross-sectional variation in these variables would be useful to explain
store performance.
Both conversion rate and basket value can be correlated with traﬃc characteristics.
Figure 3.5 plots conversion rate intra-day traﬃc variability for one of the stores in the
sample. Figure 3.6 plots average basket value across stores against traﬃc uncertainty.
We see strong correlations between the pairs of variables in each Figure. Such strong
correlations could be the result of many factors including labor, consumer purchase
behavior, economy, product availability, and merchandise assortment.
In this chapter, we conduct a descriptive study of conversion rate and basket value
for a retailer. Speciﬁcally, we consider the correlation between store performance and
intra-day traﬃc variability and traﬃc uncertainty. We also measure traﬃc-labor mis-
matches and study if they explain the observed correlations in our sample.
There are two main reasons why we focus on conversion rate and basket value
instead of proﬁtability. First, the above two metrics provide additional information
that a manager could use to better utilize his current resources. Information on av-
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erage spending and customer conversion could allow the store manager to direct his
resources as needed in order not to leave money on the table and increase the cus-
tomer’s average spending. Second, conversion rate could be a more appropriate metric
of bench-marking store performance as opposed to proﬁtability or sales. For instance,
sales and proﬁtability could be higher in store A than store B of the same chain simply
because store A is located in an area that attracts more traﬃc than store B. But store
B could have a higher conversion rate which indicates that it is a better performing
store since it utilizes its existing resources and potential in a more eﬃcient manner.
We report the following results in this chapter. First, we report the within-store
results. We ﬁnd that intra-day traﬃc variability is negatively correlated with both
conversion rate and basket value. A 1% increase in traﬃc variability is associated
with a 0.094% decrease in conversion rate in a store and 0.037% decrease in basket
value. We also ﬁnd that, for a given level of traﬃc, both conversion rate and basket
value increase with an increase in store labor at a diminishing rate. A 1% increase
in labor is associated with a 0.102% increase in conversion rate and 0.066% increase
in basket value. In addition, we ﬁnd that conversion rates are higher during holidays
but basket values are lower suggesting that price promotions oﬀered during the holiday
season cause more customers to purchase but do not increase the size of the average
customer purchase. Moreover, we ﬁnd that both conversion rates and basket values
exhibit signiﬁcant seasonality.
Next, we report the across-store results. We ﬁnd that stores with higher traﬃc
uncertainty have lower conversion rates but similar basket values. We also ﬁnd that
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stores that have higher traﬃc variability and higher traﬃc uncertainty have higher
mismatches between required labor and actual labor. Furthermore, our tests reveal that
stores that have lower foot-traﬃc have higher traﬃc uncertainty resulting in mismatches
between required labor and actual labor. A surprising result of our analysis is that
competition does not aﬀect conversion rates and basket values. This suggests that
the consumers’ decision on whether or not to purchase and how much to purchase is
unaﬀected by the presence of other competitors once they are in the store. Finally, we
ﬁnd that stores located in neighborhoods with higher per capita income have higher
conversion rates but similar basket values.
Our research is closest to Fisher et al. (2009) who conduct a cross-sectional study
to show that labor scheduling and execution signiﬁcantly explain diﬀerences in basket
value for a retailer. Our results are consistent with Fisher et al. (2009) in the sense
that we ﬁnd that mismatches between labor and traﬃc are correlated with lower basket
values across stores. Furthermore, our use of data on hourly traﬃc, sales, and labor
is novel and allows us to diﬀerentiate variability in traﬃc within a day and variability
across days and show their association with the mismatches between traﬃc and labor.
In addition, our research setting allows us to study within-store analysis of basket
value, as well as conversion rates, a metric that has not been studied in operations
management so far. Our study is also the ﬁrst to study aggregate volatility and show
its association with negative store performance.
Our study has two implications for practitioners. First, many retailers plan labor
based on sales and traﬃc. Hence, stores that have higher sales and traﬃc tend to have
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more labor. However, our study shows that stores with lower sales and traﬃc tend to
have higher volatility. This suggests that planning labor based on average traﬃc may
be misleading and traﬃc volatility needs to be taken into account. Even though some
part of traﬃc volatility is uncontrollable retailers need to handle volatilities that are
under their control either using increased labor or through more ﬂexible labor. Second,
retailers need to analyze their actions to determine if they are resulting in increased
traﬃc volatility and seek ways to address them. While several studies have considered
the impact of retail actions such as advertising, price promotions etc., we do not know of
any study that considered the impact of such actions on traﬃc volatility. For example,
several retailers have “early bird specials” that would cause traﬃc variability to increase
substantially. Hence, our study shows that it is important to coordinate actions that
drive store traﬃc with those that help manage the potential increase in volatility.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant
literature. Section 3 presents the store performance framework that we use. In section
4 we present our hypotheses. Sections 5 and 6 describe the data and the econometric
model respectively. In Section 7 we discuss our results. Section 8 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Literature Review
Our work falls into the stream of literature that examines factors inﬂuencing store per-
formance. Several factors have been studied in the literature including store-, market-,
and consumer characteristics. We focus on the role of labor and traﬃc characteristics
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and review only papers that examine those factors. An interested reader could refer to
Reinartz and Kumar (1999) for a brief literature review on diﬀerent store performance
studies.
Few papers in the retail operations literature empirically examine the role of labor
capacity in retail store performance. Hise et al. (1983) focus on explaining cross-
sectional variations in store-performance of a retail chain using survey data and ﬁnd that
among other factors the number of employees is statistically signiﬁcant in explaining
the ﬁnancial performance of a store. Ton and Huckman (2005) examine the impact of
employee turnover on store performance and show that the negative eﬀect of turnover on
performance is most pronounced in stores that have low level of process conformance.
Fisher et al. (2006) analyze the drivers of a retail store’s ﬁnancial performance and
ﬁnd that store staﬃng levels have a signiﬁcant impact on customer satisfaction and
sales. Another study by Fisher et al. (2009) focuses on the impact of labor planning
and execution practices on the ﬁnancial performance of a retail location. They show
that mismatches between the planned employee staﬃng level and the actual employee
staﬃng level have negative impact on the ﬁnancial performance of a store. Ton (2008)
studies the eﬀect of labor levels on retail store proﬁtability through its impact on
quality deﬁned in terms of service and conformance. In the setting that she studies she
ﬁnds that increasing labor has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on proﬁtability through its impact
on conformance quality but not its impact on service quality.
Our work is diﬀerent from the above papers in the following aspect. To the best
of our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst one to examine empirically the impact of
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labor levels on store conversion eﬀects. The only empirical research to date that has
studied conversion eﬀects at the store level is the work by Lam et al. (2001) who
study the eﬀectiveness of marketing activities (i.e., promotions) on store performance
including attraction, conversion, and spending eﬀects. In contrast, our focus is to
examine the impact of labor capacity as measured by labor hours as well as traﬃc on
store performance as measured by conversion rate, basket value, and sales.
Our work contributes to existing literature that focuses on retail sales force planning
based on store traﬃc forecasting. A representative work of this stream of research is
the paper by Lam et al. (1998) which proposes a model that links store sales potential
with store traﬃc volume, customer type, and customer response to sales force avail-
ability. Our research demonstrates that traﬃc variability and uncertainty in addition
to average store traﬃc volume have an eﬀect on store performance. This result has
important operational implications in planning and scheduling sales force. According
to our ﬁndings, a retailer while making his store labor force planning may need to
take into account not only factors identiﬁed by previous literature (e.g., Lam et al.
(1998)) such as average store traﬃc volume, customer type, and customer response to
sales force availability but also traﬃc variability and uncertainty. To the best of our
knowledge, our research is the ﬁrst attempt in the operations literature that uses traﬃc
data to empirically examine the eﬀect of traﬃc variability and uncertainty on store
performance and its potential implications on labor planning and scheduling.
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3.3 Store Performance Framework and Factors In-
ﬂuencing Store Performance
Figure 3.1 presents a modiﬁcation of the framework suggested by Lam et al. (2001)
for analyzing store performance. This framework breaks down store sales into three
components: store traﬃc, conversion rate, and basket value. Such a partitioning of sales
can be very useful and can lead to a better understanding of the diﬀerent factors that
aﬀect sales. Our focus will be on three store performance measures (sales, conversion
rate, and basket value). Conversion rate and basket value are related to the eﬀectiveness
of store related activities in converting potential customers into buyers and encouraging
them to spend more. In addition to store related factors that are under the control
of a retailer, there are several other factors beyond his control that can aﬀect store
performance.
Store Traffic Conversion
Rate
Number of  
Transactions
Basket Value 
Store Sales 
x
x
FIGURE 3.1: A Framework for Analyzing Store Performance
Lam et al. (2001) have suggested an organizing framework for studying the impact
of diﬀerent controllable and uncontrollable factors on store performance. We borrow his
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framework and classify the diﬀerent factors based on time dimension into time-variant
and time-invariant. Figure 3.2 illustrates the framework we use for our analysis. Note
that consumer demographics and competitive conditions can actually vary with time.
We assume that the above factors are time invariant for the period of our study.
Time-Variant 
Variables
Merchandise
Price
Promotion and 
Advertising
Sales Force 
Operations
Policies
Seasonality
Day of Week 
Weather
Economic 
Conditions
Time-Invariant 
Variables
Store Design 
Location
Consumer 
Demographics 
Competitive 
Conditions
Store Performance
Conversion Rate 
Basket Value 
Sales
FIGURE 3.2: Factors Inﬂuencing Store Performance
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Lam et al. (2001) examine two additional store performance measures (i.e., front
traﬃc and store entry ratio) since they are interested in the impact of marketing ac-
tivities on attraction in addition to conversion and spending eﬀects. We do not treat
traﬃc as a performance measure but focus on understanding the impact of traﬃc vari-
ability and traﬃc uncertainty on store performance. Traﬃc variability corresponds to
intra-day traﬃc variability and traﬃc uncertainty is proxied by inter-day traﬃc vari-
ability. More information regarding the above traﬃc characteristics is provided in the
data description.
In our analysis, we control for all the factors that aﬀect store performance presented
in Figure 3.2 besides merchandise and price for which we unfortunately have no data.
In addition, since traﬃc variability could be correlated with days of the week we do
not use days of the week as controls in our analysis.
3.4 Hypotheses
In this section, we develop hypotheses regarding the impact of labor and traﬃc on store
performance. Our hypotheses are motivated based on practice as well as literature.
Impact of Staﬃng Levels. The linkage between staﬃng levels and store per-
formance has been highlighted by several researchers who have identiﬁed mechanisms
through which the former aﬀects the latter. For example, Fisher et al. (2006) show that
more labor at retail stores is associated with higher customer satisfaction and higher
sales. Ton (2008) examines the eﬀect of labor on proﬁtability through its impact on
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quality. She ﬁnds that increasing labor is associated with an increase in proﬁtability
through its impact on conformance quality. Both studies provide empirical support
that higher labor is associated with higher service quality.
The relationship between service quality and performance has been established by
the literature on customer satisfaction. They ﬁnd that higher service quality leads to
higher customer satisfaction which then increases customer loyalty resulting in better
performance (Heskett et al. (1994)). For instance, Babakus et al. (2004) ﬁnd that
both service and merchandise quality exert signiﬁcant impact on store performance–
measured by sales growth and customer growth–and this impact is mediated by cus-
tomer satisfaction. Sulek et al. (1995) ﬁnd empirical support that customer satisfaction
has a positive impact on the sales per labor hour for a retail chain of 46 stores.
In the context of retailing, the research stream on customer satisfaction usually
considers sales force as a vital driver of the sales process (and subsequently customer
conversion and spending) by providing information to the customers about the product
characteristics, features, prices, and brands, by helping customers identify the right
product for their needs and locate the product in the store as well as by making the
sales transaction process more eﬃcient. Hence, as the number of sales force increases
each employee will have more time to interact with the customer and assist him/her
in identifying his/her needs with the oﬀerings of the store (Wernerfelt (1994)). As a
result, the customer is more likely to buy at the store. Moreover, customers who are
interested in multiple items can make more purchases at the store if they ﬁnd suﬃcient
assistance. In addition, more time spent with customers can provide more opportunities
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to the sales force to engage in cross-selling and up-selling, and subsequently increasing
the amount that customers eventually spend. Building on the above arguments we
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1 Increase in labor is associated with higher store performance.
Impact of Traﬃc Characteristics.
Traﬃc uncertainty aﬀects store performance in two ways. First, increase in traﬃc
uncertainty would lead to increase in demand uncertainty for individual items. Hence,
for a given level of inventory, as traﬃc uncertainty increases we would expect more
stockouts when the demand is very high and we would expect unused inventory that
needs to be discounted to move when the demand is low.
Second, increase in traﬃc uncertainty would lead to greater diﬃculty in planning
store labor. Retailers often use sales and traﬃc as input to derive their staﬃng lev-
els. Based on the staﬃng levels and available labor, they schedule employees in their
stores. For a given staﬃng level, increase in traﬃc uncertainty would lead to greater
mismatches between required store labor (to manage in-store customers) and actual
store labor. When the required store labor exceeds actual store labor, the customer
service within the store would decline resulting in fewer customer purchases as well as
decline in customer’s basket value. This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 Increase in traﬃc uncertainty is associated with lower store perfor-
mance.
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For a given level of daily traﬃc, we expect store performance to decline as the
intra-day traﬃc variability increases due to the following reason. Labor scheduling
is a complex function that requires matching the supply of available store labor with
the traﬃc demand. Store labor usually comprises of full-time employees, part-time
employees, and temporary workers. These employees may be available at diﬀerent
times of the day for diﬀerent durations as opposed to a standard eight-hour work
schedule. Furthermore, there are additional complications such as diﬀerent skill sets of
the employees, minimum staﬃng requirements, overtime and wages, budget constraints,
vacations, leaves, etc. that need to be taken into account when scheduling employees.
Therefore, as the variability in intra-day traﬃc increases, it will become more diﬃcult
for the retailer to schedule daily labor for diﬀerent hours of the day resulting in over-
and under-staﬃng at diﬀerent hours of the day. Finally, Fisher et al. (2009) ﬁnd that
greater mismatches between store traﬃc and planned staﬃng levels result in lower
ﬁnancial performance across stores. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3 Increase in intra-day traﬃc variability is associated with lower store
performance.
Based on the above discussion, mismatches between labor and traﬃc seem to be
one of the mechanisms through which traﬃc uncertainty and variability could aﬀect
store performance. We are interested in testing out that mechanism and see whether
it indeed holds. To this end, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Increase in traﬃc uncertainty and traﬃc variability are associated with
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higher mismatches between labor and traﬃc.
Control Variables
In this section, we have presented hypotheses regarding the eﬀect of labor as well
as the eﬀect of traﬃc variability and uncertainty on store performance. We have also
hypothesized a mechanism called labor mismatches through which traﬃc variability
and uncertainty aﬀect store performance. We deﬁne labor mismatches as the deviation
between required staﬃng levels to manage in store operations based on actual traﬃc and
actual staﬃng levels. Note that the company could enforce certain labor rules regarding
the staﬃng levels that need to be maintained which could be diﬀerent from the staﬃng
levels that are required to serve in store customers. In addition to the above explanatory
variables, we also control for multiple variables that may impact store performance
according to the framework presented in Figure 3.2. These include weather, seasonality,
consumer demographics, competitive conditions, economic conditions, location, store
design, and promotions.
3.5 Data Description
Our study requires store-level data which is not publicly available. Our store-level
data pertains to a large retail chain provided under conditions of nondisclosure and
anonymity. We will be referring to this retail chain as “Alpha” in this chapter.
“Alpha” is a women’s apparel retail chain. Retailer “Alpha” as of July 2008 operated
212 stores in 35 states of the United States, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin
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Islands, and Canada. The stores are located primarily in regional shopping centers
and in freestanding street locations. The study period was from January 1, 2007 to
December 31, 2007. The retail chain used counters to record store traﬃc. As of 2007 the
retailer had installed traﬃc counters in only 60 stores located in the United States. We
obtained three types of data for retailer “Alpha”: ﬁnancial data (i.e., retail transactions
in units and store sales in dollars), labor data (i.e., employee hours), and traﬃc data
for the year of 2007. The above data were provided to us in both hourly level as well as
daily level. We also obtained regular business hours for each store by calling the stores
and requesting this information from a sales associate.
In addition to the above data, we hand-collected data by accessing online the website
of the mall where each store is located and recording stores in the mall directory that
sold women’s apparel and targeted the same age group as retailer “Alpha”. These stores
served as a proxy of competition. Out of 60 stores, 5 stores were located in freestanding
street locations and 4 stores were located in malls that did not have a working website.
Moreover, there were stores for which we did not have any observations for the whole
year of 2007. Those store either opened during that year or they did not install traﬃc
counters at the beginning of the year. To overcome this problem, we focused only on
those stores for which we could obtain complete information with respect to the above
variables. After we removed outliers in our data set our sample size dropped to 41
stores.
We also collected data on the daily average temperature of each store location.
This data was obtained from the United States National Climatic Data Center in
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Asheville, NC. The center archives data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, a scientiﬁc agency within the United States Department of Commerce
focused on the conditions of the oceans and the atmosphere. Climate-Data Inventories
are accessible online and the website provides diﬀerent search capabilities for locating
weather stations including city, zip-code, state, and county. Each weather station
has archived data on certain aspects of weather covering a speciﬁc time period. We
identiﬁed weather stations searching by zip-code. There were 5 zip-codes for which we
were not able to identify a weather station and had to use the closest station within 20
miles to that zip-code.
To control for economic conditions, we collected data on the Dow Jones Industrial
Average (DJI) using the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) as well as data on
the Standard & Poor Retail Index (RLX) using Thomson Datastream. We used the
Dow Jones Industrial Average to do our analysis and the Standard & Poor Retail Index
to validate the robustness of our results. For the days for which the stock market is
closed and there are no data on the DJI or RLX, we used a ﬁve-day moving average to
obtain estimates. In addition, for the RLX we used the previous quarter’s data.
We also obtained demographic data for the population in each store location using
U.S. Census data. We collected information on median household income and per
capita income. The above variables were highly correlated and hence, we only used per
capita income in our analysis.
Among other factors that aﬀect store performance (see Figure 3.2) are time-invariant
store characteristics such as location and store design. We control for such factors using
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store ﬁxed eﬀects.
Store performance is also aﬀected by store promotions. We could not obtain any
information regarding retailer “Alpha’s” promotional activities. However, we control
for major holidays in which retailers typically run promotions. We provide more in-
formation about the holidays we consider when we give a brief description of each
variable.
Although we possessed data on the hourly level we performed our core analysis on
the daily level. We used the hourly level to obtain one of the variables for the analysis
as explained later in the section. The reason why we chose to work with the daily
level was that we found that the ﬁnancial and labor data for the daily and aggregated
hourly level did not always match. However, this was not the case with the traﬃc
information. We believe that the reason for this discrepancy is that the hourly level
data is collected on the basis of hours the store is open. Sometimes store managers will
get in early and run returns and employee sales transactions prior to the store opening
hour. This would lead to lower sales and transactions in the hourly aggregated data
when compared to the daily data.
To test our hypotheses it is necessary to estimate traﬃc variability and traﬃc uncer-
tainty. We used as measures of traﬃc variability and traﬃc uncertainty the intra-day
traﬃc variability within a store and the inter-day traﬃc variability across stores respec-
tively.
To calculate the intra-day traﬃc variability within a store we used the hourly level
data to obtain the coeﬃcient of variation of traﬃc for each store for every day of the
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year. To calculate inter-day traﬃc variability across stores, we used the daily level
data to obtain the coeﬃcient of variation of traﬃc for each store for each week of the
year. We then obtained the overall mean of the coeﬃcient of variation of traﬃc across
weeks for each store. To test the robustness of our results, we measured inter-day traﬃc
variability using three alternate models. We describe these models in the sensitivity
analysis section of the chapter.
To test our fourth hypothesis we also need to estimate labor mismatches. If we
possessed information on the planned staﬃng levels we could obtain deviations between
the actual labor schedule and the planned labor schedule. As in many empirical studies,
our variable choices and deﬁnitions are driven by the data availability. Since we did not
have any information on the planned labor and the retailer’s labor planning is based
on traﬃc we calculated labor mismatches for each store as follows: We regressed labor
hours of each store for a given day on the previous week’s traﬃc controlling for days of
the week, months as well as holidays. We then obtained the residual of each regression
for each store and calculated the mean residual for each store. In addition, we estimated
labor mismatches using three other models that we present in the sensitivity analysis
section.
Table 3.1 summarizes the variables that we obtained and Table 3.2 summarizes
descriptive statistics for all variables. We use subscript i ranging from 1 to 41 to
denote each store and we use subscript t ranging from 1 to 365 to denote each time
period. Below we give a brief description of each variable.
TRAFFIC(TRAFFICit) is the number of customers that entered a store per day.
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The average arrivals were 729.541 and ranged from 114 to 2719.
SALES(SALESit) is the revenue in U.S. dollars at a store during the day. While
sales averaged about $9083.46 per day per store there was considerable variation both
within a store and across stores.
TRANSACTIONS(TRANSit) corresponds to the number of customer transac-
tions recorded at the checkout counters at a store. On average, a store in a given day
had 97.72 transactions.
CONV ERSION RATE(CRit) is the proportion of customers who made a trans-
action per day per store and is calculated as follows: CRit =
TRANSit
TRAFFICit
. The average
conversion rate was about .14 and there was considerable variation both within a store
and across stores.
BASKET V ALUE(BVit) is the value of customers’ shopping basket and is cal-
culated as follows: BVit =
SALESit
TRANSit
. Basket value averaged about $90.49 per day per
store.
LABOR HOURS(LBRHRSit) is the total number of employee hours reported per
store in a given day. On average, a total number of 56.432 employee hours were reported
in a store per day.
Because the store business hours varied across the study period (i.e., during holiday
season stores had extended business hours) we divided the daily total employees hours,
traﬃc, transactions, and sales with the regular business hours of each store to obtain an
average staﬃng level, traﬃc level, average transactions, and average sales that we used
for our analysis (see Section 6). We denote these variables as ADJUSTLBRHRSit,
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ADJUSTTRAFFICit, ADJUSTTRANSit, and ADJUSTSALESit.
COMPETITION(COMPi) is measured by the total number of women’s apparel
stores which target the same age group as retailer “Alpha” and are located in the same
mall/shopping center with retailer’s store i. On average, there were 32 such competitors
in each mall.
TEMPERATURE (TEMPit) corresponds to the daily temperature for each store
location. Lam et al. (2001) treated daily temperature as a categorical variable and we
adopted his approach. We used the following temperature ranges as Lam et al. (2001):
(i) below 15 ◦F, (ii) 15− 40 ◦F, (iii) 40− 60 ◦F, (iv) 60− 85 ◦F, (v) above 85 ◦F.
DOW JONES INDEX (DJIt) denotes the Dow Jones Industrial Average that
varied between 12127.81 and 14086.09 during the period of the study.
PER CAPITA INCOME (PERCAPINCi) denotes the per capita income that
was on average $35946.53.
INTER − DAY TRAFFIC V ARIABILITY (TRAFFICUNCi) denotes the
inter-day traﬃc variability for each store that was on average .365.
INTRA − DAY TRAFFIC V ARIABILITY (TRAFFICV ARit) denotes the
intra-day traﬃc variability per store in a given day that was on average .643.
HOLIDAY S (δh) corresponds to major holidays such as Christmas season (Dec
23-31), Easter, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Martin Luther King
Day, Mother’s Day, Veterans Day, and Thanksgiving Day. We also control for 3 days
before the occurrence of these holidays since retailers typically run diﬀerent types of
promotions before these holidays.
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Table 3.3 shows the correlations among longitudinal variables. Note that traﬃc
variability is negatively correlated with sales, basket value, and conversion rate. In
addition, labor hours are positively correlated with store performance. Table 3.7 shows
correlations among cross-sectional variables. Note that traﬃc variability and traﬃc
uncertainty are positively correlated with labor mismatches.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present summary statistics for store related variables for diﬀerent
time slots within a day. Note that average traﬃc is lowest at the beginning of the
store operating hours (i.e., 10:00am-12:00pm) and reaches its peak between 4:00pm-
6:00pm on a weekday and between 2:00pm-4:00pm on a weekend. Sales and number of
transactions are on average lowest at the beginning of the day and are highest between
6:00pm-8:00pm on a weekday and between 4:00pm-6:00pm on a weekend. On a weekday
conversion rate reaches its peak at the beginning of the day (i.e., 10:00am-12:00pm)
which is also the time period that we observe the lowest number of customer arrivals
and is lowest between 4:00pm-6:00pm which is the time that we have the highest traﬃc.
On a weekend conversion rate reaches its peak at the end of the day (6:00pm-8:00pm)
and is lowest between 2:00pm-4:00pm which is the period with the highest traﬃc. On
a weekday basket value is lowest around noon time (12:00pm-2:00pm) and is highest
between 4:00pm-6:00pm whereas on a weekend basket value is lowest at the beginning of
the day (10:00am-12:00pm) and reaches its peak closer to the end of the store operating
hours (6:00pm-8:00pm). On a weekday labor hours are lowest at the opening hours of
the store which is also the time with the lowest customer traﬃc and are highest between
2:00pm-4:00pm. On a weekend labor hours are lowest at the opening hours of the store
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and highest between 2:00pm-4:00pm which are the periods with the lowest and highest
customer traﬃc respectively.
Table 3.7 summarizes descriptive statistics for store related variables across diﬀerent
days of the week. Traﬃc, sales, and number of transactions are highest on Saturday
and lowest on Tuesday. The day with the highest intra-day traﬃc variability is Sunday
and the days with the lowest are Tuesday and Wednesday. Conversion rate is lowest on
Sunday, which is also the day with the highest traﬃc variability, and reaches its peak
on Thursday. Basket value is lowest on Monday and highest on Thursday and labor
hours are lowest on Sunday and reach their peak on Saturday the day with the highest
traﬃc.
Table 3.8 presents summary statistics for store related variables across months.
Traﬃc, sales, and number of transactions are highest in December and while traﬃc
and transactions are lowest in October, sales are lowest in the beginning of the year
(i.e., January). Intra-day traﬃc variability is lowest in December and is highest in
September. May and June are the months that we observe the highest conversion rate
and October is the month in which we observe the lowest average conversion rate.
Basket value is lowest in January and highest in October and labor hours are lowest in
February and reach their peak in December the month with the highest traﬃc.
We also conducted independent samples t-tests to compare the average traﬃc, la-
bor hours, sales, transactions, basket values, and conversion rates of the holiday season
(that corresponds to all major holidays described in this section) and non-holiday sea-
son. There is signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the average traﬃc, labor hours, sales, trans-
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actions, basket value, and conversion rate of the holiday season and non-holiday season
as illustrated in Table 3.11. Note that the average conversion rate and basket value
are signiﬁcantly higher during non-holiday season as opposed to average traﬃc, labor
hours, sales, and transactions which are signiﬁcantly higher during holiday season.
We computed the logarithm of each variable in order to construct a multiplica-
tive model that we present in the next section. The variables obtained after taking
logarithm are denoted by lower-case letters, i.e., adjusttrafficit, adjusttransit, bvit,
adjustlbrhrsit, etc.
3.6 Econometric Model
Since we have in our possession both longitudinal variables in addition to cross-sectional
variables, we formulate a two-stage econometric model for each store performance mea-
sure following Figure 3.2 to test the proposed hypotheses. As in Lam et al. (2001)
we use a multiplicative model. The ﬁrst stage of the model focuses on explaining
within-store variations using ﬁxed eﬀects while the second stage focuses on explaining
across-store variations. In the ﬁrst stage, the dependent variables are the adjusted
number of transactions, the basket value, and the adjusted sales. The independent
variables are adjusted store traﬃc, adjusted labor hours, traﬃc variability, the Dow
Jones Industrial Average Index, dummy variables for daily temperature ranges, as well
as dummy variables for months and holidays. We also control for diﬀerences across
stores by using time-invariant store ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Based on Figure 3.2, we specify the ﬁrst stage equations for transactions, basket
value, and sales as:
adjusttransit = Fi + α11adjusttrafficit + α12adjustlbrhrsit + α13trafficvarit
+ α14djit + α15δh + α
′
16tδt + α
′
17mδm + it (3.1)
bvit = Ji + α21adjusttrafficit + α22adjustlbrhrsit + α23trafficvarit
+ α24djit + α25δh + α
′
26tδt + α
′
27mδm + ζit (3.2)
adjustsalesit = Hi + α31adjusttrafficit + α32adjustlbrhrsit + α33trafficvarit
+ α34djit + α35δh + α
′
36tδt + α
′
37mδm + φit (3.3)
Each equation consists of store ﬁxed eﬀects (Fi, Ji, Hi), coeﬃcients of the indepen-
dent variables, and an error term (it, ζit, φit). Note that α11, α12, α13, α14, α15, α21,
α22, α23, α24, α25, α31, α32, α33, α34, and α35 are scalars. Let δh be a dummy variable
used to control for holidays. We denote by α′ the transpose of a vector and by δ a
vector of dummy variables for each temperature range δt and for months δm.
In equation (3.1) we use as dependent variable the number of transactions instead of
conversion rate for the following reason: Retailer “Alpha” makes his staﬃng decisions
based on forecasted traﬃc. Hence, since conversion rate is the ratio of the number
of transactions to traﬃc having conversion rate as a dependent variable would create
endogeneity issues because traﬃc would be aﬀecting labor hours and consequently
adjusted labor hours that is one of the explanatory variables in the right-hand side. To
avoid endogeneity of our regressors, we used the number of transactions as a dependent
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variable controlling for traﬃc.
In the second stage, the dependent variables are the store ﬁxed eﬀects (Fi, Ji,
Hi) obtained from the equations of the ﬁrst-stage. The independent variables are
competition, per capita income, and the average traﬃc uncertainty of a store. These
are the variables that we treat as time-invariant. Hence, the second stage equations are
as follows:
Fi = β11compi + β12percapinci + β13trafficunci + ωi (3.4)
Ji = β21compi + β22percapinci + β23trafficunci + χi (3.5)
Hi = β31compi + β32percapinci + β33trafficunci + ψi (3.6)
In order to test the labor mismatch hypothesis we specify the following equation:
mismatchesi = γ11trafficunci + γ12trafficvari + ηi (3.7)
In the above equation we denote by trafficvari the mean of the longitudinal variable
trafficvarit.
3.7 Results and Discussion
Tables 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13 present the estimates of the parameters for equations (3.1)-
(3.7). Below we present the eﬀects of labor and traﬃc characteristics on store perfor-
mance.
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Staﬃng levels. The estimates of the parameters for equations (3.1)-(3.3) are
presented in Table 3.11. Note that since we used a log-linear model the coeﬃcient
estimates need to be interpreted as elasticities. Labor is positively correlated with
conversion rate and basket value. An increase of 1% in labor is associated with a 0.102%
increase in conversion rate and with a 0.066% increase in basket value. We also ﬁnd
that labor is positively correlated with sales. An increase of 1% in labor is associated
with a 0.173% increase in sales. Note that the elasticity of labor on store performance
is less than 1 which suggests that store performance increases with an increase in store
labor at a diminishing rate. We conclude that Hypothesis 1 is supported in our data.
The signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of labor on store performance is consistent with pre-
vious literature (Fisher et al. (2006), Ton (2008)). Moreover, our results supplement
Fisher et al. (2006) ﬁndings by conﬁrming that labor and other performance metrics
such as conversion rate and basket value in addition to sales are related through a
concave increasing function.
Traﬃc Characteristics. The parameter estimates for traﬃc variability and traﬃc
uncertainty on store performance are presented in Tables 3.11 and 3.12 respectively.
The corresponding parameter estimates for average traﬃc variability and uncertainty
on labor mismatches are presented in Table 3.13.
First and foremost, we see that stores with higher traﬃc uncertainty have lower
conversion rates and sales but similar basket values. Hence, higher traﬃc uncertainty
is associated with lower conversion rates and sales. Our results show support for Hy-
pothesis 2 for conversion rate and sales but not basket value which requires further
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examination. Second, we see that traﬃc variability is negatively correlated with both
conversion rate and basket value. A 1% increase in traﬃc variability is associated with
a 0.094% decrease in conversion rate at a store and 0.037% decrease in basket value.
Hence, our results support Hypothesis 3. Moreover, we ﬁnd that both traﬃc uncer-
tainty and average traﬃc variability are positively correlated with mismatches between
required labor and actual labor supporting Hypothesis 4. Hence, our results conﬁrm
that customer traﬃc uncertainty and variability can have implications in the labor
planning and scheduling process by resulting in labor mismatches. Furthermore, our
tests reveal that stores that have lower foot-traﬃc have higher traﬃc uncertainty (see
Figure 3.7) resulting in mismatches between required labor and actual labor.
Covariates. The parameter estimates of the covariates provide support for the
framework in Figure 3.2 regarding factors that aﬀect store performance. For example,
the signiﬁcant positive estimates of the Dow Jones Index support the idea that the
economy aﬀects consumers’ ability and their conﬁdence of making purchases. Our re-
sults show that consumer demographics and speciﬁcally the per capita income has a
signiﬁcant and positive impact on store performance. We ﬁnd that stores located in
neighborhoods with higher per capita income have higher conversion rates but similar
basket values. We also ﬁnd that both conversion rate and basket values exhibit signif-
icant seasonality. A surprising result of our analysis is that competition as measured
here does not aﬀect conversion rates and basket values.
Holidays have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on store performance. Our results show that
holiday season has a positive conversion eﬀect but a negative spending eﬀect which
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results in a negative overall eﬀect on sales. A possible explanation could be that price
promotions oﬀered during the holiday season aﬀect consumers’ probability of making
a purchase at a store. The direction of the eﬀect of price promotions on basket value
depends on the tradeoﬀ between the sales gain resulting from an increase in the quantity
of the goods sold and the sales loss due to the price discount. Our results indicate that
the latter eﬀect was dominant which is consistent with some of the ﬁndings in the
marketing literature (e.g., Lam et al. (2001)).
Summary. Both the hypotheses and the results obtained from our analysis are
summarized in Table 3.14. We ﬁnd full support for Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4. Regarding
Hypothesis 2 we ﬁnd support for conversion rate and sales but not basket value which
merits further investigation.
3.8 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we perform some sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of our results.
During this analysis we use diﬀerent model speciﬁcations for hypothesis testing and
alternate models to deﬁne some of our variables.
First, we checked the robustness of our results testing diﬀerent traﬃc uncertainty
models. Recall that we used as measure of traﬃc uncertainty the inter-day traﬃc
variability across stores. For our core analysis we obtained this measure as follows:
we calculated the coeﬃcient of variation of traﬃc for each store over a week and then
obtained the overall mean of the coeﬃcient of variation across weeks for each store.
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We calculated the inter-day traﬃc variability using three alternate approaches. In
the ﬁrst approach which we refer to as Model 1 we calculate the coeﬃcient of variation
of traﬃc for each store over a month and then obtain the overall mean across months for
each store. In the second approach (Model 2) we calculate the coeﬃcient of variation
for each store over two weeks and obtain the overall mean for each store across the two-
week periods. In the third approach (Model 3) we calculate the coeﬃcient of variation
of traﬃc for each store over the whole year.
Tables 3.15 and 3.16 present the results of regression equations (3.4) and (3.7). Table
3.15 shows that the results obtained from the three alternate model speciﬁcations for
traﬃc uncertainty are robust. We ﬁnd that traﬃc uncertainty is negatively correlated
with conversion rate and sales under all model speciﬁcations. Similarly, we ﬁnd that
the coeﬃcient estimates of Models 1-3 in Table 3.16 conﬁrm support for Hypothesis 4.
Second, we checked the robustness of our results using diﬀerent labor mismatch
models. In the main analysis we had used the following model to obtain mismatches:
LBRHRSit = b11TRAFFICit−1 + b12TRAFFICit−2 + b13TRAFFICit−3
+ b14TRAFFICit−4 + b15TRAFFICit−5 + b16TRAFFICit−6
+ b17TRAFFICit−7 + b18δh + b′19dδd + b
′
20mδm + ηit (3.8)
We deﬁned as a mismatch the residuals of the above regression which we convert into
a single number for each store by obtaining the mean residual for each store in order
to enable cross-sectional analysis to test our fourth hypothesis. The advantage of this
75
deﬁnition is that we do utilize longitudinal data to create the mismatch variable.
To test the robustness we tried three alternative model speciﬁcations for mismatches.
We ﬁrst removed the dummy variable for holidays from the regression equation (3.8).
We refer to this speciﬁcation as Model 4. Models 5 and Model 6 were constructed
sequentially from Model 4 by removing days of the week and months from the covariates
respectively. Table 3.17 present the results of regression equation (3.7) for the three
alternate model speciﬁcations for mismatches. Table 3.17 shows that our results support
fully Hypothesis 4.
Third, we also tested the robustness of the results from the ﬁrst stage model in
which we removed one of the covariates at a time and rerun the model. First, we
removed from regression equations (3.1)-(3.3) the dummy variable for holidays. This
is refered to as Model 7. Second, we removed from regression equations (3.1)-(3.3) the
month covariates (i.e., Model 8). The results of the estimation of the above models are
presented in Table 3.17. We ﬁnd under all alternate model speciﬁcations that traﬃc
variability is negatively associated with store performance which is consistent with our
previous ﬁndings.
3.9 Conclusion
Motivated by the increasing eﬀorts that retailers make to track conversion rate and
basket value and the importance that they place on such store performance metrics
we conduct a descriptive study of these metrics for a retailer. Speciﬁcally, we consider
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the correlation between store performance and intra-day traﬃc variability and traﬃc
uncertainty. We also measure traﬃc-labor mismatches and study if they explain the
observed correlations in our sample.
We report the following results in this chapter. First, we present the within-store
results. We ﬁnd that intra-day traﬃc variability is negatively correlated with both
conversion rate and basket value. A 1% increase in traﬃc variability is associated with
a 0.094% decrease in conversion rate in a store and 0.037% decrease in basket value.
We also ﬁnd that, for a given level of traﬃc, both conversion rate and basket value
increase with an increase in store labor at a diminishing rate. A 1% increase in labor
is associated with a 0.102% increase in conversion rate and 0.066% increase in basket
value. In addition, we ﬁnd that conversion rates are higher during holidays but basket
values are lower suggesting that price promotions oﬀered during the holiday season
cause more customers to purchase but do not make the average customer purchase
more. Moreover, we ﬁnd that both conversion rates and basket values exhibit signiﬁcant
seasonality.
Next, we report the across-store results. We ﬁnd that stores with higher traﬃc
uncertainty have lower conversion rates but similar basket values. We also ﬁnd that
stores that have higher traﬃc variability and higher traﬃc uncertainty have higher
mismatches between required labor and actual labor. Furthermore, our tests reveal
that stores that have lower foot-traﬃc have higher traﬃc uncertainty resulting in mis-
matches between required labor and actual labor. A surprising result of our analysis
is that competition does not aﬀect conversion rates and basket values. This suggests
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that consumers decision to whether or not to purchase and how much to purchase is
unaﬀected by the presence of other competitors once they are in the store. Finally, we
ﬁnd that stores located in neighborhoods with higher per capita income have higher
conversion rates but similar basket values.
Although our analysis has provided several interesting insights related to the link-
ages between staﬃng levels, traﬃc variability, traﬃc uncertainty, and store performance
we need to acknowledge its limitations. One of the drivers of store performance is the
availability of inventory at a store. Our stores are under the same ownership so one
would expect that the target inventory levels should be similar in all stores. However,
there could be large variations in the actual inventory levels across stores as well as
within a store over time. Unfortunately, we could not obtain any information with
respect to the inventory levels for the retailer we studied and as a result, we could not
control for actual inventory in our analysis. Another information that we could not
obtain pertains to the type and size of assortment. Even though the stores that we
considered in our analysis are of the same type there could be large variations in the
size as well as type of assortment that they oﬀer.
Summarizing our study has the following implications for practitioners. First, ac-
cording to our study retailers need to plan labor not only based on sales and traﬃc
which has been the traditional approach but also take traﬃc volatility into account.
Even though some part of traﬃc volatility is uncontrollable retailers need to handle
volatilities that are under their control either using increased labor or through more
ﬂexible labor. Second, retailers often can induce traﬃc volatility through the actions
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that they take. For example, several retailers have “early bird specials” that would
cause traﬃc variability to increase substantially. Hence, our study shows that it is
important to coordinate actions that drive store traﬃc with those that help manage
the potential increase in volatility.
3.10 Supplement with Tables and Figures
FIGURE 3.3: Correlation between conversion rate and basket value for one store
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FIGURE 3.4: Correlation between average conversion rate and average basket value
across stores
FIGURE 3.5: Correlation between conversion rate and intra-day traﬃc variability for
one of the stores
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FIGURE 3.6: Correlation between basket value and traﬃc uncertainty across stores
FIGURE 3.7: Correlation between average traﬃc uncertainty and average store traﬃc
across stores
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TABLE 3.1: Description of Variables
Variable Description
TRAFFICit Number of customers who entered store i on day t
ADJUSTTRAFFICit Total number of customers who entered store i on day t
divided by the regular business hours of store i on day t
SALESit Revenue in U.S. dollars for store i on day t
ADJUSTSALESit Revenue in U.S. dollars for store i on day t
divided by the regular business hours of store i on day t
TRANSit Number of customer transactions at store i on day t
ADJUSTTRANSit Number of customer transactions at store i on day t
divided by the regular business hours of store i on day t
CRit Proportion of customers who made a transaction
at store i on day t
BVit Value in U.S. dollars of customers’ shopping basket
at store i on day t
LBRHRSit Total number of employee hours reported at store i on day t
ADJUSTLBRHRSit Total number of employee hours reported at store i on day t
divided by the regular business hours of store i on day t
COMPi Total number of stores that are in the mall where store i
is located which sell similar assortment as “Alpha”
TEMPit Daily temperature for store location i
DJIt Dow Jones Industrial Average on day t
PERCAPINCi Per capita income for store location i
TRAFFICUNCi Average inter-day traﬃc variability for store location i
TRAFFICV ARit Intra-day traﬃc variability for store location i on day t
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TABLE 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
LONGITUDINAL VAR
TRAFFIC 729.541 379.506 114 2719
TRAFFICV AR .643 .161 .269 1.065
SALES 9083.464 5618.848 140.21 56666.14
TRANS 97.716 47.314 17 371
CR .139 .035 .020 .458
BV 90.494 24.256 2.780 365.83
LBRHRS 56.432 19.508 16.63 140.76
OPERATING HRS 10.500 1.400 6 14
TEMP 64.171 15.299 18 93
DJI 13177.24 507.689 12127.81 14086.09
CROSS− SECTIONAL VAR
COMP 31.523 11.994 15 71
PERCAPINC 35946.530 19417.730 12763 92940
TRAFFICUNC .365 .062 .216 .524
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TABLE 3.4: Correlations among cross-sectional variables
Variable Name 1 2 3 4 5
1. MISMATCH 1.00
2. TRAFFICV AR 0.04* 1.00
3. TRAFFICUNC 0.15* 0.15* 1.00
4. COMP -0.12* -0.42* -0.11* 1.00
5. PERCAPINC -0.14* -0.35* -0.07* 0.29* 1.00
Note:* denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level and higher.
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TABLE 3.5: Summary Statistics for Store Related Variables for Diﬀerent Time Slots
Within a Weekday
Time Slots Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
TRAFFIC 29.479 21.831 1 235
SALES 425.580 441.719 19 3772.670
10 : 00AM − 12 : 00PM TRANS 4.767 3.658 1 36
CR .164 .099 .030 1
BV 89.671 55.239 5.825 317
LBRHRS 3.401 1.491 2 11
TRAFFIC 56.441 30.596 4 237
SALES 747.063 594.365 19 3812.190
12 : 00PM − 2 : 00PM TRANS 8.332 4.776 1 40
CR .156 .071 .030 .705
BV 89.696 48.564 5.7 316.426
LBRHRS 4.226 1.709 2 11
TRAFFIC 65.174 35.724 1 238
SALES 840.986 634.361 19.8 3796.250
2 : 00PM − 4 : 00PM TRANS 9.031 5.027 1 40
CR .148 .066 .030 1
BV 93.224 48.243 5.72 316.150
LBRHRS 5.018 1.899 2 11
TRAFFIC 66.009 35.875 1 238
SALES 849.663 645.999 19.980 3812.940
4 : 00PM − 6 : 00PM TRANS 9.029 5.134 1 40
CR .145 .067 .030 1
BV 93.909 47.776 5.802 317
LBRHRS 4.888 1.896 2 11
TRAFFIC 65.997 35.595 1 238
SALES 857.168 633.986 19 3798.600
6 : 00PM − 8 : 00PM TRANS 9.184 5.057 1 35
CR .150 .077 .030 1
BV 93.312 46.710 5.8 316.863
LBRHRS 4.465 1.689 2 11
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TABLE 3.6: Summary Statistics for Store Related Variables for Diﬀerent Time Slots
Within a Weekend
Time Slots Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
TRAFFIC 38.815 30.3680 1 205
SALES 572.516 598.870 19 3809.610
10 : 00AM − 12 : 00PM TRANS 6.427 4.970 1 38
CR .140 .091 .030 1
BV 86.539 48.532 5.691 315.990
LBRHRS 3.388 1.471 2 11
TRAFFIC 93.579 42.027 4 237
SALES 999.621 723.544 21 3813.250
12 : 00PM − 2 : 00PM TRANS 11.092 5.963 1 46
CR .121 .049 .030 .464
BV 88.787 42.111 5.871 314.618
LBRHRS 4.764 1.880 2 11
TRAFFIC 131.650 45.771 8 238
SALES 1335.082 778.738 19.980 3812.120
2 : 00PM − 4 : 00PM TRANS 14.853 6.408 2 46
CR .115 .039 .030 .342
BV 89.665 37.591 5.870 314.128
LBRHRS 5.819 1.951 2 11
TRAFFIC 122.563 48.438 1 238
SALES 1381.591 784.754 29 3813.500
4 : 00PM − 6 : 00PM TRANS 14.959 6.556 1 42
CR .128 .051 .030 .833
BV 92.301 37.228 6.117 309
LBRHRS 5.602 1.863 2 11
TRAFFIC 79.831 57.536 1 238
SALES 1097.237 768.951 19.990 3801.210
6 : 00PM − 8 : 00PM TRANS 11.310 6.649 1 50
CR .190 .176 .030 1
BV 99.266 46.486 5.792 316
LBRHRS 4.967 1.776 2 11
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TABLE 3.7: Summary Statistics for Store Related Variables for Diﬀerent Days
(Monday-Sunday)
Day Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
TRAFFIC 599.476 306.532 209 2464
TRAFFICV AR .627 .142 .269 1.064
SALES 7065.308 4382.507 716.630 33281.200
MONDAY TRANS 82.291 39.169 26 313
CR .143 .035 .025 .338
BV 83.740 24.379 9.146 236.926
LBRHRS 55.599 18.600 22.600 131.05
TRAFFIC 542.024 239.48 187 2264
TRAFFICV AR .606 .138 .269 .898
SALES 6919.516 4002.317 269.7 28311.43
TUESDAY TRANS 76.975 33.134 28 262
CR .146 .035 .029 .458
BV 88.021 26.792 2.780 347.547
LBRHRS 61.773 19.899 26.69 136.91
TRAFFIC 591.691 285.951 214 2462
TRAFFICV AR .606 .135 .272 1.064
SALES 7743.733 4231.748 140.21 35399.85
WEDNESDAY TRANS 84.030 37.829 29 299
CR .146 .035 .027 .344
BV 91.309 26.024 3.260 365.83
LBRHRS 54.107 18.536 27.02 135.59
TRAFFIC 630.881 296.698 217 2378
TRAFFICV AR .609 .135 .270 1.044
SALES 8984.044 5526.249 935.64 48252.4
THURSDAY TRANS 92.312 41.750 29 281
CR .150 .037 .020 .392
BV 94.550 25.493 15.411 236.585
LBRHRS 54.232 18.900 26.65 140.76
TRAFFIC 815.497 341.595 228 2467
TRAFFICV AR .607 .134 .269 .900
SALES 10922.740 5621.024 1876.290 46115.310
FRIDAY TRANS 114.969 45.029 32 312
CR .144 .031 .033 .313
BV 93.045 21.623 22.562 193.533
LBRHRS 59.883 19.311 27.310 129.330
TRAFFIC 1175.169 418.113 323 2605
TRAFFICV AR .674 .135 .278 1.037
SALES 13781.840 6718.914 2691.190 56666.140
SATURDAY TRANS 144.261 52.403 40 371
CR .125 .028 .046 .322
BV 93.611 20.171 29.199 270.075
LBRHRS 62.769 19.232 27.260 138.970
TRAFFIC 730.317 306.934 114 2719
TRAFFICV AR .778 .222 .274 1.065
SALES 7814.846 4530.942 574.220 36815.990
SUNDAY TRANS 85.832 37.736 17 324
CR .119 .028 .040 .291
BV 88.757 22.853 17.944 190.576
LBRHRS 45.854 16.699 16.630 127.810
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TABLE 3.8: Summary Statistics for Store Related Variables for Diﬀerent Months
(January-June)
Months Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
TRAFFIC 666.119 323.674 114 2355
TRAFFICV AR .649 .161 .273 1.064
SALES 6950.871 4477.252 140.210 33281.200
JANUARY TRANS 89.629 42.895 17 313
CR .140 .039 .025 .3
BV 76.164 25.113 2.780 186.375
LBRHRS 53.923 18.290 17.210 131.610
TRAFFIC 704.794 375.571 197 2544
TRAFFICV AR .642 .160 .2690 1.061
SALES 8675.499 5217.262 1230.470 39091.450
FEBRUARY TRANS 91.956 43.898 26 324
CR .138 .038 .020 .3
BV 91.726 23.786 37.342 347.547
LBRHRS 51.134 16.533 18.700 111.230
TRAFFIC 733.200 369.313 219 2338
TRAFFICV AR .646 .162 .279 1.061
SALES 9489.285 6073.535 716.630 44070.110
MARCH TRANS 97.213 46.858 26 289
CR .139 .042 .027 .360
BV 93.821 24.430 18.375 190.779
LBRHRS 55.004 19.534 18.750 129.470
TRAFFIC 711.324 359.870 202 2394
TRAFFICV AR .646 .161 .269 1.060
SALES 9153.486 5566.904 1639.340 35412.020
APRIL TRANS 96.983 46.553 23 297
CR .141 .038 .059 .458
BV 91.212 21.699 29.628 250.492
LBRHRS 56.042 19.322 18.710 121.300
TRAFFIC 732.220 365.294 233 2605
TRAFFICV AR .637 .158 .272 1.065
SALES 9802.685 5868.811 1582.080 49676.780
MAY TRANS 104.065 48.214 31 371
CR .146 .032 .076 .344
BV 91.323 20.724 36.258 177.238
LBRHRS 56.804 19.765 23.260 134.280
TRAFFIC 693.245 331.949 183 2413
TRAFFICV AR .638 .162 .271 1.062
SALES 8593.011 5207.741 870.580 38705.410
JUNE TRANS 99.191 46.781 23 291
CR .146 .031 .062 .305
BV 84.082 20.450 15.010 228.025
LBRHRS 56.954 18.582 18.240 136.910
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TABLE 3.9: Summary Statistics for Store Related Variables for Diﬀerent Months (July-
December)
Months Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
TRAFFIC 703.181 314.899 190 2199
TRAFFICV AR .651 .161 .269 1.063
SALES 7967.695 4303.862 907.760 35416.820
JULY TRANS 92.816 40.685 24 266
CR .135 .030 .040 .260
BV 84.426 21.135 14.641 190.269
LBRHRS 53.828 17.973 18.440 126.940
TRAFFIC 701.352 323.768 209 2273
TRAFFICV AR .643 .156 .270 1.051
SALES 8858.745 5464.121 574.220 48252.400
AUGUST TRANS 92.836 42.077 30 275
CR .135 .031 .051 .295
BV 92.122 24.565 17.944 200.217
LBRHRS 56.546 20.003 18.720 140.760
TRAFFIC 692.778 367.163 212 2336
TRAFFICV AR .657 .166 .276 1.065
SALES 8957.168 5632.290 996.710 56666.140
SEPTEMBER TRANS 91.849 43.513 27 337
CR .139 .035 .054 .288
BV 94.904 25.481 26.229 365.830
LBRHRS 56.001 19.702 18.560 136.610
TRAFFIC 648.295 348.222 215 2401
TRAFFICV AR .640 .161 .280 1.065
SALES 8560.075 5253.109 1636.450 38890.890
OCTOBER TRANS 83.576 37.699 27 291
CR .13680 .033 .064 .273
BV 99.010 26.682 41.875 270.075
LBRHRS 56.726 19.270 16.630 132.220
TRAFFIC 727.054 396.239 217 2449
TRAFFICV AR .645 .164 .273 1.061
SALES 9371.947 5743.932 1302.240 39794.560
NOV EMBER TRANS 93.044 44.960 26 312
CR .134 .031 .045 .269
BV 97.513 25.144 27.442 304.886
LBRHRS 60.665 21.628 18.540 138.970
TRAFFIC 1065.840 501.390 204 2719
TRAFFICV AR .616 .158 .270 1.063
SALES 12901.610 6481.820 1783.480 41693.870
DECEMBER TRANS 141.259 57.844 31 299
CR .139 .032 .072 .279
BV 90.960 22.306 15.411 165.988
LBRHRS 63.728 20.246 21.440 131.050
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TABLE 3.11: Regression Results of First Stage Equations
Transactions Basket Value Sales
adjusttraffic .753*** .046*** .804***
(.004) (.005) (.006)
adjustlbrhrs .102*** .066*** .173***
(.006) (.008) (.010)
trafficvar -.094*** -.037*** -.122***
(.008) (.011) (.014)
dji .522*** .486*** .961***
(.107) (.130) (.173)
40− 60 ◦F .003 -.005 .004
(.006) (.008) (.010)
60− 85 ◦F .015* -.010 .014
(.007) (.009) (.012)
> 85 ◦F .004 -.021* -.000
(.010) (.012) (.017)
Jan -.082*** -.092*** -.172***
(.011) (.013) (.017)
Feb -.073*** .038*** -.028**
(.010) (.012) (.017)
Mar -.053*** .073*** .018
(.012) (.015) (.020)
Apr -.060*** .043*** -.014
(.010) (.012) (.016)
May -.042*** .031*** -.006
(.008) (.010) (.013)
June -.047*** -.062*** -.106***
(.009) (.010) (.014)
July -.124*** -.046*** -.168***
(.009) (.010) (.014)
Aug -.116*** .032*** -.084***
(.009) (.011) (.014)
Sep -.106*** .056*** -.044***
(.009) (.010) (.014)
Oct -.158*** .067*** -.089***
(.009) (.011) (.015)
Nov -.126*** .095*** -.027**
(.008) (.009) (.013)
Holidays .025*** -.082*** -.052***
(.005) (.006) (.008)
Constant -6.220*** -.577 -6.374***
(1.021) (1.239) (1.652)
Wald χ2 88560.01*** 8156.73*** 45121.47***
Note:*,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Fixed store
eﬀects are included in the regressions but not shown in the table. The numbers below the parameter
estimates are the respective standard errors. Wald test statistic compares the ﬁt of the model
including explanatory variables to ﬁt of model with only the intercept. GLS estimators are used.
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TABLE 3.12: Regression Results of Second Stage Equation
Transactions Basket Value Sales
comp .010 .071 .083
(.052) (.070) (.095)
percapinc .081** -.007 .076
(.038) (.050) (.067)
trafficunc -.342*** -.119 -.459**
(.095) (.107) (.178)
Constant -7.313*** -.746** -7.666***
(.372) (.415) (.564)
Note:*,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The numbers
below the parameter estimates are the respective robust standard errors.
TABLE 3.13: Regression Results for the Labor Mismatches Equation
Labor Mismatches Equation
trafficunc .014***
(.005)
trafficvar .014**
(.005)
Constant 3.804***
(.004)
Note:*,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The numbers
below the parameter estimates are the respective robust standard errors.
TABLE 3.14: Summary of Hypotheses and Results
Indep. Variable Hypothesis Dep. Variable Anticipated Sign Results
adjustlbrhrs H1 adjusttrans + Supported
adjustlbrhrs H1 bv + Supported
adjustlbrhrs H1 adjustsales + Supported
trafficunc H2 F - Supported
trafficunc H2 J - Not Supported
trafficunc H2 H - Supported
trafficvar H3 adjusttrans - Supported
trafficvar H3 bv - Supported
trafficvar H3 adjustsales - Supported
trafficvar H4 mismatch + Supported
trafficunc H4 mismatch + Supported
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TABLE 3.16: Sensitivity Analysis for H4 for diﬀerent Traﬃc Uncertainty Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
trafficunc .017*** .014*** .027***
(.005) (.005) (.007)
trafficvar .013** .013** .010**
(.005) (.005) (.005)
Constant 3.807*** 3.805*** 3.812***
(.004) (.004) (.005)
Note:*,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The numbers
below the parameter estimates are the respective robust standard errors. Traﬃc uncertainty is
computed as follows: (i) In Model 1 we calculate the coeﬃcient of variation of traﬃc for each store
over a month’s period and then take the average. (ii) In Model 2 we calculate the coeﬃcient of
variation of traﬃc for each store over a two week’s period and then take the average. (iii) In Model 3
we calculate the coeﬃcient of variation of traﬃc for each store over the whole year.
TABLE 3.17: Sensitivity Analysis for H4 for diﬀerent Mismatch Models
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
trafficunc .014*** .019*** .021***
(.005) (.006) (.007)
trafficvar .013** .0203*** .021**
(.005) (.006) (.008)
Constant 3.804*** 3.809*** 3.805***
(.004) (.005) (.007)
Note:*,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The numbers
below the parameter estimates are the respective robust standard errors. Mismatches are computed
as the residuals of the following regressions: In Model 4 we regressed labor hours of a given day and
a given store on the previous week’s traﬃc controlling for days of the week and months. In Model 5
we regressed labor hours of a given day and a given store on the previous week’s traﬃc controlling
for days of the week. In Model 6 we regressed labor hours of a given day and a given store on the
previous week’s traﬃc.
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TABLE 3.18: Sensitivity Analysis for H1 and H2
Transactions Basket Value Sales
Model 7 Model 8 Model 7 Model 8 Model 7 Model 8
adjusttraffic .757*** .771*** .035*** .043*** .796*** .818***
(.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.006)
adjustlbrhrs .101*** .102*** .068*** .075*** .175*** .184***
(.006) (.006) (.008) (.008) (.010) (.010)
trafficvar -.089*** -.120*** -.051*** -.027** -.131*** -.143***
(.008) (.008) (.011) (.011) (.014) (.014)
dji .476*** .238*** .658*** .430*** .512*** .623***
(.107) (.049) (.131) (.058) (.162) (.077)
40 − 60 ◦F -.005 .021** .020 .018 .000 .030*
(.011) (.010) (.012) (.011) (.017) (.015)
60 − 85 ◦F -.002*** .017** .017* .025*** .006 .037***
( .008) (.007) (.010) (.009) (.013) (.012)
> 85 ◦F .009 .020* .011 .027*** .016 .042***
(.007) (.007) (.008) (.008) (.011) (.010)
Jan -.086*** -.077*** -.164***
(.011) (.013) (.017)
Feb -.080*** .062*** -.0137
(.010) (.012) (.016)
Mar -.062*** .103*** .036*
(.012) (.015) .020
Apr -.066*** .063*** -.002
(.010) (.012) (.016)
May -.041*** .027*** -.009
(.008) (.010) (.013)
June -.052*** -.049*** -.098***
(.009) (.010) (.014)
July -.125*** -.044*** -.167***
(.009) (.011) (.0147)
Aug -.121*** .045*** -.075**
(.009) (.011) (.014)
Sep -.108*** .062*** -.041***
(.009) (.010) (.014)
Oct -.160*** .0744*** -.085***
(.009) (.011) (.015)
Nov -.126*** .094*** -.027**
(.008) (.010) (.013)
Holidays .027*** -.082*** -.049***
(.005) (.006) (.008)
Constant -5.783*** -3.689*** -2.219* -2.219* -7.288*** -3.323***
(1.021) (.472) (.5594) (1.249) (1.650) (.740)
Wald χ2 87847.69*** 79732.15*** 7689.97*** 5807.91*** 44765.86*** 40508.45***
Note:*,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Fixed store
eﬀects are included in the regressions but not shown in the table. The numbers below the parameter
estimates are the respective standard errors. Wald test statistic compares the ﬁt of the model
including explanatory variables to ﬁt of model with only the intercept. GLS estimators are used. In
Model 7 we have removed holidays from the covariates and in Model 8 we have removed months.
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CHAPTER 4
Temporal Management of Service
Investments under Demand
Uncertainty and Competition
4.1 Introduction
In many settings, retailer investments in customer experience activities are important
in inﬂuencing demand for a product. For example, a retailer can stimulate demand
through various ways such as provide training to its sales personnel to promote a given
product, create special areas to show case a product or even invest in technology that
oﬀers a unique experience for a product. In addition to price, all the above activities
which we will be referring to as “service” can aﬀect the purchasing decision of customers.
The planning of such costly activities can be very crucial especially when a new product
is being launched in a market. In the case of new product introduction, the retailer
needs not only to decide the optimal price and service investments for the product but
also when to invest in such experience activities. Given that market demand could
be highly uncertain, a retailer may choose to wait until he receives some information
regarding the market state before investing in such activities or he may want to make
all these investments upfront to take advantage of possible reduced investment costs.
A retailer typically has three alternatives regarding when to make such investments.
(i) A retailer can make investments in experience activities in advance of the sell-
ing season without knowing the market state to take advantage of possible reduced
investment costs.
(ii) A retailer can make investments in experience activities close to the selling
season but typically incur a higher investment cost.
(iii) A retailer may follow a hybrid strategy by making some investments before and
some after the market state realizes.
In this chapter we focus on understanding the temporal management of service
investments under demand uncertainty and competition. We develop a two-stage model
in order to examine two alternatives that retailers typically have in terms of timing
their investments under both monopoly and symmetric duopoly settings. The ﬁrst
alternative is to invest in service in advance of the selling season without knowing the
market state (i.e., invest in the ﬁrst stage) and the second alternative is to invest in
service after the market state realizes (i.e., invest in the second stage). In both cases a
retailer decides on pricing after observing the demand (i.e., in the second stage). For
the monopoly we further examine a hybrid strategy in which a retailer can invest both
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before and after the demand state is known. Typically, investing after the demand state
is known is associated with higher investment costs. We analyze these settings under
both equal and diﬀerent investment costs across stages. In addition, we investigate the
deterministic demand case for the symmetric duopoly and contrast our results with
the stochastic demand case. In the case of a deterministic demand these alternatives
translate to making sequential decisions (i.e., ﬁrst service and then price) as opposed
to simultaneous decisions (both service and price).
Our major ﬁndings are as follows. For a monopolist who faces stochastic demand
and incurs diﬀerent investment costs across stages we show that a hybrid strategy
always dominates a strategy in which a retailer invests only before or only after the
market state is known. In addition, we show that a monopolist would prefer to delay
investments until demand realizes only when the market variability is high and the
diﬀerential cost of investments across stages is low. In all other regimes a monopolist
would prefer to invest before the demand realizes. This result is in contrast to the
case of equal investment costs in which a monopolist would always defer investments
in service after the demand realizes.
For symmetric duopolists who face deterministic demand and incur same invest-
ments costs across stages we show that the dominant strategy is always to invest in
service in the ﬁrst stage. We ﬁnd that this is not always the case when the duopolists
incur higher investment costs in the second stage. Interestingly, when the intensity of
service competition exceeds a given threshold, a symmetric duopolist could be better
oﬀ to invest in the second stage as the diﬀerential cost of investment in the two stages
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increases. We also ﬁnd computationally that the equilibrium strategies for a symmetric
retailer can shift in a non-monotonic fashion as the diﬀerential cost of investment in
the two stages increases. In particular, a retailer could invest in the ﬁrst stage for high
and low diﬀerential costs and in the second stage for intermediate values of diﬀerential
costs.
For symmetric duopolists who face stochastic demand and incur the same costs
across stages the dominant strategy is to invest in service in the ﬁrst stage in all regimes
except for one characterized by high demand variability, low intensity of competition
in service, and high investment cost. This result shows that the competitive dynamics
could diminish signiﬁcantly the value of delaying investments after demand realizes. We
further characterize some of the investment strategies when a duopolist incurs higher
investment costs in the second stage. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that in the case of high
intensity of service competition an increase in demand variability could make investing
in the ﬁrst stage more preferable than investing in the second stage provided that the
diﬀerential costs of investments across stages exceeds a given threshold.
The remaining of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2, we brieﬂy discuss
related literature. In Section 4.3, we present and analyze the monopoly. In Sections
4.4 and 4.5 we discuss the symmetric duopoly under deterministic and stochastic de-
mands and characterize the dominant strategies. Finally in Section 4.6 we conclude
this chapter.
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4.2 Literature Review
Our research focuses on temporal management of demand-enhancing activities. The
operations literature has extensively studied timing issues regarding capacity and in-
ventory/production (see Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) for representative work) but
the timing of investments in service activities that stimulate demand has escaped its
attention. Regarding service provision, most papers in the literature have focused on
designing contractual mechanisms to improve channel coordination. Winter (1993)
studies a manufacturer with competing retailers who specify both price and service.
The author ﬁnds that vertical restraints could achieve the ﬁrst-best solution. Desiraju
and Moorthy (1997) ﬁnd that when the retailer has private demand information, the
manufacturer could achieve higher proﬁt by enforcing retail price and service perfor-
mance requirements. Perry and Porter (1990) show that resale price maintenance and
franchise fees could correct the sub-optimal level of retail service although resale price
maintenance alone is not enough. Iyer (1998) studies how a manufacturer should re-
spond to the consumer’s location diﬀerence and the diﬀerence in the willingness to pay
for the retail service when two retailers specify both the retail price and the quality
of service for the manufacturer’s product. Tsay and Agrawal (2000) study a setting
in which a single manufacturer sells its product through two diﬀerent retailers. They
ﬁnd that the retailers are better oﬀ when service plays a role in their competition than
when they compete only based on price. Our demand model is a modiﬁcation of Tsay
and Agrawal (2000) for a stochastic demand environment but our focus is quite diﬀer-
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ent. First, we are interested in understanding under what circumstances a monopolist
should postpone or not the service investments until demand realizes. Second, we aim
to understand the equilibrium investment strategies in a symmetric duopoly where each
retailer can invest in service either before or after the demand realizes. Since there is
no study in the literature studying the timing of service investments in an uncertain
demand environment under competition, we aim to ﬁll this gap with this study.
4.3 Model-Monopoly Benchmark
In the following, we ﬁrst introduce the demand model, the sequence of events, and the
ﬁrm’s decisions.
We consider one retailer in the market introducing a new product. The retailer
experiences a stochastic linear demand that is decreasing in retailer’s price (pk) and
increasing in the retailer’s service (sk). Service captures all the activities mentioned in
the introduction that could stimulate demand.
Dk(pk, sk) = αk − bppk + bssk (4.1)
where αk > 0, bp > 0 and bs ≥ 0.
αk denotes the market base for the retailer at demand state k, k = {H,L} taking
values αL = m− u and αH = m + u with equal probabilities. Hence, P (α = m + u) =
P (α = m − u) = 1
2
where m is a measure of the mean demand and u is a measure
of demand variability. We restrict our analysis to 0 < u < m. We refer to αL as
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the “low” market and similarly αH as the “high” market. Mathematically, αk is the
demand faced by the retailer at demand state k when the retailer prices at 0 and oﬀers
no accompanying service. bp and bs measure the responsiveness of the retailer’s market
demand to his price and service respectively.
The retailer’s cost of providing service level sk is η
s2k
2
, where the quadratic form
suggests diminishing returns of such expenditures and η (a strictly positive term which
we refer to as “investment cost factor”) denotes the eﬀectiveness of the retailer in
operational deployment of service. The above demand model is a modiﬁcation of Tsay
and Agrawal’s model (cf. Tsay and Agrawal (2000)) for a monopoly setting with
stochastic demand.
The retailer needs to decide the timing of service investments. We examine three
alternatives regarding when to make such investments.
(i) A retailer can make investments in experience activities in advance of the sell-
ing season without knowing the market state to take advantage of possible reduced
investment costs.
(ii) A retailer can make investments in experience activities close to the selling
season but typically incur a higher investment cost.
(iii) A retailer may follow a hybrid strategy by making some investments before and
some after the market state realizes.
We denote these three scenarios as F (investment only in ﬁrst stage), S (investment
only in second stage) and B (investment in both stages). In particular, in Stage 1 the
retailer knows the distribution of demand and in Stage 2 he knows the realization of
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the demand. Stage 2 corresponds roughly to the beginning of the sales season and at
this stage the retailer decides on pricing. At this time, the ﬁrm has observed interest in
and demand for samples and most of the market uncertainty has been resolved. In the
following subsection, we present each scenario and assume that making an investment
at the second stage (i.e, after the demand is realized) is more expensive than at the ﬁrst
stage (η2 > η1). A reason behind this is that the retailer may have to incur expedited
costs after the demand has realized in order to make the service investments.
4.3.1 Scenario F (Investment Only in First Stage)
In this scenario, the retailer decides on price after the demand has realized and on
service before the demand realization. The demand at state k will be as follows:
Dk(pk, s) = αk − bppk + bss. We solve this two-stage problem by backwards induc-
tion.
Second stage solution
In the second stage the demand is revealed to the retailer. The retailer decides on the
optimal price to maximize his proﬁt given in (4.2).
πk(pk, s) = pk(αk − bppk + bss), k = {H,L} (4.2)
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The optimal price can be obtained by the ﬁrst-order conditions since the proﬁt function
given the service level is concave in price (i.e., ∂
2πk
∂p2k
= −2bp < 0).
p∗i (s) =
αk + bss
2bp
, k = {H,L}
First stage solution
In the ﬁrst stage the retailer maximizes his expected proﬁt (πˆ) provided in (4.3) by
choosing the service level s.
max
s
πˆ(s) =
1
2
(pLDL(s)− η1 s
2
2
) +
1
2
(pHDH(s)− η1s
2
2
) (4.3)
The proﬁt function is strictly concave in the service level s if 2η1bp − b2s > 0. The
optimal service level is found by applying the ﬁrst order conditions and substituting
the optimal service in the price, demand, and proﬁt expressions, thus obtaining the
following:
pFL =
2αL(2η1bp − b2s) + b2s(αH + αL)
4bp(2η1bp − b2s)
pFH =
2αH(2η1bp − b2s) + b2s(αH + αL)
4bp(2η1bp − b2s)
sF =
bs(αH + αL)
2(2η1bp − b2s)
DFL =
b2s(αH − αL) + 4bpαLη1
2(4η1bp − 2b2s)
DFH =
4bpαHη1 − b2s(αH − αL)
2(4η1bp − 2b2s)
πˆF =
4bp(α
2
H + α
2
L)η1 − b2s(αH − αL)2
16bp(2η1bp − b2s)
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4.3.2 Scenario S (Investment Only in Second Stage)
In this scenario, the retailer decides on the service level and price simultaneously after
the demand has realized, which reduces the problem to a single stage. The retailer
solves
max
pk,sk
πk(pksk) = pkDk(pk, sk)− η2 s
2
k
2
(4.4)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
∂πk
∂pk
= αk − 2bppk + bssk = 0 (4.5)
∂πk
∂sk
= −η2sk + bspk = 0 (4.6)
The Hessian is ⎛
⎜⎜⎝
∂2πk
∂p2k
∂2πk
∂pksk
∂2πk
∂skpk
∂2πk
∂s2k
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
−2bp bs
bs −η2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
Second order conditions for proﬁt maximization by the retailer will be satisﬁed if 2η2bp−
b2s > 0. The optimal price and service are obtained solving a system of equations from
the ﬁrst order conditions. Substituting the optimal price and service expressions on
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the demand function and proﬁt we obtain the following expressions.
pSk =
αkη2
2η2bp − b2s
, k = {H,L}
sSk =
αkbs
2η2bp − b2s
, k = {H,L}
DSk =
αkη2bp
2η2bp − b2s
, k = {H,L}
πSk =
α2kη2
2(2η2bp − b2s)
, k = {H,L}
πˆS =
1
2
πSL +
1
2
πSH
4.3.3 Scenario B (Investment in Both Stages)
In this scenario, we assume that the retailer can invest s1 in the ﬁrst stage and s2 in
the second stage. We further make the assumption that the two service levels have an
additive impact on demand i.e., Dk(pk, s1, s2k) = αk − bppk + bs(s1 + s2k).
Second stage solution
In the second stage, the retailer decides on the service level s2 and price after the
demand has realized. The retailer solves the following problem
max
pk,s2k
πk(pk, s1, s2k) = pkDk(pk, s1, s2k)− η2 s
2
2k
2
(4.7)
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Second order conditions for proﬁt maximization by the retailer are satisﬁed if 2bpη2 −
b2s > 0. From ﬁrst order conditions we obtain:
pk(s1) =
(αk + bss1)η2
2bpη2 − b2s
, k = {H,L}
s2k(s1) =
(αk + bss1)bs
2bpη2 − b2s
, k = {H,L}
First stage solution
In the ﬁrst stage, the retailer maximizes his expected proﬁt (πˆ) by choosing the service
level s1.
max
s1
πˆ(s1) =
1
2
(pLDL(s1)− η1 s
2
1
2
− η2 s
2
2L
2
) +
1
2
(pHDH(s1)− η1 s
2
1
2
− η2s
2
2H
2
) (4.8)
The proﬁt function is strictly concave in the service level s1 if 2bpη1η2− b2s(η1+η2) > 0.
The optimal service (s1) is obtained from ﬁrst order conditions. From substitution we
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obtain the following expressions:
pBL =
η2(2αL(2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2)) + b2sη2(αH + αL))
2(2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2))(2bpη2 − b2s)
pBH =
η2(2αH(2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2)) + b2sη2(αH + αL))
2(2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2))(2bpη2 − b2s)
sB1 =
bs(αH + αL)η2
2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2)
sB2L =
bs(2αL(2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2)) + η2b2s(αH + αL))
2(2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2))(2bpη2 − b2s)
sB2H =
bs(2αH(2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2)) + η2b2s(αH + αL))
2(2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2))(2bpη2 − b2s)
DBL =
bpη2(4bpαLη1η2 + b
2
s((αH − αL)η2 − αLη1))
2(2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2))(2bpη2 − b2s)
DBH =
bpη2(4bpαHη1η2 − b2s(αHη1 + (αH − αL)η2))
2(2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2))(2bpη2 − b2s)
πˆB =
η2(4bp(α
2
H + α
2
L)η1η2 − b2s(2(α2H + α2L)η1 + (αH − αL)2η2))
8(2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2))(2bpη2 − b2s)
4.3.4 Comparison of the scenarios in Monopoly
In this subsection, we compare the three scenarios in monopoly. The following propo-
sition summarizes the eﬀect of timing of service investments on the retailer’s price,
service level, demand, and proﬁt.
Proposition 8 For a monopolist we have the following ordering of prices, service lev-
els, demands, and proﬁts.
(1) pˆB > pˆF > pˆS
(2) sF > sˆS
(3) sB1 > s
F
(4) sB2 > sˆ
S
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(5) DˆB > DˆF > DˆS
(6) πˆB > πˆF
(7) πˆB > πˆS
(8a) πˆF ≥ πˆS if η2 ≥ η˜2
(8b) πˆF ≥ πˆS if η2 < η˜2 and u ≤ uˆ and πˆF < πˆS if η2 < η˜2 and u > uˆ
where η˜2 =
4bpη1−b2s
2bp
and uˆ = m
√
2bp(η2−η1)
2bpη1−b2s
Proposition 8 shows that a monopolist always beneﬁts from having the opportunity
to make service investments in both stages. Interestingly, the service level that a
monopolist invests in the ﬁrst stage in scenario B is higher than the corresponding
service level in scenario F. This result is driven by the assumption that the service levels
in both stages have an additive impact on demand, which creates demand enhancement
and leads to service levels s1 and s2 being complements as opposed to substitutes. If this
opportunity of investing in both stages does not exist and the monopolist has to decide
between investing at the ﬁrst stage only or at the second stage only, then the scenario
that dominates depends on the relative magnitude of the investment cost factors in the
two stages as well as the demand variability. If the investment cost at the second stage
is high enough (η2 > η˜2), then scenario F dominates scenario S. Even if the investment
cost at the second stage is low enough (η2 < η˜2), scenario F can still dominate scenario
S provided that the demand variability is low (u < uˆ). In the case of high demand
variability and low investment cost at the second stage scenario S dominates scenario
F. Note that when the investment costs in the two stages are the same (η1 = η2), then
a monopolist is always better oﬀ to postpone investments in service to the second stage
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(i.e., scenario S dominates scenario F). Figure 4.1 is a pictorial representation of the
F S
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L H
L
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u
FIGURE 4.1: Scenario Dominance for a Monopolist Under Stochastic Demand and
Diﬀerent Investment Costs
regimes under which a monopolist would prefer to invest before or after the demand
realization. Note that low investment cost in the second stage corresponds to η2 < η˜2
and low demand variability corresponds to u < uˆ.
Lemma 1 The impact of diﬀerent parameters on thresholds η˜2 and uˆ is as follows:
i) ∂η˜2
∂bp
> 0, ∂η˜2
∂bs
< 0, ∂η˜2
∂η1
> 0
ii) ∂uˆ
∂bp
< 0, ∂uˆ
∂bs
> 0, ∂uˆ
∂m
> 0, ∂uˆ
∂η1
< 0, ∂uˆ
∂η2
> 0
Lemma 1 presents comparative statics on thresholds η˜2 and uˆ. Let us consider the
case where the investment cost at the second stage is low (i.e., η2 < η˜2). Note that
as the elasticity of price (bp) increases the region under which scenario S dominates F
becomes larger. This is because as the elasticity of price increases (i.e., consumers are
very price sensitive) a retailer could be better oﬀ oﬀering low price (which is the case
under regime S) even for low demand variability. On the other hand, as the elasticity of
service (bs) increases the region under which scenario S dominates F becomes smaller.
As the elasticity of service increases (i.e., consumers are very service sensitive) a retailer
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would only be better oﬀ oﬀering low service (which is the case under regime S) only if
demand variability is very high.
In the following section we describe the duopoly model. We ﬁrst discuss the deter-
ministic demand in order to gain some insights regarding the dynamics of price and
service competition and then analyze the stochastic demand.
4.4 Duopoly - Deterministic Demand
We now consider two symmetric retailers in the market indexed by i ∈ {1, 2} and
j = 3−i selling the same product. The retailers engage in price and service competition.
The customer demand faced by retailer i is: Di(pi, pj , si, sj) = α− bppi + θp(pj − pi) +
bssi − θs(sj − si), where α, bp > 0, bs, θp, θs ≥ 0. θp, θs denote intensity of competition
between the two retailers with regards to pricing and service behavior. This functional
form of demand has the desirable property that for a ﬁxed set of retailers actions, the
total market size (D1 + D2) is invariant to changes in θp or θs.
We assume that both retailers have the ability to make service investments. We
focus on the following symmetric outcomes:
(1) Both retailers invest in the ﬁrst stage (scenario FF).
(2) Both retailers invest in the second stage (scenario SS).
In the following subsection we analyze the two scenarios (FF and SS) under the
assumption that investment costs of the two stages are the same (i.e., η1 = η2 = η)
in order to isolate the eﬀect of competition on the decision of the retailers to time
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such investments. We will later waive this assumption and consider the case where the
investment at the second stage is more expensive than that at the ﬁrst stage (η2 > η1).
4.4.1 Scenario FF (Two Competing Retailers Investing in First
Stage)
In this scenario, both retailers decide on prices in the second stage and on service levels
in the ﬁrst stage.
Second stage solution
In the second stage, the retailers engage only in price competition. The demand for
retailer i is given by Di(pi, pj, si, sj) = α− bppi + θp(pj − pi) + bssi − θs(sj − si).
The proﬁt function for retailer i is equal to his revenue since he does not incur any
investment cost at the second stage.
πi(pi, pj, si, sj) = pi(α− bppi + θp(pj − pi) + bssi − θs(sj − si)) i ∈ {1, 2}, j = 3− i,
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
∂πi
∂pi
= α− bppi + bssi − pi(bp + θp) + θp(pj − pi)− (sj − si)θs = 0 (4.9)
Since ∂
2πi
∂p2i
= −2(bp + θp) < 0, the proﬁt function given service levels is strictly
concave in prices. Solving for p1 and p2 simultaneously from the above two equations,
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we obtain the equilibrium prices:
pi(si, sj) =
R + Ssi − Tsj
W
, i ∈ {1, 2}, j = 3− i, (4.10)
where
R = α(2bp + 3θp)
S = 2bp(θs + bs) + θp(2bs + θs)
T = θs(2bp + θp)− θpbs
W = (2bp + θp)(2bp + 3θp)
The corresponding demand quantities at the equilibrium prices are:
Di(si, sj) =
(R + Ssi − Tsj)(θp + bp)
W
, i ∈ {1, 2}, j = 3− i. (4.11)
From (4.10) and (4.11) note that when T < 0, for a ﬁxed choice of retailer i’s service
level, retailer i will see its equilibrium price as well as the demand at this equilibrium
price increase as competing retailer j increases its service level. Hence, we assume that
T > 0, i.e.,
T > 0⇔ θs(2bp + θp)− θpbs > 0 (4.12)
First stage solution
In the ﬁrst stage, retailer i maximizes his proﬁt (πi) by choosing his service level si.
max πi(si) = piDi(si)− ηs
2
i
2
. (4.13)
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The proﬁt function is strictly concave in the service level si if W
2η− 2(θp + bp)S2 > 0.
Further, for a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium to exist, we require that the reaction
functions for the two retailers intersect once. A suﬃcient condition for this to happen
is the following (Tirole (1990)):
∣∣∣∂2πi
∂s2i
∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣ ∂2πi
∂sisj
∣∣∣⇔ W 2η − 2(θp + bp)S2 − 2ST (θp + bp) > 0 (4.14)
The optimal service levels, prices, demands, and proﬁts are provided below:
pFFi =
RWη
W 2η − 2S(S − T )(θp + bp) i ∈ {1, 2}
sFFi =
2RS(θp + bp)
W 2η − 2S(S − T )(θp + bp) i ∈ {1, 2}
DFFi =
RWη(θp + bp)
W 2η − 2S(S − T )(θp + bp) i ∈ {1, 2}
πFFi =
R2η(θp + bp)(W
2η − 2S2(θp + bp))
(W 2η − 2S(S − T )(θp + bp))2 i ∈ {1, 2}
Note that the diagonal dominance condition (4.14) is suﬃcient to ensure concavity
of the proﬁt function in the service levels as well as positive service levels, prices, and
demands.
4.4.2 Scenario SS (Two Competing Retailers Investing in Sec-
ond Stage)
In this scenario, both retailers decide on service levels and prices in the second stage.
As a result, the retailers engage in simultaneous price and service competition.
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Retailer i solves maxπi(pi, pj, si, sj) = pi(α−bppi+θp(pj−pi)+bssi−θs(sj−si))−η s
2
i
2
,
i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3− i. The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
∂πi
∂pi
= α− bppi + bssi − pi(bp + θp) + θp(pj − pi)− (sj − si)θs = 0 (4.15)
∂πi
∂si
= −ηsi + pi(bs + θs) = 0 (4.16)
The Hessian is
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
∂2πi
∂p2i
∂2πi
∂pisi
∂2πi
∂sipi
∂2πi
∂s2i
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
−2(bp + θp) bs + θs
bs + θs −η
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
Second order conditions for proﬁt maximization by retailer i will be satisﬁed if
2η(bp + θp) − (bs + θs)2 > 0. Joint concavity of the proﬁt function in (p, s) ensures
existence of a pure equilibrium strategy. Uniqueness is not too diﬃcult to demonstrate
in this case since the equilibrium is symmetric. Since the players have two-dimensional
strategies, ﬁnding a symmetric equilibrium reduces to determining whether a system
of 2 equations has a unique solution (Cachon and Netessine (2004)). The conditions
that ensure joint concavity are suﬃcient in our case to ensure the existence of a unique
solution. The optimal price, service level, demand and proﬁt expressions for retailer i
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are given below:
pSSi =
αη
η(2bp + θp)− bs(bs + θs) i ∈ {1, 2}
sSSi =
α(θs + bs)
η(2bp + θp)− bs(bs + θs) i ∈ {1, 2}
DSSi =
αη(θp + bp)
η(2bp + θp)− bs(bs + θs) i ∈ {1, 2}
πSSi =
α2η(2η(θp + bp)− (bs + θs)2)
2(η(2bp + θp)− bs(bs + θs))2 i ∈ {1, 2}
We impose 2η(bp + θp)− (bs + θs)2 > 0 to ensure that the second order conditions
are satisﬁed. In addition, we impose η(2bp + θp) − bs(bs + θs) > 0 to ensure positive
service and price.
4.4.3 Comparison of scenarios FF and SS (same investment
costs)
In this subsection, we compare scenarios FF and SS in duopoly under deterministic
demand and same investment costs across stages. The following proposition summarizes
the eﬀect of timing of service investments on the duopolists’ prices, service levels,
demands, and proﬁts.
Proposition 9 For duopolist i we have the following ordering of prices, service levels,
demands, and proﬁts.
(1) pFFi < p
SS
i
(2) sFFi < s
SS
i
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(3) DFFi < D
SS
i
(4) πFFi > π
SS
i
Proposition 9 shows that a symmetric duopolist always charges higher price and
invests in a higher level of service when he does not commit to service (i.e., invests
in the second stage). In addition, he enjoys higher demand if he invests in service
provision in the second stage. Interestingly, a duopolist will have higher proﬁt if he
makes an investment in the ﬁrst stage. The reason behind this is that the investment
cost is quadratic and the investment cost per unit of service η needs to be large enough
to ensure existence and uniqueness of the NE in both scenarios. As a result, a duopolist
will prefer to invest less in service which is the case if he makes a service investment
upfront. Hence, a duopolist will always be better oﬀ in Scenario FF.
We next consider the case where the investment costs in the two stages are diﬀerent
and speciﬁcally when η2 > η1. Since the derivation of the expressions for scenarios FF
and SS is done in a similar fashion as in the case with the same investment costs it
can be omitted. We next present the comparison of the scenarios FF and SS under
diﬀerent investment costs.
4.4.4 Comparison of scenarios FF and SS (diﬀerent invest-
ment costs)
The following proposition summarizes the eﬀect of timing of service investments on the
duopolist’s price, service level, and demand in the case where the investment cost in
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the second stage is higher than the corresponding cost in the ﬁrst stage.
Proposition 10 For duopolist i we have the following ordering of prices, service levels,
and demands.
(1) If η2
η1
≥ η¯, then pFFi ≥ pSSi and if η2η1 < η¯, then pFFi < pSSi .
(2) If η2
η1
≥ η¯, then sFFi ≥ sSSi and if η2η1 < η¯, then sFFi < sSSi .
(3) If η2
η1
≥ η¯, then DFFi ≥ DSSi and if η2η1 < η¯, then DFFi < DSSi ,
where η¯ = (2bp+θp)(2bp+3θp)(bs+θs)
2(bp+θp)(2bs(bp+θp)+θs(2bp+θp))
.
Proposition 10 shows that if the investment cost in the second stage is high enough
(η2
η1
> η¯), a symmetric duopolist will charge higher price, invest in higher service, and
enjoy higher demand in the ﬁrst stage. Otherwise, he will invest in higher service in
the second stage and hence charge higher price and enjoy higher demand.
For the remaining of the analysis we let for simplicity of exposition η1 = η and
η2 = η + , where  > 0. We ﬁrst illustrate how the proﬁt function of a symmetric
duopolist in scenario SS changes with respect to . This allow us to derive some of
the conditions under which investment in the second stage dominates investment in the
ﬁrst stage and vice versa.
Proposition 11 Let 1 =
bs(bs+θs)2+η(2bp+θp)θs−bs(2bp+3θp)
bs(2bp+3θp)−(2bp+θp)θs , then we have the following
cases:
1. If θpbs
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and  ≥ 1, then ∂π
SS
i
∂
≤ 0.
2. If θpbs
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and  < 1, then
∂πSSi
∂
> 0.
3. If θs ≥ bs(2bp+3θp)2bp+θp , then
∂πSSi
∂
> 0.
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Note that when there is competition across two dimensions (i.e., price and service),
then an increase in the diﬀerential investment cost of the two stages () could result in
proﬁt increase for a symmetric duopolist.
The following proposition presents two of the regimes that we are able to fully
characterize analytically.
Proposition 12 a) If θpbs
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and η > max{ bs(bs+θs)2
bs(2bp+3θp)−(2bp+θp)θs , ηmax},
then πSSi < π
FF
i ∀  > 0.
b) If θs ≥ bs(2bp+3θp)2bp+θp , then there exists a threshold ¯3 such that if  < ¯3, then
πSSi < π
FF
i and if  > ¯3, then π
SS
i > π
FF
i . The expressions for ηmax and ¯3 are
provided in the Appendix.
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FIGURE 4.2: Scenario Dominance (obtained analytically) for a Symmetric Duopolist
Under Deterministic Demand and Diﬀerent Investment Costs
Figure 4.2 summarizes the regimes that we obtain analytically.
The regime that we are not able to fully characterize is the following: θpbs
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and ηmax < η <
bs(bs+θs)2
bs(2bp+3θp)−(2bp+θp)θs . For the above regime a numerical study
shows that there could be several diﬀerent cases depending on the parameter values.
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1. We could have πSSi < π
FF
i ∀  > 0.
2. There could exist two thresholds of  (i.e., ¯1, ¯2 > 0) such that if  < min{¯1, ¯2}
or  > max{¯1, ¯2} then πSSi < πFFi else if min{¯1, ¯2} ≤  ≤ max{¯1, ¯2} then πSSi ≥
πFFi .
3. There could exist two thresholds of  (i.e., ¯1, ¯2) such that min{¯1, ¯2} < 0 and
max{¯1, ¯2} > 0. If 0 <  < max{¯1, ¯2} then πSSi < πFFi and if  > max{¯1, ¯2} then
πSSi > π
FF
i .
Figure 4.3 summarizes the regimes that we obtain numerically. Note that unlike the
FF
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FIGURE 4.3: Scenario Dominance (obtained numerically) for a Symmetric Duopolist
Under Deterministic Demand and Diﬀerent Investment Costs
deterministic case with equal costs, where the dominant strategy is always to invest in
the ﬁrst stage, in the case of higher investment costs in the second stage we can have
a richer set of investment strategies depending on the parametric setting.
First, when the intensity of competition with regard to service (θs) is low (i.e.,
θpbs
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
) and the investment cost is high (i.e., η > max{η¯, ηmax}), then
the dominant strategy would be for a symmetric retailer to invest in the ﬁrst stage.
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Second, when the intensity of competition with regard to service (θs) is low (i.e.,
θpbs
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
) and the investment cost is low (i.e., ηmax < η < η¯), then we
could observe a non-monotonic behavior on the Nash equilibrium strategies in the sense
that for low (i.e.,  < min{¯1, ¯2}) or high values of  (i.e.,  > max{¯1, ¯2}), a symmetric
duopolist would be better of investing in the ﬁrst stage whereas for intermediate values
he would be better oﬀ postponing investments to the second stage.
Third, when the intensity of service competition is high (i.e., θs ≥ bs(2bp+3θp)2bp+θp ),
then  has an interesting impact on the dominant outcome. We show that as the cost
diﬀerential of the two stages (i.e., ) increases, a symmetric duopolist would be better oﬀ
making the investment in the second stage. We also observe such instances numerically
even when the intensity of service competition is low for some parameter values.
4.5 Duopoly - Stochastic Demand
In this section, we describe the duopoly model and discuss the timing of the service
investment under demand uncertainty. The customer demand faced by retailer i at
demand state k is: Dik(pik, pjk, sik, sjk) = αk− bppik +θp(pjk−pik)+ bssik−θs(sjk−sik)
where αk, bp > 0 and bs, θp, θs ≥ 0.
As in the monopoly case, αk takes values αL = m − u and αH = m + u for low
demand and high demand state with equal probabilities. We focus our attention on
the following scenarios:
(1) Both retailers invest before the demand realizes (scenario FF).
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(2) Both retailers invest after the demand realizes (scenario SS).
As in the case of deterministic demand, we ﬁrst analyze the two scenarios (FF and
SS) under the assumption that investment costs of the two stages are the same (i.e.,
η1 = η2 = η) and later examine the case where the investment cost at the second stage
is more expensive than that at the ﬁrst stage (η2 > η1).
4.5.1 Scenario FF (Two Competing Retailers Investing in First
Stage)
In this case both retailers decide on price after the demand has realized and on service
before the demand realization. The demand for retailer i at demand state k is given
by Dik(pik, pjk, si, sj) = αk − bppik + θp(pjk − pik) + bssi − θs(sj − si).
Second stage solution
The proﬁt function for retailer i is equal to his revenue since he does not incur any
investment cost at the second stage.
πik(pik, pjk, si, sj) = pik(αk − bppik + θp(pjk − pik) + bssi − θs(sj − si)), (4.17)
i ∈ {1, 2}, j = 3− i, k ∈ {H,L}
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The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
∂πik
∂pik
= αk−2(bp+θp)pik+θppjk+(bs+θs)sik−θssjk = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, j = 3−i, k ∈ {H,L}
(4.18)
Since ∂
2πik
∂p2ik
= −2(bp + θp) < 0, the proﬁt function given the service levels is strictly
concave in prices. Solving for p1k and p2k simultaneously from the above two equations,
we obtain the equilibrium price for each retailer:
pik(si, sj) =
Rk + Ssi − Tsj
W
i ∈ {1, 2}, j = 3− i, k ∈ {H,L} (4.19)
where
Rk = αk(2bp + 3θp), k ∈ {H,L}
S = 2bp(θs + bs) + θp(2bs + θs)
T = θs(2bp + θp)− θpbs
W = (2bp + θp)(2bp + 3θp)
The corresponding demand quantities at the equilibrium prices are:
Dik(si, sj) =
(Rk + Ssi − Tsj)(θp + bp)
W
i ∈ {1, 2}, j = 3− i, k ∈ {H,L} (4.20)
From (4.19) and (4.20) note that when T < 0 for a ﬁxed choice of retailer i’s service
level, retailer i will see its equilibrium price as well as the demand at this equilibrium
price increase as competing retailer j increases its service level. Hence, we assume that
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T > 0, i.e.,
T > 0⇔ θs(2bp + θp)− θpbs > 0 (4.21)
First stage solution
In this stage retailer i maximizes his expected proﬁt (πˆi) by choosing his service level
si.
max πˆi(si) =
1
2
(piLDiL(si)− ηs
2
i
2
) +
1
2
(piHDiH(si)− ηs
2
i
2
) (4.22)
The proﬁt function is strictly concave in the service level si if W
2η− 2S2(bp + θp) > 0.
Further, for a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium to exist, we require that the reaction
functions for the two retailers intersect once. A suﬃcient condition for this to happen
is the following (Tirole (1990)):
∣∣∣∂2πˆi
∂s2i
∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣ ∂2πˆi
∂sisj
∣∣∣⇔ W 2η − 2S(S + T )(θp + bp) > 0 (4.23)
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The optimal service, price, demand, and proﬁt expressions are as follows:
pFFiL =
2W 2ηRL + 2S(S − T )(bp + θp)(RH −RL)
2W (W 2η − 2S(S − T )(bp + θp)) i ∈ {1, 2}
pFFiH =
2W 2ηRH − 2S(S − T )(bp + θp)(RH − RL)
2W (W 2η − 2S(S − T )(bp + θp)) i ∈ {1, 2}
sFFi =
2S(RH + RL)(bp + θp)
2(W 2η − 2S(S − T )(bp + θp)) i ∈ {1, 2}
DFFiL =
(bp + θp)(2W
2ηRL + 2S(S − T )(bp + θp)(RH − RL))
2W (W 2η − 2S(S − T )(bp + θp)) i ∈ {1, 2}
DFFiH =
(bp + θp)(2W
2ηRH − 2S(S − T )(bp + θp)(RH −RL))
2W (W 2η − 2S(S − T )(bp + θp)) i ∈ {1, 2}
πˆi
FF =
(bp + θp)(RH −RL)2(W 2η − 2S(S − T )(bp + θp))2
4W 2(W 2η − 2S(S − T )(bp + θp))2
+
(bp + θp)(RH + RL)
2W 2η(W 2η − 2S2(bp + θp))
2W 2(W 2η − 2S(S − T )(bp + θp))2 i ∈ {1, 2}
Note that the diagonal dominance condition (4.23) is suﬃcient to ensure concavity
of the proﬁt function in the service level as well as positive service, price, and demand.
4.5.2 Scenario SS (Two Competing Retailers Investing in Sec-
ond Stage)
In this case both retailers decide on both the service level and price after the demand
has realized. Retailer i solves max πik(pik, pjk, sik, sjk) = pikDik(pik, pjk, sik, sjk)− η s
2
ik
2
,
i ∈ {1, 2}, j = 3− i, and k ∈ {H,L}.
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The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
∂πik
∂pik
= αk − 2(bp + θp)pik + θppjk + (bs + θs)sik − θssjk = 0 (4.24)
∂πik
∂sik
= −ηsik + pik(bs + θs) = 0 (4.25)
The Hessian is
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
∂2πik
∂p2ik
∂2πik
∂piksik
∂2πik
∂sikpik
∂2πik
∂s2ik
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
−2(bp + θp) bs + θs
bs + θs −η
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
Second order conditions for proﬁt maximization by retailer i will be satisﬁed if
2η(bp + θp)− (bs + θs)2 > 0 which is also a suﬃcient condition to ensure existence and
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in terms of price and service (see previous discussion
in the deterministic demand). The optimal expressions for retailer i are given below:
pSSik =
αkη
η(2bp + θp)− bs(bs + θs) i ∈ {1, 2}, k ∈ {H,L}
sSSik =
αk(bs + θs)
η(2bp + θp)− bs(bs + θs) i ∈ {1, 2}, k ∈ {H,L}
DSSik =
αkη(bp + θp)
η(2bp + θp)− bs(bs + θs) i ∈ {1, 2}, k ∈ {H,L}
πSSik =
α2kη(2η(bp + θp)− (bs + θs)2)
2(η(2bp + θp)− bs(bs + θs))2 i ∈ {1, 2}, k ∈ {H,L}
πˆSSi =
1
2
πSSiL +
1
2
πSSiH i ∈ {1, 2}
We impose 2η(bp + θp)− (bs + θs)2 > 0 to ensure that the second order conditions are
satisﬁed. In addition, we impose (2bp + θp)η− bs(bs + θs) > 0 to ensure positive service
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and price.
4.5.3 Comparison of scenarios FF and SS (same investment
costs)
In this subsection, we compare scenarios FF and SS in duopoly under stochastic demand
and same investment costs across stages. The following proposition summarizes the
eﬀect of timing of service investments on the duopolist’s price, service level, demand,
and proﬁts.
Proposition 13 For duopolist i we have the following ordering of prices, service levels,
demands, and proﬁts.
(1) pˆi
FF < pˆi
SS
(2) sFFi < sˆi
SS
(3) Dˆi
FF
< Dˆi
SS
(4) If ηmax < η < ηˆ then πˆi
FF > πˆi
SS.
(5) If η > max{ηˆ, ηmax}, bsθp2bp+θp < θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
, and u ≤ u¯ then πˆiFF ≥ πˆiSS
whereas if u > u¯ then πˆi
FF < πˆi
SS.
(6) If η > max{ηˆ, ηmax} and θs > bs(2bp+3θp)2bp+θp then πˆiFF > πˆiSS.
The expressions for ηˆ, ηmax, and u¯ are provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 13 shows that a duopolist always prices lower, oﬀers lower service, and has
lower demand if he invests in the ﬁrst stage. The strategy that a duopolist should follow
to maximize his proﬁts depends on his investment cost, the intensity of competition in
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FIGURE 4.4: Scenario Dominance for a Symmetric Duopolist Under Stochastic De-
mand and Equal Investment Costs
service as well as the degree of demand variability. Figure 4.4 is a pictorial representa-
tion of the regimes under which a duopolist would prefer to invest before or after the
demand realization. Note that low investment cost corresponds to ηmax < η < ηˆ, low
intensity of competition in service corresponds to bsθp
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and low de-
mand variability corresponds to u < u¯. There are four possible quadrants depending on
the value of the investment cost and the intensity of competition in service. Quadrant
1 corresponds to the case of low investment cost and low intensity of competition in
service. Quadrant 2 corresponds to the case of low investment cost and high intensity
of competition in service. Quadrant 3 corresponds to the case of high investment cost
and low intensity of competition in service. Quadrant 4 corresponds to the case of high
investment cost and high intensity of competition in service. Note that in contrast to
a monopolist whose dominant strategy is always to postpone service provision under
same investment costs, a duopolist would consider commitment to service as the dom-
inant strategy in most regimes. The only regime under which a duopolist would delay
service investments after demand realization is the case of high investment cost, low
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intensity of competition in service, and high demand variability. Hence, we ﬁnd that
in the face of competition the value of delaying service investments can be signiﬁcantly
diminished. The following proposition presents an ordering of the eﬀect of demand
variability on proﬁts for scenarios F, S (under monopoly) and FF, SS (under duopoly).
Proposition 14 i) if η and θs are in quadrants 1,2, or 4 (see Figure 4.4), then
∂πˆi
S
∂u
>
∂πˆi
F
∂u
> ∂πˆi
FF
∂u
> ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
.
ii) if η and θs are in quadrant 3 (see Figure 4.4), then
∂πˆi
S
∂u
> ∂πˆi
F
∂u
and ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
> ∂πˆi
FF
∂u
.
In all quadrants other than 3 (where the investment cost is high and the intensity of
competition in service is low) demand variability has a greater impact on proﬁts in the
monopoly as opposed to the duopoly. Moreover, in those quadrants demand variability
has the most impact on a monopolist’s proﬁts who postpones investment to the second
stage and the least impact on a symmetric duopolist’s proﬁts who postpones investment
to the second stage.
4.5.4 Comparison of scenarios FF and SS (diﬀerent invest-
ment costs)
We now consider the stochastic demand case where the cost of investing in the second
stage is higher than that in the ﬁrst stage. We ﬁrst illustrate how demand variability
aﬀects the proﬁts of a symmetric duopolist in scenarios FF and SS. This allows us
to derive some of the conditions under which investment in the second stage would
dominate investment in the ﬁrst stage and vice versa.
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Proposition 15 Let 2 =
2b2s(bs+θs)(bp+θp)+η((2bp+θp)θs−bs(2bp+3θp))(2bp+θp)
(bs(2bp+3θp)−(2bp+θp)θs)(2bp+θp) , then we have
the following cases:
1. If θpbs
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and  ≤ 2, then ∂πˆiFF∂u ≥ ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
.
2. If θpbs
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and  > 2, then
∂πˆi
FF
∂u
< ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
.
3. If θs ≥ bs(2bp+3θp)2bp+θp , then ∂πˆi
FF
∂u
> ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
.
Note that as the variability of demand increases there are regimes where the ex-
pected proﬁt of a symmetric duopolist in scenario FF increases at a higher rate than
the corresponding expected proﬁt at scenario SS. As a result there could be regimes in
which the dominant strategy could shift from investing in the second stage to investing
in the ﬁrst stage as the variability of demand increases.
Proposition 16 a) If θs ≥ bs(2bp+3θp)2bp+θp and  < ¯3, then πˆiSS < πˆiFF . If  > ¯3 then
there exists a threshold u¯1 such that if u < u¯1, then πˆi
SS > πˆi
FF and if u ≥ u¯1, then
πSSi ≤ πFFi .
b) If θpbs
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and η > max{ bs(bs+θs)2
bs(2bp+3θp)−(2bp+θp)θs , nmax}, then there
exists a threshold u¯2 such that if u < u¯2, then πˆi
SS < πˆi
FF and if u ≥ u¯2, then
πˆi
SS ≥ πˆiFF .
The expressions for ηmax, ¯3, u¯1 and u¯2 are provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 16 presents the characterization of some of the possible regimes and the
dominant strategies which are illustrated in Figure 4.5. Recall that in the deterministic
demand case with diﬀerent costs, when the intensity of competition of service is high
(i.e., θs ≥ bs(2bp+3θp)2bp+θp ), the dominant investment strategy for a symmetric duopolist
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FIGURE 4.5: Scenario Dominance (obtained analytically) for a Symmetric Duopolist
Under Stochastic Demand and Diﬀerent Investment Costs
would shift from investing in the ﬁrst stage to investing in the second stage as the
diﬀerential costs of investments across stages () increases (Proposition 12(b)). In the
case of stochastic demand we could have a non-monotonic behavior in the investment
strategies. Speciﬁcally, when the diﬀerential cost of investments () is low, the dominant
strategy for a retailer would be to make investments in the ﬁrst stage. Beyond a given
value of  and for low levels of demand variability a symmetric duopolist would be better
oﬀ to invest in the second stage but interestingly, as demand variability increases, the
dominant strategy would be to make service investments in the ﬁrst stage.
When the intensity of competition of service is low ( θpbs
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
) and
the investment cost is high (η > max{ bs(bs+θs)2
bs(2bp+3θp)−(2bp+θp)θs , nmax}), then a symmet-
ric duopolist would always make an investment in the ﬁrst stage under deterministic
demand (Proposition 12(a)). In the case of stochastic demand a symmetric duopolist
would still prefer to invest in the ﬁrst stage for low demand uncertainty. But as demand
uncertainty increases there will be value in postponing investment after the demand
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realizes which could lead to investing in the second stage. Note that we have not been
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FIGURE 4.6: Scenario Dominance (obtained numerically) for a Symmetric Duopolist
Under Stochastic Demand and Diﬀerent Investment Costs
able to fully analytically characterize the regime in which θpbs
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and
nmax < η <
bs(bs+θs)2
bs(2bp+3θp)−(2bp+θp)θs . A computational study demonstrated that we could
have a rich number of diﬀerent strategies in the above regime. Some of the possible
cases are described below and illustrated in Figure 4.6
1. There could exist two thresholds of  (i.e., ¯1, ¯2 > 0). If  < min{¯1, ¯2} there
could exist a threshold u¯3 such that if u < u¯3 then πˆi
SS < πˆi
FF and if u ≥ u¯3 then
πˆi
SS ≥ πˆiFF . Similarly if  > max{¯1, ¯2} then there could exist a threshold u¯4 such
that if u < u¯4 then πˆi
SS < πˆi
FF and if u ≥ u¯4 then πˆiSS ≥ πˆiFF . If min{¯1, ¯2} ≤  ≤
max{¯1, ¯2} then πˆiSS ≥ πˆiFF .
2. There could exist two thresholds of  (i.e., ¯1, ¯2) such that min{¯1, ¯2} < 0 and
max{¯1, ¯2} > 0. If 0 <  < max{¯1, ¯2} then πˆiSS < πˆiFF . If  > 2 then πˆiSS > πˆiFF .
If max{¯1, ¯2} <  < 2 then there exists a threshold u¯5 such that if u < u¯5 then
πˆi
SS > πˆi
FF and if u ≥ u¯5 then πˆiSS ≤ πˆiFF .
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4.6 Conclusion
Motivated by the increasing importance that retailers place on activities that enhance
demand we examine the temporal management of investments in service in the face of
demand uncertainty and competition.
We develop a two-stage model in order to understand the trade-oﬀs that retailers
need to take into consideration while deciding on the timing of service investments. We
focus mainly on two alternatives that retailers typically have in terms of timing their
investments and examine them under both monopoly and symmetric duopoly settings.
The ﬁrst alternative is to make service investments in advance of the selling season
without knowing the market state (i.e., invest in the ﬁrst stage) and the second alter-
native is to make service investments after the market state realizes (i.e., invest in the
second stage). In both cases a retailer decides on pricing after observing the demand
(i.e., in the second stage). For the monopoly case we further examine a hybrid strategy
in which a retailer can invest both before and after the demand state is known. Typ-
ically, investing after the demand state is known is associated with higher investment
costs. We analyze these settings under both equal and diﬀerent investment costs across
stages. In addition, we investigate the deterministic demand case for the symmetric
duopoly and contrast our results with the stochastic demand case. In the case of a
deterministic demand these alternatives translate to making sequential decisions (i.e.,
ﬁrst service and then price) as opposed to simultaneous decisions (both service and
price).
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Our major ﬁndings are as follows. For a monopolist who faces stochastic demand
and incurs diﬀerent investment costs across stages we show that a hybrid strategy
always dominates a strategy in which a retailer invests only before or only after the
market state is known. In addition, we show that a monopolist would prefer to delay
investments until demand realizes only when the market variability is high and the
diﬀerential cost of investments across stages is low. In all other regimes a monopolist
would prefer to invest before the demand realizes. This result is in contrast to the case
of equal investment costs in which a monopolist would always defer service investments
after the demand realizes.
For a symmetric duopolist who faces deterministic demand and incurs same in-
vestments costs across stages we show that the dominant strategy is always to make
service investments in the ﬁrst stage. We ﬁnd that this is not always the case when
the duopolist incurs higher investment costs in the second stage. Interestingly, when
the intensity of service competition is high, a symmetric duopolist could be better oﬀ
to invest in the second stage as the diﬀerential cost of investment in the two stages in-
creases. We also ﬁnd computationally that the equilibrium strategies for a symmetric
retailer can shift in a non-monotonic fashion as the diﬀerential cost of investment in
the two stages increases. In particular, a retailer could invest in the ﬁrst stage for high
and low diﬀerential costs and in the second stage for intermediate values of diﬀerential
costs.
For a symmetric duopolist who faces stochastic demand and incurs same costs across
stages the dominant strategy is to invest in service in the ﬁrst stage in all regimes
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except for one characterized by high demand variability, low intensity of competition
in service, and high investment cost. This result shows that the competitive dynamics
could diminish signiﬁcantly the value of delaying investments after demand realizes. We
further characterize some of the investment strategies when a duopolist incurs higher
investment costs in the second stage. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that in the case of high
intensity of competition in service increase in demand variability could make investing
in the ﬁrst stage more preferable than investing in the second stage provided that the
diﬀerential costs of investments across stages exceeds a given threshold.
One of the key messages of this research, apart from oﬀering several insights with
regards to temporal management of investments in demand enhancing activities is that
competition could actually diminish the value of postponing such investments after
demand realization.
Our results, of course, reﬂect our assumptions. This immediately suggests a number
of opportunities to build upon this work. While our linear demand relationships are
analytically tractable, more general demand relationships could be considered. These
could include diﬀerent functional forms and diﬀerent type of service costs to reﬂect
economies of scale.
We have consider symmetric players to keep the analysis tractable but one could
introduce diﬀerent types of asymmetries that can potentially exist between retail com-
petitors. For example, the cross-retailer demand eﬀects could be nonsymmetric, as
could the functional forms of the service cost terms.
The game structure we have considered is only a subset of the possibilities that
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can occur. One could introduce a manufacturer who could be a Stackelberg leader
and examine the implications of service investments on the manufacturer’s proﬁtability
as well as the supply chain as a whole. Similarly, we could also consider competition
between distinct channels, each of which consists of a manufacturer and a retailer.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
Retail Operations has emerged as an important area of research in recent years. There
are several reasons that have led to this advent. First, retailing is a large, growing,
and dynamic sector in most countries both developed and developing. Second, retail
operations has some unique aspects that are diﬀerent from other issues faced by other
players in a supply chain providing a fertile ground for operations management re-
search. Third, the advanced computer technology, the advent of the Internet, and the
emergence of new players in both the local and global markets has create tremendous
opportunities to study new applications, contexts, and theory in retail operations. In
this dissertation comprising of three essays, we attempt to shed light on retail practices
that enhance consumer valuation, on factors that aﬀect store performance, and on tem-
poral management of investments in demand enhancing activities using both analytical
and empirical methodologies.
The second chapter of the dissertation titled “Improving Valuation Under Consumer
Search:Implications for Pricing and Proﬁts” investigates technology type of investments
that can aﬀect consumer valuation. In this chapter, we employ analytical methodology
in order to investigate ﬁrst how consumer valuation practices followed by retailers could
aﬀect their prices and proﬁts under competition and second how market characteristics
could aﬀect retailers’ decision to invest in the above practices. We study a duopoly in
which retailers compete in prices and consumers can search among the two retailers. In
such a setting, a retailer may incur investments to increase consumer valuation for his
product, but the ﬁnal sale could be made at the other retailer, who may not incur such
investments, leading to free riding. We explore the Nash equilibria in terms of both
investment and pricing through a computational study. Then we focus on the pricing
game only and establish the pricing Nash equilibria. Next, we focus on a special case
in which the competing retailers are symmetric and characterize the possible Nash
equilibria investment strategies depending on the investment cost. Finally, we present
a model with an endogenous level of investment and analyze the symmetric equilibrium
for a symmetric duopoly.
Among other results our key ﬁndings in Chapter 2 are as follows. When the invest-
ment decision is endogenous, surprisingly in the majority of instances both retailers
decide to invest in equilibrium but price the product in a manner to avoid consumer
search between them. We also ﬁnd that the proximity of retailers has an interesting non
monotonic impact on their decisions to invest in that retailers tend to invest when they
are very close or very far away but refrain from investing in the intermediate range.
When we further focus on the pricing game only we ﬁnd two major eﬀects related to
improvements in consumer valuation. First, consistent with popular belief, we ﬁnd that
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a retailer could overcome competitive eﬀects by improving consumer valuation beyond
a certain threshold. However, there are situations where a greater improvement in
consumer valuation by a retailer could lead to lower proﬁts. Second, we ﬁnd that a
retailer who does not invest could beneﬁt from an innovative competitor who increases
consumer valuation beyond a threshold. When we focus on symmetric retailers we ﬁnd
that as the investment cost increases the Nash equilibrium strategies shift from both
retailers investing, to only one retailer investing (either retailer 1 or retailer 2), and
ﬁnally to neither retailer investing. Finally, for the extension where the level of invest-
ment is endogenous, we show that a symmetric duopolist’s optimal strategy to cover his
whole local market or part of his market depends on his investment cost eﬀectiveness
and the optimal price charged by him may indeed decrease with the per unit cost of
acquiring the product.
In the third chapter of the dissertation titled “The Impact of Labor and Traﬃc on
Store Performance” we investigate the eﬀect of store labor and customer traﬃc charac-
teristics on store performance. We conduct a descriptive study of two store performance
metrics, conversion rate and basket value using proprietary data pertaining to a retailer.
Speciﬁcally, we consider the correlation between store performance and intra-day traﬃc
variability and traﬃc uncertainty. We also measure traﬃc-labor mismatches and study
if they explain the observed correlations in our sample.
We report the following results in Chapter 3. First, we report the within-store
results. We ﬁnd that intra-day traﬃc variability is negatively correlated with both
conversion rate and basket value. We also ﬁnd that, for a given level of traﬃc, both
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conversion rate and basket value increase with an increase in store labor at a diminishing
rate. In addition, we ﬁnd that conversion rates are higher during holidays but basket
values are lower suggesting that price promotions oﬀered during the holiday season
cause more customers to purchase but do not make the average customer purchase
more. Moreover, we ﬁnd that both conversion rates and basket values exhibit signiﬁcant
seasonality.
Next, we report the across-store results. We ﬁnd that stores with higher traﬃc
uncertainty have lower conversion rates but similar basket values. We also ﬁnd that
stores that have higher traﬃc variability and higher traﬃc uncertainty have higher
mismatches between required labor and actual labor. Furthermore, our tests reveal
that stores that have lower foot-traﬃc have higher traﬃc uncertainty resulting in mis-
matches between required labor and actual labor. A surprising result of our analysis
is that competition does not aﬀect conversion rates and basket values. This suggests
that consumers decision to whether or not to purchase and how much to purchase is
unaﬀected by the presence of other competitors once they are in the store. Finally, we
ﬁnd that stores located in neighborhoods with higher per capita income have higher
conversion rates but similar basket values.
Finally, in the fourth chapter of the dissertation, titled “Temporal Management of
Service Investments under Demand Uncertainty and Competition” we employ analyt-
ical methodology to investigate the timing of investments in activities that enhance
demand under competition in the face of demand uncertainty. We develop a two-stage
model in order to examine two alternatives that retailers typically have in terms of
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timing their investments under both monopoly and symmetric duopoly settings. The
ﬁrst alternative is to invest in advance of the selling season without knowing the mar-
ket state (i.e., invest in the ﬁrst stage) and the second alternative is to invest after the
market state realizes (i.e., invest in the second stage). In both cases a retailer decides
on pricing after observing the demand (i.e., in the second stage). For the monopoly
we further examine a hybrid strategy in which a retailer can invest both before and
after the demand state is known. Typically, investing after the demand state is known
is associated with higher costs of investments. We analyze these settings under both
equal and diﬀerent costs of investment across stages. In addition, we investigate the
deterministic demand case for the symmetric duopoly and contrast our results with
the stochastic demand case. In the case of a deterministic demand these alternatives
translate to making sequential decisions (i.e., ﬁrst service and then price) as opposed
to simultaneous decisions (both service and price).
Our major ﬁndings in Chapter 4 are as follows. For a monopolist who faces stochas-
tic demand and incurs diﬀerent investment costs across stages we show that a hybrid
strategy always dominates a strategy in which a retailer invests only before or only
after the market state is known. In addition, we show that a monopolist would prefer
to delay investments until demand realizes only when the market variability is high
and the diﬀerential cost of investments across stages is low. In all other regimes a
monopolist would prefer to invest before the demand realizes. This result is in contrast
to the case of equal investment costs in which a monopolist would always defer service
investments after the demand realizes.
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For a symmetric duopolist who faces deterministic demand and incurs same in-
vestments costs across stages we show that the dominant strategy is always to make
investments in service in the ﬁrst stage. We ﬁnd that this is not always the case when
the duopolist incurs higher investment costs in the second stage. Interestingly, when
the intensity of service competition is high a symmetric duopolist could be better oﬀ
to invest in the second stage as the diﬀerential cost of investment in the two stages in-
creases. We also ﬁnd computationally that the equilibrium strategies for a symmetric
retailer can shift in a non-monotonic fashion as the diﬀerential cost of investment in
the two stages increases. In particular, a retailer could invest in the ﬁrst stage for high
and low diﬀerential costs and in the second stage for intermediate values of diﬀerential
costs.
For a symmetric duopolist who faces stochastic demand and incurs same costs across
stages the dominant strategy is to invest in service in the ﬁrst stage in all regimes
except for one characterized by high demand variability, low intensity of competition
in service, and high investment cost. This result shows that the competitive dynamics
could diminish signiﬁcantly the value of delaying investments after demand realizes. We
further characterize some of the investment strategies when a duopolist incurs higher
investment costs in the second stage. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that in the case of high
intensity of competition in service increase in demand variability could make investing
in the ﬁrst stage more preferable than investing in the second stage provided that the
diﬀerential costs of investments across stages exceeds a given threshold.
Together these three essays can contribute to the better management of retail prac-
143
tices and activities that could enhance demand and consumers’ valuation as well as
enable retailers to improve store performance. Summarizing these essays provide the
following key messages for practitioners. First, a retailer’s decision to engage in con-
sumer valuation enhancing practices needs to be made taking into consideration the
following important factors in addition to the costs associated with such investments:
the physical proximity to their competitor as well as the demographics of their local
customers such as willingness to pay and search for better deals in the market. Second,
the timing of activities that enhance demand depends on the existence of competitors
in the market. Retailers need to be aware that strategies regarding the timing of such
activities which could be dominant in a monopolistic environment may have dimin-
ishing value in the face of competition. Moreover, the nature of competition such as
the relative competitive intensity in price and service plays an important role in the
adoption of the most suitable strategy. Third, with respect to labor planning and its
impact on store performance retailers need to refrain from traditional labor planning
approaches that are based solely on sales and average customer traﬃc and acknowledge
the importance of taking traﬃc volatilities into account as well. Finally, even though
traﬃc volatilities can be uncontrollable to a certain extent, retailers need to under-
stand that their own actions could often induce them and seek ways to address such
volatilities.
This dissertation can be extended on several fronts. For example, an interesting
extension to the ﬁrst essay, which has focused solely on retailer induced increases in
customer valuations, would be to consider the supply chain implications of increased
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consumer valuation. Intensiﬁed retail competition can also aﬀect the manufacturers’
market share and proﬁtability which results in manufacturers adopting diﬀerent strate-
gies of enhancing customer valuation. Speciﬁcally, several manufacturers, especially in
the electronics industry, have engaged in activities such as improving product design
that may diﬀerentiate their products, increase consumers valuation about their product
line, and command higher prices (Guth et al., 2008)1. In settings where a manufac-
turer sells directly to consumers, stocking decisions and investment decisions could be
planned together to improve the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability. In supply chains where a manufac-
turer sells his product through an independent retailer, who stocks competing products
from multiple manufacturers, the manufacturer may need to make his investment de-
cisions to enhance product valuation before the retailer commits to his stocking levels.
An interesting question that arises in such a setting is how the presence of substitutable
products in a stochastic demand environment aﬀects the incentive of a manufacturer
to invest in activities that increase consumer valuation for his product.
Another possible extension relates to understanding how the opportunities to in-
vest in demand enhancing services for a product line aﬀect the interactions between
a manufacturer and her retailer. In the third essay, we focused on the timing of de-
mand enhancing services that are typically undertaken by a retailer. Many demand
enhancing services, e.g. information about how to install or use the product, after
sales support, warranty repair etc. can be provided either by the manufacturer or they
1Guth R.A., J. Scheck, Clark D. (2008). “Window Dressing: PC Makers Take a Stylish Turn to
Tackle Apple-Pink, Spotted Laptops Aimed at New Buyers; Designers Rule at Dell.” The Wall Street
Journal, January 4 2008.
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can be delegated to the retailer. Such services can increase the consumer’s perceived
value of the product. An interesting question in such setting would be to explore how
the competitive environment and the retailer’s relative eﬃciency to the manufacturer’s
relative eﬃciency interacts with the manufacturer’s decision about whether to deliver
the services directly to a consumer or to outsource these services to the retailer.
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A1 Appendix for Chapter 2
TABLE A1: Notation.
Notation Description
V Consumer willingness to pay prior to the investment
f Pdf of V
F Cdf of V
Vˆ Consumer willingness to pay after the investment
fˆ Pdf of Vˆ
Fˆ Cdf of Vˆ
γ Fraction of consumers who visits retailer 1 ﬁrst
δ Fraction of consumers who is willing to search
μ Market size
 Market expansion
ci Retailer i’s per unit cost of acquiring the product
ki Consumer traveling cost at retailer i
Δk Consumer traveling cost from one retailer to the other
Ii Retailer i’s investment cost
λi Retailer i’s investment cost factor
α Consumer valuation distribution mean shift
pji Retailer i’s price in scenario j
dji Retailer i’s demand in scenario j
πji Retailer i’s proﬁt in scenario j
Before we present the proofs, we review a useful deﬁnition on supermodularity (see
Topkis (1979) for details on submodular games).
Deﬁnition 1 Suppose f(x1, x2) is twice diﬀerentiable, then f(x1, x2) is supermodular
in (x1, x2) if and only if
∂2f(x1, x2)
∂x1∂x2
≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let V and Vˆ be the consumer valuation before and after
the investment, with corresponding domains [0,1] and [α,1+α]. We could theoretically
have four possible investment scenarios: (i) Neither retailer invests, (ii) Retailer 1 does
not invest but retailer 2 invests, (iii) Retailer 1 invests but retailer 2 does not invest,
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TABLE A2: Scenarios examined.
Scenario Description
N Retailer 1 does not invest
I Retailer 1 invests
IEIE Both retailers invest and α is endogenous
IINN Both retailers invest and there is no consumer search
NNNN Neither retailer invests and there is no consumer search
NISS Retailer 1 does not invest, retailer 2 invests,
and consumers search both retailers
NISN Retailer 1 does not invest, retailer 2 invests,
and consumers search from retailer 1 to 2
NINS Retailer 1 does not invest, retailer 2 invests,
and consumers search from retailer 2 to 1
INSS Retailer 1 invests, retailer 2 does not invest,
and consumers search both retailers
INSN Retailer 1 invests, retailer 2 does not invest,
and consumers search from retailer 1 to 2
INNS Retailer 1 invests, retailer 2 does not invest,
and consumers search from retailer 2 to 1
(iv) Both retailers invest.
(i) Consumers who do not obtain positive consumer surplus at retailer 1 buy from
retailer 2 if p2+k1+Δk ≤ u ≤ p1+k1, which implies that p1 > p2+Δk. Consumers who
do not obtain positive consumer surplus at retailer 2 buy from retailer 1 if p1+k2+Δk ≤
u ≤ p2 + k2, which implies that p2 > p1 + Δk. But p1 > p2 + Δk and p2 > p1 + Δk
cannot be satisﬁed at the same time hence, only one retailer can obtain sales from the
consumers who search (i.e., consumers who did not buy at their local retailer and visit
the competing retailer).
(ii) Consumers who do not obtain positive consumer surplus at retailer 1 buy from
retailer 2 if p2 + k1 + Δk ≤ uˆ ≤ p1 + k1 + α, which implies that p1 > p2 + Δk − α.
Consumers who do not obtain positive consumer surplus at retailer 2 buy from retailer
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TABLE A3: Full Factorial Design 1.
Parameters Values
γ 0.2, 0.5, 0.8
δ 0.2, 0.8
 0, 0.4, 0.8
μ 1
c1 0.3, 0.4
c2 0.3, 0.4
k1 0.1, 0.3
k2 0.1, 0.3
Δk 0.05, 0.2
I1 0.02, 0.1
I2 0.02, 0.1
α 0.2, 0.5
TABLE A4: Full Factorial Design 2.
Parameters Values
δ 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7
μˆ 5, 10, 15, 20
c 0.1, 0.3, 0.5
k 0.1, 0.2, 0.3
Δk 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2
α T3, T4, T5
Note:The feasible range for the parameter α is α ∈ (T1, T2) where T1 = δΔk(2+3δ)δ(1+δ) and
T2 =
((1+δ)(1−c−k)+δΔk)(2+3δ)
δ(1+δ) . For our computational study, we considered three values of α, T3, T4
and T5 (T3 = T1+T22 , T4 =
T1+T3
2 , and T5 =
T2+T3
2 ) that divide the interval (T1, T2) in three
equally-spaced intervals
1 if p1 + k2 + Δk ≤ uˆ ≤ p2 + k2, which implies that p2 > p1 + Δk. Both retailers can
obtain sales from the consumers who search under the following conditions: Δk < α/2,
p1 > p2 +Δk − α, and p2 > p1 +Δk.
(iii) Consumers who do not obtain positive consumer surplus at retailer 1 buy
from retailer 2 if p2 + k1 + Δk ≤ uˆ ≤ p1 + k1, which implies that p1 > p2 + Δk.
Consumers who do not obtain positive consumer surplus at retailer 2 buy from retailer
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1 if p1+k2+Δk ≤ uˆ ≤ p2+k2+α, which implies that p2 > p1+Δk−α. Both retailers can
obtain sales from the consumers who search under the following conditions: Δk < α/2,
p1 > p2 +Δk, and p2 > p1 +Δk − α.
(iv) Consumers who do not obtain positive consumer surplus at retailer 1 buy
from retailer 2 if p2 + k1 + Δk ≤ uˆ ≤ p1 + k1, which implies that p1 > p2 + Δk.
Consumers who do not obtain positive consumer surplus at retailer 2 buy from retailer
1 if p1 + k2 + Δk ≤ uˆ ≤ p2 + k2, which implies that p2 > p1 + Δk. But p1 > p2 + Δk
and p2 > p1 + Δk cannot be satisﬁed at the same time hence, only one retailer can
obtain sales from the consumers who search (i.e., consumers who did not buy at their
local retailer and visit the competing retailer).
Concluding, only in investment scenarios (ii) and (iii) both retailers can obtain sales
from the consumers who search.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using Deﬁnition 1, we can prove the supermodularity of
the expected proﬁt function of each retailer. We illustrate the supermodularity for the
case in which retailer 1 does not invest, retailer 2 invests, and consumers search in both
directions (i.e., scenario NISS). The same logic applies for the rest of the scenarios
and we omit the proof to conserve space. Retailer 1’s proﬁt in scenario NISS is:
πNISS1 = (p1 − c1)((μ+ )γ(1− p1 − k1) + δ(μ+ )(1− γ)(p2 − p1 −Δk))
∂2πNISS1
∂p1∂p2
= δ(μ+)(1−γ) ≥ 0, which proves the supermodularity of πNISS1 . Similarly,
we can prove that πNISS2 is supermodular in (p1, p2). Because we have a supermodular
game there exists at least one Nash equilibrium.
Conditions of uniqueness of NE
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The literature has considered several methods for proving NE uniqueness (Cachon
and Netessine (2004)). One of the suﬃcient conditions for the uniqueness of a NE is
the “diagonal dominance” condition, which in a two-player game is stated as follows:
If a Nash equilibrium exists and |∂2πi(p1,p2)
∂pi∂pj
| < |∂2πi(p1,p2)
∂p2i
|, i, j = 1, 2, i 	= j, then the
Nash equilibrium is unique. Using “diagonal dominance” the conditions we obtain for
the uniqueness of the NE for the scenarios in Table A2 hold. Hence, the NE is unique.
Proof of Proposition 3.
The retailers’ proﬁt functions πNISS1 and π
NISS
2 are concave in their corresponding
prices p1 and p2. The optimal prices p
∗NISS
1 and p
∗NISS
2 for the two retailers are the
intersection of the best response functions obtained from the ﬁrst order conditions of
retailers’ proﬁts (see equations (3) and (4)). Evaluating the expressions for demands
qNISS1 and q
NISS
2 and proﬁts π
NISS
1 and π
NISS
2 at their optimal prices provides us with
the corresponding optimal demand and proﬁt expressions. We ﬁnd the expressions
for α¯1, α¯2, and α¯
(1) respectively by solving the following equations: p∗NISS1 = p
∗N
1 ,
q∗NISS1 = q
∗N
1 , and π
∗NISS
1 = π
∗N
1 . We present all the expressions in Table A5.
Comparing retailer 1’s optimal price and demand under monopoly and duopoly
regimes we obtain the results summarized in Table A6. Note that Table A6 presents
suﬃcient conditions (but not necessary). In Table A6 retailer 1’s proﬁt is lower under
duopoly than under monopoly for low levels of α and it is higher under duopoly than
under monopoly for high levels of α. Hence, there exists a threshold in the consumer
valuation mean shift α¯(1) such that if α < α¯(1) then π∗N1 > π
∗NISS
1 and if α > α¯
(1) then
π∗N1 < π
∗NISS
1 .
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TABLE A5: Expressions for scenario NISS.
Notation Expression
p∗NISS1 (δ + γ(2(1− δ)− γ(2− 3δ)) + α(1 − γ)(1− γ(1− δ))δ − (1− γ)δ(2− γ(2− 3δ))Δk
+2(1− γ(1− δ))(γ(1− δ) + δ)c1 + (1− γ)(1− γ(1− δ))δc2
−2γ(1− γ(1− δ))k1 − (1− γ)2δk2)/(4δ + (1− γ)γ(2− δ)(2− 3δ))
q∗NISS1 ((γ(1 − δ) + δ)( + μ)(δ + γ(2(1− δ)− γ(2− 3δ)) + α(1− γ)(1− γ(1− δ))δ
−(1− γ)δ(2 − γ(2− 3δ))Δk − (1− γ)2δk2 − (2δ + (1− γ)γ(2− (4− δ)δ))c1
−2γ(1− γ(1− δ))k1 + (1− γ)(1− γ(1− δ))δc2)/(4δ + (1− γ)γ(2− δ)(2 − 3δ))
π∗NISS1 ((γ(1 − δ) + δ)( + μ)(δ + γ(2(1− δ)− γ(2− 3δ)) + α(1− γ)(1− γ(1− δ))δ
−(1− γ)δ(2 − γ(2− 3δ))Δk − (1− γ)2δk2 − (2δ + (1− γ)γ(2− (4− δ)δ))c1
−2γ(1− γ(1− δ))k1 + (1− γ)(1− γ(1− δ))δc2)2)/(4δ + (1− γ)γ(2− δ)(2− 3δ))2
α¯1 (2(1 − γ) + 3γδ + 2(2(1− γ + 3γδ))Δk − γδc1 − 2(1− γ(1− δ))c2
−(4− 4γ + 3γδ)k1 + 2(1− γ)k2)/(2− 2γ(1− δ))
ζ −2(1− γ)(1− γ(1− δ))(γ(1 − δ) + δ)δ(δ + γ(2− 2δ − γ(2− 3δ))
−(1− γ)δ(2 − γ(2− 3δ))δk)( + μ)
η (1 − γ)2(1− γ(1− δ))2(γ(1− δ) + δ)δ2(4δ + γ(1− γ)(2− δ)(2− 3δ))2μ( + μ)(1 − c1 − k1)2
θ 2(1− γ)3(1 − γ(1− δ))(γ(1− δ) + δ)δ2( + μ)k2
+4(1− γ)γ(1− γ(1− δ))2(γ(1− δ) + δ)δ( + μ)k1
−2(1− γ)2(1 + γ(1− δ))(1 − γ(1− δ))(γ(1 − δ) + δ)δ2( + μ)c2
+2(1− γ)(1− γ(1− δ))(γ(1 − δ) + δ)δ(2δ + (1− γ)γ(2− (4− δ)δ))( + μ)c1
τ −2(γ(1− δ) + δ)(δ + γ(2− 2δ − γ(2− 3δ))− (1− γ)δ(2− γ(2− 3δ))Δk)
υ (1 − γ)(2δ(2− δ + 2δΔk)− 2γ2(1− δ)(2 − 3δ)(1 + δΔk)
+γ(4− δ(10− 4Δk − δ(7− 8Δk + 6δΔk))))
φ 2(γ(1− δ) + δ)(2δ + (1− γ)γ(2− (4− δ)δ))− (1− γ)(4(1− δ)δ
−2γ2(1 − δ)(2− (4 − δ)δ) + γ(4− (4− δ)δ(3− 2δ)))μ
χ 2(1− γ)(1− γ(1− δ))(γ(1 − δ) + δ)δ( + μ)
ψ −4γ(1− γ(1− δ))(γ(1 − δ) + δ) + (1 − γ)(4δ + γ(4− 4γ(1− δ)2 − (8− 3δ)δ))μ
ω −2(1− γ)2(γ(1− δ) + δ)δ( + μ)
α¯2 (τ + υμ + φc1 − χc2 − ψk1 − ωk2)/(2(1− γ)(1− γ(1− δ))(γ(1− δ) + δ)δ( + μ))
α¯(1) (ζ ±√η + θ)/(2(1− γ)2(1− γ(1− δ))2(γ(1− δ) + δ)δ2( + μ))
Proof of Proposition 4.
Taking the partial derivatives of α¯1, α¯2, and α¯
(1) with respect to Δk we obtain that:
∂α¯1
∂Δk
= ∂α¯2
∂Δk
= ∂α¯
(1)
∂Δk
= 2−2γ+3γδ
1−γ+γδ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. The retailers’ proﬁt functions πINSS1 and π
INSS
2 are con-
cave in their corresponding prices p1 and p2. The optimal prices p
∗INSS
1 and p
∗INSS
2 for
the two retailers are the intersection of the best response functions obtained from the
ﬁrst order conditions of retailers’ proﬁts (see equations (7) and (8)). Evaluating the
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TABLE A6: Impact of competition on retailer 1 in scenario NISS.
Suﬃcient Conditions Impact
μ < ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)) and α < α¯2 p∗N1 > p∗NISS1 , q∗N1 > q∗NISS1 , and π∗N1 > π∗NISS1
μ < ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)) and α¯2 < α < α¯1 p∗N1 > p∗NISS1 and q∗N1 < q∗NISS1
μ < ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)) and α > α¯1 p∗N1 < p∗NISS1 , q∗N1 < q∗NISS1 , and π∗N1 < π∗NISS1
μ > ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)) and α < α¯1 p∗N1 > p∗NISS1 , q∗N1 > q∗NISS1 , and π∗N1 > π∗NISS1
μ > ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)) and α¯1 < α < α¯2 p∗N1 < p∗NISS1 and q∗N1 > q∗NISS1
μ > ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)) and α > α¯2 p∗N1 < p∗NISS1 , q∗N1 < q∗NISS1 , and π∗N1 < π∗NISS1
expressions for demands qINSS1 and q
INSS
2 and proﬁts π
INSS
1 and π
INSS
2 at their opti-
mal prices provides us with the corresponding optimal demand and proﬁt expressions.
We obtain the expressions for α¯3, α¯4, and α¯
(2) respectively by solving the following
equations: p∗INSS1 = p
∗I
1 , q
∗INSS
1 = q
∗I
1 , and π
∗INSS
1 = π
∗I
1 . The equation q
∗INSS
1 = q
∗I
1
is a ﬁrst degree polynomial of the form αx = y. We derive the expression for ¯ and
Δ¯k by setting x = 0 and y = 0 and solving for  and Δk respectively. We present all
these expressions in Table A7 other than the expression for α¯(2), which is very long and
hence, we omit it. Comparing retailer 1’s optimal price and demand under monopoly
and duopoly regimes we obtain the results summarized in Table A8.
From Table A8 we can make the following observations: (i) When the retailers’
proximity is low (Δk > Δ¯k) and market expansion is high ( > ¯) retailer 1’s proﬁt
for low levels of α is lower under duopoly than under monopoly and for high levels of
α is higher under duopoly than under monopoly. Hence, there exists a threshold in
the consumer valuation mean shift α¯(2) such that if α < α¯(2) then π∗I1 > π
∗INSS
1 and if
α > α¯(2) then π∗I1 < π
∗INSS
1 . (ii) When the retailers’ proximity is low (Δk > Δ¯k) and
market expansion is low ( < ¯), then π∗I1 > π
∗INSS
1 for α < α¯3. Hence, from (i) if the
retailers’ proximity is low there exists a threshold α¯ = min{α¯(2), α¯3} such that if α < α¯
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TABLE A7: Expressions for scenario INSS.
Notation Expression
p∗INSS1 (δ + γ(2(1− δ) + γ(3δ − 2)) + 2α((1 − γ)γ(1− δ)2 + δ)− (1 − γ)δ(2 + γ(3δ − 2))Δk
+2(1− γ(1− δ))(γ(1− δ) + δ)c1 + (1− γ)(1− γ(1− δ))δc2
−2γ(1− γ + γδ)k1 − (1 − γ)2δk2)/(4δ + (1 − γ)γ(2− δ)(2 − 3δ))
q∗INSS1 (δ + γ(2(1− δ) + γ(3δ − 2)) + 2α((1 − γ)γ(1− δ)2 + δ)− (1 − γ)δ(2 + γ(3δ − 2))Δk
−(2δ + γ(1− γ)(2− (4 − δ)δ))c1 + (1− γ)(1− γ(1− δ))δc2
−2γ(1− γ + γδ)k1 − (1 − γ)2δk2)(γ(1 − δ) + δ)( + μ)/(4δ + (1 − γ)γ(2− δ)(2 − 3δ))
π∗INSS1 (δ + γ(2(1− δ) + γ(3δ − 2)) + 2α((1 − γ)γ(1− δ)2 + δ)− (1 − γ)δ(2 + γ(3δ − 2))Δk
−(2δ + γ(1− γ)(2− (4 − δ)δ))c1 + (1− γ)(1− γ(1− δ))δc2 − 2γ(1− γ + γδ)k1
−(1− γ)2δk2)2(γ(1− δ) + δ)( + μ)/(4δ + (1 − γ)γ(2− δ)(2 − 3δ))2 − I1
α¯3 (2(1 − γ) + 3γδ + 2(2(1− γ) + 3γδ)Δk − γδc1 − 2(1− γ(1− δ))c2
−(4(1− γ) + 3γδ)k1 + 2(1− γ)k2)/γδ
τ1 −2(γ(1− δ) + δ)(δ + γ(2− 2δ − γ(2− 3δ))− (1− γ)δ(2− γ(2− 3δ))Δk)
υ1 (1 − γ)(2δ(2− δ + 2δΔk)− 2γ2(1− δ)(2 − 3δ)(1 + δΔk)
+γ(4 + δ(−10 + 4Δk + δ(7 − 8Δk + 6δΔk))))
φ1 2(γ(1− δ) + δ)(2δ + (1− γ)γ(2− (4− δ)δ))− (1− γ)(4(1− δ)δ
−2γ2(1 − δ)(2− (4 − δ)δ) + γ(4− (4− δ)δ(3− 2δ)))μ
χ1 2(1− γ)(1− γ(1− δ))(γ(1 − δ) + δ)δ( + μ)
ψ1 4γ(1− γ(1− δ))(γ(1− δ) + δ) + (1− γ)(4δ + γ(4− 4γ(1− δ)2 + (8− 3δ)δ))μ
ω1 −2(1− γ)2(γ(1− δ) + δ)δ( + μ)
τ2 2(γ(1− δ) + δ)(δ + γ(2− 2δ − γ(2− 3δ)))
υ2 −(1− γ)(−4(1− γ)γ − 2(2− 5(1− γ)γ)δ + (2− γ(7− 6γ))δ2)
φ2 2(γ(1− δ) + δ)(2δ + (1− γ)γ(2− (4− δ)δ))− (1− γ)(4(1− δ)δ
−2γ2(1 − δ)(2− (4 − δ)δ) + γ(4− (4− δ)δ(3− 2δ)))μ
χ2 2(1− γ)(1− γ(1− δ))(γ(1 − δ) + δ)δ( + μ)
ψ2 −4γ(1− γ(1− δ))(γ(1 − δ) + δ)− (1 − γ)(−4δ − γ(4− 4γ(1− δ)2 − (8− 3δ)δ))μ
ω2 −2(1− γ)2(γ(1− δ) + δ)δ( + μ)
η1 4(1− γ(1− δ))(γ + δ − γδ)2− (1− γ)(−4γ2(1 − δ)3 + 4(1− δ)δ
+γ(4− δ(12− (11− 4δ)δ)))μ
α¯4 (τ1 + υ1μ + φ1c1 − χ1c2 − ψ1k1 − ω1k2)/η1
¯ (1 − γ)μ(4γ2(δ − 1)3 + 4(1− δ)δ) + γ(4 + δ((11− 4δ)δ − 12))/(4(1− γ(1− δ))(γ + δ − γδ)2)
Δ¯k (τ2− υ2μ− φ2c1 + χ2c2 + ψ2k1 + ω2k2)/(2(1− γ)(γ(1− δ) + δ)δ(2− γ(2− 3δ))( + μ))
then π∗I1 > π
∗INSS
1 .
Proof of Proposition 6.
When the retailers are symmetric the expressions of proﬁt for the four investment
scenarios examined (IINN), (NNNN), (INSS), (NISS) are as follows:
πIINNi = (p− c)μˆ(1 + α− p− k)− I, i = 1, 2
πNNNNi = (p− c)μˆ(1− p− k), i = 1, 2
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TABLE A8: Impact of competition on retailer 1 for scenario INSS.
Suﬃcient Conditions Impact
 > ¯, Δk < Δ¯k and α < α¯3 p∗I1 > p
∗INSS
1 and q
∗I
1 < q
∗INSS
1
 > ¯, Δk < Δ¯k, and α > α¯3 p∗I1 < p
∗INSS
1 , q
∗I
1 < q
∗INSS
1 , and π
∗I
1 < π
∗INSS
1
 > ¯, Δk > Δ¯k, and α < min{α¯3, α¯4} p∗I1 > p∗INSS1 , q∗I1 > q∗INSS1 , and π∗I1 > π∗INSS1
 > ¯, Δk > Δ¯k, and α¯3 < α < α¯4 p∗I1 < p
∗INSS
1 and q
∗I
1 > q
∗INSS
1
 > ¯, Δk > Δ¯k, and α¯4 < α < α¯3 p∗I1 > p
∗INSS
1 and q
∗I
1 < q
∗INSS
1
 > ¯, Δk > Δ¯k, and α > max{α¯3, α¯4} p∗I1 < p∗INSS1 , q∗I1 < q∗INSS1 , and π∗I1 < π∗INSS1
 < ¯, Δk < Δ¯k, and α < min{α¯3, α¯4} p∗I1 > p∗INSS1 and q∗I1 < q∗INSS1
 < ¯, Δk < Δ¯k, and α¯3 < α < α¯4 p∗I1 < p
∗INSS
1 , q
∗I
1 < q
∗INSS
1 , and π
∗I
1 < π
∗INSS
1
 < ¯, Δk < Δ¯k, and α¯4 < α < α¯3 p∗I1 > p
∗INSS
1 , q
∗I
1 > q
∗INSS
1 , and π
∗I
1 > π
∗INSS
1
 < ¯, Δk < Δ¯k and α > max{α¯3, α¯4} p∗I1 < p∗INSS1 and q∗I1 > q∗INSS1
 < ¯, Δk > Δ¯k, and α < α¯3 p∗I1 > p
∗INSS
1 , q
∗I
1 > q
∗INSS
1 , and π
∗I
1 > π
∗INSS
1
 < ¯, Δk > Δ¯k, and α > α¯3 p∗I1 < p
∗INSS
1 and q
∗I
1 > q
∗INSS
1
πINSS1 = (p1 − c)(μˆ(1 + α− p1 − k) + μˆδ(p2 + α− p1 −Δk))− I
πINSS2 = (p2 − c)(μˆ(1− p2 − k) + μˆδ(p1 − p2 −Δk))
πNISS1 = (p1 − c)(μˆ(1− p1 − k) + μˆδ(p2 − p1 −Δk))
πNISS2 = (p2 − c)(μˆ(1 + α− p2 − k) + μˆδ(p1 − p2 −Δk + α))
Note that in order to ensure positive demand from searching consumers and local
consumers we need to constrain α in the following region:
α ∈ ( δΔk(2+3δ)
δ(1+δ)
, ((1+δ)(1−c−k)+δΔk)(2+3δ)
δ(1+δ)
).
Since we have symmetric retailers the following should hold:
π∗IINN1 = π
∗IINN
2 , π
∗NNNN
1 = π
∗NNNN
2 , π
∗INSS
1 = π
∗NISS
2 , and π
∗NISS
1 = π
∗INSS
2 ,
where the optimal proﬁt expressions are given below:
π∗IINNi =
μˆ(1+α−c−k)2
4
− I, i = 1, 2
π∗NNNNi =
μˆ(1−c−k)2
4
, i = 1, 2
π∗INSS1 =
(1+δ)μˆ((2+3δ)(1−c−k−δΔk)+2α(1+δ)2 )2
(4+8δ+3δ2)2
− I
π∗INSS2 =
(1+δ)μˆ((2+3δ)(1−c−k−δΔk)+αδ(1+δ))2
(4+8δ+3δ2)2
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π∗NISS1 =
(1+δ)μˆ((2+3δ)(1−c−k−δΔk)+αδ(1+δ))2
(4+8δ+3δ2)2
π∗NISS2 =
(1+δ)μˆ((2+3δ)(1−c−k−δΔk)+2α(1+δ)2 )2
(4+8δ+3δ2)2
− I
We now explore the diﬀerent possible Nash Equilibrium strategies.
Case 1: Both retailers invest
Both retailers invest is a unique Nash equilibrium strategy if the following holds:
π∗IINN1 > π
∗NISS
1 .
Let A1, A2 denote the values of investment cost at which π
∗IINN
1 = π
∗NISS
1 and
π∗INSS1 = π
∗NNNN
1 respectively.
A1 =
μˆ(1+α−c−k)2
4
− (1+δ)μˆ((2+3δ)(1−c−k−δΔk)+αδ(1+δ))2
(4+8δ+3δ2)2
and
A2 =
(1+δ)μˆ((2+3δ)(1−c−k−δΔk)+2α(1+δ)2 )2
(4+8δ+3δ2)2
− μˆ(1−c−k)2
4
One can easily show that π∗IINN1 > π
∗NISS
1 if 0 < I < A1.
Hence, both retailers invest is a unique Nash equilibrium strategy if 0 < I < A1.
Case 2: Neither retailer invests
Neither retailer invests is a unique Nash equilibrium strategy if the following holds:
π∗INSS1 < π
∗NNNN
1 .
One can easily show that π∗INSS1 < π
∗NNNN
1 if I > max{0, A2}.
Hence, neither retailer invests is a unique Nash equilibrium strategy if I > max{0, A2}.
Case 3: Only one retailer invests (either retailer 1 or retailer 2)
Either retailer 1 invests and retailer 2 does not invest or retailer 1 does not invest
and retailer 2 invests are two unique Nash equilibrium strategies if the following holds:
(i) π∗INSS1 > π
∗NNNN
1 and (ii) π
∗IINN
1 < π
∗NISS
1 .
One can easily show that (i) π∗INSS1 > π
∗NNNN
1 and (ii) π
∗IINN
1 < π
∗NISS
1 if
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max{0, A1} < I < A2. Hence, either retailer 1 invests and retailer 2 does not in-
vest or retailer 1 does not invest and retailer 2 invests are two unique Nash equilibrium
strategies if max{0, A1} < I < A2.
Proof of Proposition 7.
The expressions of proﬁt for a retailer for a given α are : π∗II(α) = (1+α−c−k)
2μˆ
4
−λα2,
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 + c + k and π∗II(α) = (α− c− k)μˆ− λα2, where α ≥ 1 + c + k. The
corresponding local optima are α∗IEIE = (1−c−k)μˆ
4λ−μˆ , for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1+c+k and α∗IEIE = μˆ2λ ,
for α ≥ 1 + c + k. Thus, each retailer’s proﬁt function has two branches. The ﬁrst
branch π∗II(α) = (1+α−c−k)
2μˆ
4
−λα2 is concave when μˆ
λ
< 4 and convex otherwise, while
the second branch π∗II(α) = (α − c − k)μˆ − λα2 is concave. In order to identify the
global optimum we consider all possible cases in terms of relative magnitude of (1−c−k)μˆ
4λ−μˆ ,
μˆ
2λ
, and 1 + c + k.
Case A: First branch is concave ( μˆ
λ
< 4).
We have the following subcases: (i) (1−c−k)μˆ
4λ−μˆ <
μˆ
2λ
< 1 + c + k, (ii) 1 + c + k <
μˆ
2λ
< (1−c−k)μˆ
4λ−μˆ , (iii)
μˆ
2λ
< (1−c−k)μˆ
4λ−μˆ < 1 + c + k, (iv)
(1−c−k)μˆ
4λ−μˆ < 1 + c + k <
μˆ
2λ
, (v)
μˆ
2λ
< 1+ c+ k < (1−c−k)μˆ
4λ−μˆ and (vi) 1+ c+ k <
(1−c−k)μˆ
4λ−μˆ <
μˆ
2λ
. The only feasible subcases
are (i) and (ii), in which the global optima are α∗IEIE = (1−c−k)μˆ
4λ−μˆ , and α
∗IEIE = μˆ
2λ
respectively.
Case B: Second branch is convex ( μˆ
λ
> 4).
We have the following subcases: (i) 1+ c+ k < μˆ
2λ
and (ii) μˆ
2λ
< 1+ c+ k. The only
feasible subcase is (i) and the global optimum is μˆ
2λ
.
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Combining cases A and B we obtain that a) if λ < μˆ
2(1+c+k)
, then α∗IEIE = μˆ
2λ
b)
if λ > μˆ
2(1+c+k)
, then α∗IEIE = (1−c−k)μˆ
4λ−μˆ .
Consumers search from retailer 1 to retailer 2
The proﬁt expressions for retailer 1 for investment scenarios (ii) and (iii) are as
follows:
(ii) Retailer 1 does not invest but retailer 2 invests
πNISN1 = (p1 − c1)(μ + )γ(1− p1 − k1).
(iii) Retailer 1 invests but retailer 2 does not invest
πINSN1 = (p1 − c1)(μ + )γ(1 + α− p1 − k1)− I1.
Let π∗k1 , d
∗k
1 , and π
∗k
1 be the optimal prices, demands and proﬁts in scenarios k =
{NISN, INSN}.
Proposition A1 Retailer’s 1 optimal price, demand, and proﬁt are impacted from
competition as follows:
(i) p∗N1 = p
∗NISN
1 and p
∗I
1 = p
∗INSN
1
(ii) If μ > (μ + )γ then a) q∗N1 > q
∗NISN
1 and q
∗I
1 > q
∗INSN
1 and b) π
∗N
1 > π
∗NISN
1
and π∗I1 > π
∗INSN
1 .
(iii) If μ < (μ + )γ then a) q∗N1 < q
∗NISN
1 and q
∗I
1 < q
∗INSN
1 and b) π
∗N
1 < π
∗NISN
1
and π∗I1 < π
∗INSN
1 .
Proof of Proposition A1.
(i) Since retailer 1’s proﬁts under monopoly and duopoly are concave in p1 the ﬁrst
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order conditions are both suﬃcient and necessary. Taking ﬁrst order conditions of the
proﬁt expressions we have:
∂πNISN1
∂p1
= (1− p1 − k1)(μ + )γ − (p1 − c1)(μ + )γ = 0 (A-1)
∂πINSN1
∂p1
= (1 + α− p1 − k1)(μ + )γ − (p1 − c1)(μ+ )γ = 0 (A-2)
Let p∗k1 = arg{maxp1≥c1 πk1}, where k = {NISN, INSN}. Hence, from (A-1) and (A-2)
it follows that p∗N1 = p
∗NISN
1 =
1+c1−k1
2
and p∗I1 = p
∗INSN
1 =
1+α+c1−k1
2
.
(ii) a) The expressions of optimal demands are: q∗N1 =
(1−c1−k1)μ
2
, q∗NISN1 =
(1−c1−k1)(μ+)γ
2
,
q∗I1 =
(1+α−c1−k1)μ
2
, and q∗INSN1 =
(1+α−c1−k1)(μ+)γ
2
. Hence, if μ > (μ + )γ, then
q∗N1 > q
∗NISN
1 and q
∗I
1 > q
∗INSN
1 . If μ < (μ+ )γ, then q
∗N
1 < q
∗NISN
1 and q
∗I
1 < q
∗INSN
1 .
(ii) b) The expressions of the optimal proﬁts are: π∗N1 =
(1−c1−k1)2μ
4
, π∗NISN1 =
(1−c1−k1)2(μ+)γ
4
, π∗I1 =
(1+α−c1−k1)2μ
4
− I1, and π∗INSN1 = (1+α−c1−k1)
2(μ+)γ
4
− I1. Hence, if
μ > (μ+)γ, then π∗N1 > π
∗NISN
1 and π
∗I
1 > π
∗INSN
1 . If μ < (μ+)γ, then π
∗N
1 < π
∗NISN
1
and π∗I1 < π
∗INSN
1 .
Proposition A1 shows that when consumers search from retailer 1 to retailer 2
(consumer search scheme (3)), retailer 1 prices identically under monopoly and duopoly
regimes. The impact of competition on retailer 1’s proﬁt and demand depends solely
on the relative magnitude of retailer 1’s market potential under monopoly (μ) and
duopoly regimes ((μ + )γ). Speciﬁcally, if the market potential of retailer 1 under
monopoly is higher than the corresponding market potential under duopoly (μ > (μ+
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)γ), competition leads to retailer 1 obtaining lower demand and proﬁt. If the market
potential of retailer 1 under monopoly is lower than the corresponding market potential
under duopoly (μ < (μ + )γ), retailer 1 obtains higher demand and proﬁt under
competition. The impact of competition on retailer 1’s price and proﬁt is intuitive
since there is no search of consumers from retailer 2 to retailer 1. As a result, the only
factor that aﬀects retailer 1 is the market expansion. It can be shown similarly that
identical results hold for consumer search scheme (1).
Beneﬁting from Innovative Competition
Consumers search from retailer 2 to retailer 1
Figure A1 summarizes the impact of competition on retailer 1’s proﬁt according
to diﬀerent regimes related to market expansion, retailers’ physical proximity, and
magnitude of change in consumer valuation.
Proposition A2 Let π∗NINS1 be the optimal proﬁt of retailer 1 under duopoly, π
∗N
1 be
the optimal proﬁt of retailer 1 under monopoly, Δ˜k1 be a threshold of the retailers’
physical proximity, α˜(1), α˜2, and α˜ be thresholds of the consumer valuation mean shifts
(deﬁned in Table A9). Then,
i) if Δk < Δ˜k1 and (μ + )(γ + δ(1− γ)) > μ, then π∗N1 < π∗NINS1 ,
ii) if Δk < Δ˜k1 and α > α˜ = max{0, α˜2}, then π∗N1 < π∗NINS1 ,
iii a) if Δk > Δ˜k1 and α < α˜
(1), then π∗N1 > π
∗NINS
1 ,
iii b) if Δk > Δ˜k1 and α > α˜
(1), then π∗N1 < π
∗NINS
1 .
Proposition A2 provides the following insights:
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i) Retailer 1 has higher proﬁts under competition in a high market expansion and
high proximity regime. This result is intuitive. Since the retailers’ proximity is high,
consumers are more likely to buy from retailer 1 after having visited retailer 2, which
combined with high market expansion will lead to higher proﬁt for retailer 1 under
duopoly.
ii) When the retailers are close (i.e., proximity is high)–irrespective of the market
expansion–retailer 1 will obtain higher proﬁt provided that the magnitude of change in
consumer valuation exceeds a certain threshold (denoted as α˜).
iii) When the retailers are far (i.e., proximity is low)–irrespective of the market
expansion–retailer 1 has higher proﬁt under competition, provided that the magnitude
of change in consumer valuation exceeds a certain threshold (denoted as α˜(1)). The
intuition behind this is that since the retailers’ proximity is low, the consumer ﬂow from
retailer 2 to retailer 1 will be limited. As a result, retailer 1 beneﬁts under competition
only if his competitor makes a signiﬁcant investment to increase consumer valuation.
If the magnitude of change in consumer valuation is below a certain threshold then
retailer 1’s proﬁt is lower under duopoly.
? Low?Proximity
??
? ? ? ?????? ? ? ??????
High?Proximity?
????? ???????????????
? ? ?? ? ???? ? ??? ? ????
Lower?Profit? Higher?
Profit?
Higher?Profit?
?
Low?Proximity
??
High?Proximity
? ? ?????? ? ? ??????
Lower?Profit? Higher?
Profit?
??
? ? ???? ? ? ???
???????????????????
? ? ?? ? ???? ? ??? ? ???
?
Not?
Determined?
Higher?
Profit?
FIGURE A1: The impact on retailer 1’s proﬁt based on the analytical results in scenario
NINS.
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Note that in Figure A1 there is a regime (low market expansion and high proxim-
ity) in which the competitive eﬀects are not fully determined. To gain more insights
regarding the competitive outcomes under that regime, we performed a computational
study, which showed the existence of a threshold in the consumer valuation mean shift
α˜(1). If the mean shift is low (α < α˜(1)), the introduction of retailer 2 leads to retailer
1 obtaining lower proﬁt and if the mean shift is high (α > α˜(1)), retailer 2 creates a
positive externality and retailer 1 free rides.
In summary, our analytical results along with the computational study demonstrate
that competition may not always harm retailer 1. Even if retailer 2 brings in a small
market expansion, retailer 1 can be more proﬁtable under competition, provided that
retailer 2 has made a suﬃcient improvement in consumer valuation. This result is
consistent with the ﬁndings of the general case.
Proof of Proposition A2.
The retailers’ proﬁt functions πNINS1 and π
NINS
2 are concave in their corresponding
prices p1 and p2. The optimal prices p
∗NINS
1 and p
∗NINS
2 for the two retailers are the
intersection of the best response functions obtained from the ﬁrst order conditions of
retailers’ proﬁts. Evaluating the expressions for demands qNINS1 and q
NINS
2 and proﬁts
πNINS1 and π
NINS
2 at their optimal prices provides us with the corresponding optimal
demand and proﬁt expressions. We obtain expressions for α˜1, α˜2, and α˜
(1) respectively
by solving the following equations: p∗NINS1 = p
∗I
1 , q
∗NINS
1 = q
∗I
1 , and π
∗NINS
1 = π
∗I
1 . We
ﬁnd the expression for Δ˜k1 by setting α˜1 = 0 and solving for Δk. We provide these
expressions in Table A9.
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TABLE A9: Expressions for scenario NINS.
Notation Expression
p∗NINS1 (2γ + δ(1 − γ) + αδ(1 − γ) − 2δ(1 − γ)Δk + 2(γ(1 − δ) + δ)c1
+(1 − γ)δc2 − 2γk1 − (1 − γ)δk2)/(4γ(1 − δ) + 4δ)
q∗NINS1 ( + μ)(2γ + δ(1 − γ) + αδ(1 − γ) − 2δ(1 − γ)Δk − 2(γ(1 − δ) + δ)c1
+(1 − γ)δc2 − 2γk1 − (1 − γ)δk2)/4
π∗NINS1 (( + μ)(2γ + δ(1 − γ) + αδ(1 − γ)− 2δ(1 − γ)Δk − 2(γ(1 − δ) + δ)c1
+(1 − γ)δc2 − 2γk1 − (1 − γ)δk2)2)/(16(γ(1 − δ) + δ))
α˜1 1 + 2Δk − c2 − 2k1 + k2
α˜2 (2μ − (2γ + δ(1 − γ)− 2(1− γ)δΔk)( + μ) − 2(μ− (γ(1 − δ) + δ)( + μ))c1−
(1 − γ)δ( + μ)c2 + 2(γ − (1− γ)μ)k1 + (1 − γ)δ( + μ)k2)/((1 − γ)δ( + μ))
α˜(1) (− 2δ(1−c1−k1)
1−γ ±
2
√
(1−γ)2(γ(1−δ)+δ)δ2μ(+μ)(1−c1−k1)2
(1−γ)2(+μ) +
δ(2 − δ + 2δΔk − 2(1− δ)c1 − δc2 − 2k1 + δk2))/δ2
Δ˜k1 (c2 + 2k1 − k2 − 1)/2
Comparing retailer 1’s optimal price and demand under monopoly and duopoly
regimes we obtain the results summarized in Table A10. From Table A10 we can make
the following observations: (i) When the retailers’ proximity is high (Δk < Δ˜k1) if
the market expansion is high (μ < (μ + )(γ + δ(1 − γ))), then π∗N1 < π∗NINS1 . (ii)
When the retailers’ proximity is high (Δk < Δ˜k1) if the market expansion is low
(μ > (μ + )(γ + δ(1 − γ))), then π∗N1 < π∗NINS1 , for α > α˜2. Hence, from (i) if the
retailers’ proximity is high there exists a threshold α˜ = max{0, α˜2} such that if α > α˜
then π∗N1 < π
∗NINS
1 . (iii) If the retailers’ proximity is low (Δk > Δ˜k1) retailer 1’s proﬁt
is lower under duopoly than under monopoly for low levels of α and it is higher under
duopoly than under monopoly for high levels of α. Hence, there exists a threshold in
the consumer valuation mean shift α˜(1) such that if α < α˜(1) then π∗N1 > π
∗NINS
1 and if
α > α˜(1) then π∗N1 < π
∗NINS
1 .
Implications of Competition for an Innovative Retailer
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TABLE A10: Impact of competition on retailer 1 for scenario NINS.
Suﬃcient Conditions Impact
μ < ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)) and Δk < Δ˜k1 p∗N1 < p∗NINS1 , q∗N1 < q∗NINS1 , and π∗N1 < π∗NINS1
μ < ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δk > Δ˜k1, and α < α˜2 p∗N1 > p∗NINS1 , q∗N1 > q∗NINS1 , and π∗N1 > π∗NINS1
μ < ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δk > Δ˜k1, and α˜2 < α < α˜1 p∗N1 > p∗NINS1 and q∗N1 < q∗NINS1
μ < ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δk > Δ˜k1, and α > α˜1 p∗N1 < p∗NINS1 , q∗N1 < q∗NINS1 , and π∗N1 < π∗NINS1
μ > ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δk < Δ˜k1, and α < α˜2 p∗N1 < p∗NINS1 and q∗N1 > q∗NINS1
μ > ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δk < Δ˜k1, and α > α˜2 p∗N1 < p∗NINS1 , q∗N1 < q∗NINS1 , and π∗N1 < π∗NINS1
μ > ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δk > Δ˜k1, and α < α˜1 p∗N1 > p∗NINS1 , q∗N1 > q∗NINS1 , and π∗N1 > π∗NINS1
μ > ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δk > Δ˜k1, and α˜1 < α < α˜2 p∗N1 < p∗NINS1 and q∗N1 > q∗NINS1
μ > ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δk > Δ˜k1, and α > α˜2 p∗N1 < p∗NINS1 , q∗N1 < q∗NINS1 , and π∗N1 < π∗NINS1
Consumers search from retailer 2 to retailer 1
Figure A2 presents the impact of competition on retailer 1’s proﬁt according to
diﬀerent regimes related to market expansion, retailers’ physical proximity, and mag-
nitude of change in consumer valuation. We ﬁnd that retailer 1 always beneﬁts under
competition in a high market expansion and high proximity regime but retailer 1’s
proﬁt is always lower under competition in a low market expansion and low proximity
regime.
Proposition A3 Let π∗INNS1 be the optimal proﬁt of retailer 1 under duopoly, π
∗I
1 be
the optimal proﬁt of retailer 1 under monopoly, Δ˜k1, Δ˜k2 be thresholds of the retailers’
physical proximity, and α˜3 be a threshold of the consumer valuation mean shift (deﬁned
in Table A11). Then,
i) if Δk > max{Δ˜k1, Δ˜k2} and α < α˜3, then π∗I1 > π∗INNS1 .
ii) if Δk < min{Δ˜k1, Δ˜k2} and α < α˜3 then π∗I1 < π∗INNS1 .
Proposition A3 shows that in a low proximity regime (Δk > max{Δ˜k1, Δ˜k2}), if
retailer 1 invests in low improvement in consumer valuation his proﬁt will be lower
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FIGURE A2: The impact on retailer 1’s proﬁt based on the analytical results in scenario
INNS.
under competition. Interestingly, in a high proximity regime (Δk < min{Δ˜k1, Δ˜k2}) a
low improvement in consumer valuation allows retailer 1 to obtain higher proﬁt under
duopoly.
Because several of the regimes in Figure A2 cannot be fully characterized analyt-
ically, we performed some computational study to gain more insights on the undeter-
mined regimes. The computational study showed the existence of a threshold in the
consumer valuation mean shift (α˜(2)). When the market expansion is high, a low mean
shift (α < α˜(2)) leads to retailer 1 being worse oﬀ under duopoly and a high mean
shift (α > α˜(2)) allows retailer 1 to beneﬁt under duopoly. Interestingly, when the
market expansion is low, a low mean shift is beneﬁcial for retailer 1 in terms of proﬁts,
whereas a high mean shift can hurt retailer 1’s proﬁts (see Figure A3 with parameter
values γ = 0.1, δ = 0.3,  = 1.5, μ = 3, c1 = 0.2, c2 = 0.7, k1 = 0.7, k2 = 0.1,
Δk = 0.1, I1 = 0.05). The nature of search partially drives the counterintuitive re-
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FIGURE A3: Retailer 1’s proﬁt versus mean shift in scenario INNS.
sult illustrated in Figure A3. Because the retailers are closely located to each other,
consumers, who visit retailer 2 and do not obtain positive surplus, are likely to buy
from retailer 1 if they search. As a result, retailer 1 is in an advantageous position
which allows him to increase his price (i.e., p∗INNS1 > p
∗I
1 ). Note that as the consumer
valuation mean shift increases by Δα, retailer 1’s demands q∗INNS1 and q
∗I
1 increase
by Δα
2
(μ + )(γδ + (1 − γ)δ) and Δα
2
μ, respectively. Hence, q∗I1 increases at a faster
rate than q∗INNS1 because the market expansion is low (μ > (μ + )(γδ + (1 − γ)δ)).
Hence, even if originally the values of α are such that q∗INNS1 > q
∗I
1 and consequently
π∗INNS1 > π
∗I
1 , as α increases, q
∗I
1 becomes eventually higher than q
∗INNS
1 , which can
reverse the relative magnitude of proﬁts. In summary, our analytical results along with
the computational study demonstrate that in a high market expansion regime retailer 1
should strive for a high improvement in consumer valuation in order to overcome proﬁt
loss to competition. This is not the case for a low expansion regime. When retailer 1
faces low market expansion, he should target low improvements in consumer valuation.
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Finally, there are some regimes such as high proximity, high market expansion and low
proximity, low market expansion where the outcome of competition does not depend on
retailer 1’s magnitude of improvement in consumer valuation. In such cases, the market
characteristics (i.e., market expansion and retailers’ physical proximity) determine the
competitive eﬀects on retailer 1’s proﬁts.
Proof of Proposition A3.
The retailers’ proﬁt functions πINNS1 and π
INNS
2 are concave in their corresponding
prices p1 and p2. The optimal prices p
∗INNS
1 and p
∗INNS
2 for the two retailers are the
intersection of the best response functions obtained from the ﬁrst order conditions
of retailers’ proﬁts. Evaluating the expressions for demands qINNS1 and q
INNS
2 and
proﬁts πINNS1 and π
INNS
2 at their optimal prices provides us with the corresponding
optimal demand and proﬁt expressions. We obtain the expressions for Δ˜k1, α˜3, and
α˜(2) respectively by solving the following equations: p∗INNS1 = p
∗I
1 , q
∗INNS
1 = q
∗I
1 , and
π∗INNS1 = π
∗I
1 . The equation q
∗INNS
1 = q
∗I
1 is a ﬁrst degree polynomial of the form
αx1 = y1. We derive the expression for Δ˜k2 by setting y1 = 0 and solving for Δk. We
present all these expressions in Table A11.
Comparing retailer 1’s optimal price and demand under monopoly and duopoly
regimes we obtain the results summarized in Table A12. In Table A12 we can see
that if the retailers’ proximity is low (Δk > max{Δ˜k1, Δ˜k2}), then π∗I1 > π∗INNS1 for
α < α˜3. In the case that the retailers’ proximity is high (Δk < max{Δ˜k1, Δ˜k2}) then
π∗I1 < π
∗INNS
1 for α < α˜3.
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TABLE A11: Expressions for scenario INNS.
Notation Expression
p∗INNS1 (2γ + δ(1 − γ) + 2α(γ(1 − δ) + δ) − 2δ(1 − γ)Δk + 2(γ(1 − δ) + δ)c1
+(1 − γ)δc2 − 2γk1 − (1 − γ)δk2)/(4γ(1 − δ) + 4δ)
q∗INNS1 ( + μ)(2γ + δ(1 − γ) + 2α(γ(1 − δ) + δ) − 2δ(1 − γ)Δk − 2(γ(1 − δ) + δ)c1
+(1 − γ)δc2 − 2γk1 − (1 − γ)δk2)/4
π∗INNS1 (( + μ)(2γ + δ(1 − γ) + 2α(γ(1 − δ) + δ)− 2δ(1 − γ)Δk − 2(γ(1 − δ) + δ)c1
+(1 − γ)δc2 − 2γk1 − (1 − γ)δk2)2)/(16γ(1 − δ) + 16δ) − I1
α˜3 (−2μ + (2γ + δ(1 − γ)− 2(1− γ)δΔk)( + μ) + 2(μ + (γ(1 − δ) + δ)( + μ))c1
+(1 − γ)δ( + μ)c2 − 2(γ− (1− γ)μ)k1 − (1 − γ)δ( + μ)k2)/(2(μ − (γ(1 − δ) + δ)( + μ)))
ζ1 −(γ(1 − δ) + δ)(−2μ + (2γ + δ(1 − γ)− 2(1− γ)δΔk)( + μ))
η1 (1 − γ)2(γ(1 − δ) + δ)δ2μ( + μ)(1 + 2Δk − c2 − 2k1 + k2)2
θ1 (γ(1 − δ) + δ)(2(μ − (γ(1 − δ) + δ)( + μ))c1 + (1− γ)δ( + μ)c2 − 2(γ− (1 − γ)μ)k1 − (1− γ)δ( + μ)k2)
α˜(2) (ζ1 ±√η1 − θ1)/(−2(γ(1 − δ) + δ)(μ − (γ(1 − δ) + δ)( + μ)))
Δ˜k1 (c2 + 2k1 − k2 − 1)/2
Δ˜k2 (−2μ + (γ(2 − δ) + δ)( + μ) + 2(μ − (γ(1 − δ) + δ)( + μ))c1+
(1 − γ)δ( + μ)c2 + 2(μ − γ( + μ))k1 − (1 − γ)δ( + μ)k2)/(2(1 − γ)δ( + μ))
TABLE A12: Impact of competition on retailer 1 for scenario INNS.
Suﬃcient Conditions Impact
μ < ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δk < min{Δ˜k1, Δ˜k2} p∗I1 < p∗INNS1 , q∗I1 < q∗INNS1 , and π∗I1 < π∗INNS1
μ < ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δ˜k1 < Δk < Δ˜k2 p∗I1 > p∗INNS1 and q∗I1 < q∗INNS1
μ < ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δk > max{Δ˜k1, Δ˜k2}, and α < α˜3 p∗I1 > p∗INNS1 , q∗I1 > q∗INNS1 , and π∗I1 > π∗INNS1
μ < ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δk > max{Δ˜k1, Δ˜k2} and α > α˜3 p∗I1 > p∗INNS1 and q∗I1 < q∗INNS1
μ > ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δk < min{Δ˜k1, Δ˜k2}, and α < α˜3 p∗I1 < p∗INNS1 , q∗I1 < q∗INNS1 , and π∗I1 < π∗INNS1
μ > ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δk < min{Δ˜k1, Δ˜k2}, and α > α˜3 p∗I1 < p∗INNS1 and q∗I1 > q∗INNS1
μ > ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δ˜k2 < Δk < Δ˜k1 p∗I1 < p∗INNS1 and q∗I1 > q∗INNS1
μ > ( + μ)(γ + δ(1 − γ)), Δk > max{Δ˜k1, Δ˜k2} p∗I1 > p∗INNS1 , q∗I1 > q∗INNS1 , and π∗I1 > π∗INNS1
B1 Appendix for Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 8.
(1) The diﬀerence between the optimal expected prices in scenarios F and S is
pˆF − pˆS = (η2−η1)b2s(αH+αL)
2(2bpη1−b2s)(2bpη2−b2s)
Since, η2 > η1, 2bpη1 − b2s > 0, and 2bpη2 − b2s > 0 we have pˆF > pˆS.
The diﬀerence between the optimal expected prices in scenarios B and F is
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pˆB − pˆF = b2sη21(αH+αL)
2(2bpη1−b2s)(2bpη1η2−b2s(η1+η2))
Since, 2bpη1 − b2s > 0 and 2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2) > 0 we have pˆB > pˆF . Hence,
pˆB > pˆF > pˆS.
(2) sF = argmaxs{Eπ(s)} and sˆS = E(argmaxs π(s)) where E is the expectation
with respect to demand. Since π(s) is strictly concave in s then applying Jensen’s
inequality we get sF = argmaxs{Eπ(s)} > E(argmaxs π(s)) = sˆS. Hence, sF > sˆS.
(3) The diﬀerence in s1 in scenarios B and F is
sB1 − sF1 = η1b
3
s(αH+αL)
2(2bpη1−b2s)(2bpη1η2−b2s(η1+η2))
Since 2bpη1 − b2s > 0 and 2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2) > 0 we have sB1 > sF1 .
(4) The diﬀerence in s2 in scenarios B and S is
sB2 − sˆS = b
3
s(αH+αL)η2
2(2bpη2−b2s)(2bpη1η2−b2s(η1+η2))
Since 2bpη2 − b2s > 0 and 2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2) > 0 we have sB2 > sˆS.
(5) The diﬀerence in expected demands in scenarios F and S is
DˆF − DˆS = (η2−η1)bpb2s(αH+αL)
2(2bpη1−b2s)(2bpη2−b2s)
Since, 2bpη1 − b2s > 0 and 2bpη2 − b2s > 0 we have DˆF > DˆS.
The diﬀerence in expected demands in scenarios B and F is
DˆB − DˆF = η21b2sbp(αH+αL)
2(2bpη1−b2s)(2bpη1η2−b2s(η1+η2))
Since, 2bpη1 − b2s > 0 and 2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2) > 0 we have DˆB > DˆF .
Hence, DˆB > DˆF > DˆS.
(6) The diﬀerence in expected proﬁts in scenarios B and F is
πˆB − πˆF = 2u2b2s(2bpη1−b2s)(2bpη1η2−b2s(η1+η2))+4m2bpb2sη21(2bpη2−b2s)
8bp(2bpη1−b2s)(2bpη2−b2s)(2bpη1η2−b2s(η1+η2))
Since, 2bpη1 − b2s > 0 and 2bpη2 − b2s > 0, and 2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2) > 0 we have
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πˆB > πˆF .
(7) The diﬀerence in expected proﬁts in scenarios B and S is
πˆB − πˆS = b2sη22(αH+αL)2
4(2bpη2−b2s)(2bpη1η2−b2s(η1+η2))
Since, 2bpη1 − b2s > 0 and 2bpη1η2 − b2s(η1 + η2) > 0 we have πˆB > πˆS.
(8) The diﬀerence in expected proﬁts in scenarios F and S is
πˆF − πˆS = −2u2b2s(2bpη1−b2s)+4m2bpb2s(η2−η1)
8bp(2bpη1−b2s)(2bpη2−b2s)
Obviously the sign of πˆF−πˆS depends on the sign of−2u2b2s(2bpη1−b2s)+4m2bpb2s(η2−
η1) which is a second degree polynomial in terms of u. The above polynomial has
two roots one of which is negative. Hence, only one root which we denote by uˆ =
m
√
2bp(η2−η1)
2bpη1−b2s is positive. uˆ < m if and only if η2 < η˜2 =
4bpη1−b2s
2bp
. Hence, if η2 ≥ η˜2
then πˆF ≥ πˆS. If η2 < η˜2 and u < uˆ then πˆF > πˆS else if η2 < η˜2 and u > uˆ we have
πˆF < πˆS.
Proof of Lemma 1.
i) ∂η˜2
∂bp
= b
2
s
2b2p
> 0, ∂η˜2
∂bs
= − bs
bp
< 0, ∂η˜2
∂η1
= 2 > 0
ii) ∂uˆ
∂bp
= −mb
2
s(
bp(η2−η1)
2bpη1−b2s
)3/2
√
2b2p(η2−η1)
< 0, ∂uˆ
∂bs
=
√
2mbs
√
bp(η2−η1)
2bpη1−b2s
2bpη1−b2s > 0,
∂uˆ
∂m
=
√
2bp(η2η1)
2bpη1−b2s > 0,
∂uˆ
∂η1
= − mbp(2bpη2−b2s)√
2(2bpη1−b2s)2
√
bp(η2−η1)
2bpη1−b2s
< 0, ∂uˆ
∂η2
=
m
√
(η2−η1)bp
4bpη1−2b2s
η2−η1 > 0
Proof of Proposition 9.
(1) The diﬀerence between the optimal prices in scenarios FF and SS is
pFFi − pSSi = − αηbsθp(2bp+3θp)T(W 2η−2S(S−T )(θp+bp))(η(2bp+θp)−bs(bs+θs))
Since T > 0, (W 2η − 2S(S − T )(θp + bp)) > 0, and η(2bp + θp)− bs(bs + θs) > 0 we
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have pFFi < p
SS
i .
(2) The diﬀerence between the optimal services in scenarios FF and SS is
sFFi − sSSi = − αηθp(2bp+θp)(2bp+3θp)T(W 2η−2S(S−T )(θp+bp))(η(2bp+θp)−bs(bs+θs))
Since T > 0, (W 2η − 2S(S − T )(θp + bp)) > 0, and η(2bp + θp)− bs(bs + θs) > 0 we
have pFFi < p
SS
i .
(3) The diﬀerence between the optimal demands in scenarios FF and SS is
DFFi −DSSi = − αηθpbs(2bp+3θp)T (bp+θp)(W 2η−2S(S−T )(θp+bp))(η(2bp+θp)−bs(bs+θs))
Since T > 0, (W 2η − 2S(S − T )(θp + bp)) > 0, and η(2bp + θp)− bs(bs + θs) > 0 we
have DFFi −DSSi .
(4) The diﬀerence between the optimal proﬁts in scenarios FF and SS is
πFFi − πSSi = α
2η2θp(2bp+3θp)2T 2Y
2(W 2η−2S(S−T )(θp+bp))2(η(2bp+θp)−bs(bs+θs))2
where Y = (2bp + θp)
2(4bp + 5θp)η − 2bs(θp + bp)(4bp(bs + θs) + θp(3bs + 2θs))
Hence, if Y > 0 then πFFi > π
SS
i , else π
FF
i ≤ πSSi .
Y > 0 ⇔ η > 2bs(bp+θp)(4bp(bs+θs)+θp(3bs+2θs))
(2bp+θp)2(4bp+5θp)
In order to ensure existence and uniqueness of the NE in scenarios FF and SS we
should impose the following condition on η, η > max{2(bp+θp)S(S+T )
W 2
, (bs+θs)
2
2(bp+θp)
} = nmax
It is easy to show that nmax >
2bs(bp+θp)(4bp(bs+θs)+θp(3bs+2θs))
(2bp+θp)2(4bp+5θp)
as a result Y cannot be
negative or zero. Thus, Y > 0. So we have πFFi > π
SS
i .
Proof of Proposition 10.
(1) The diﬀerence between the optimal prices in scenarios FF and SS is
pFFi − pSSi = 2αbs(2bp+3θp)(bp+θp)(2bp(bs+θs)+θp(2bs+θs))η2−αbs(2bp+θp)(2bp+3θp)
2(bs+θs)η1
(W 2η1−2S(S−T )(θp+bp))(η2(2bp+θp)−bs(bs+θs))
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Hence if η2
η1
≥ (2bp+θp)(2bp+3θp)(bs+θs)
2(bp+θp)(2bp(bs+θs)+θp(2bs+θs))
= η¯ then pFFi ≥ pSSi and if η2η1 < η¯ then
pFFi < p
SS
i .
(2) The diﬀerence between the optimal services in scenarios FF and SS is
sFFi −sSSi = 2αbs(2bp+3θp)(bp+θp)(2bp+θp)(2bp(bs+θs)+θp(2bs+θs))η2−αbs(2bp+θp)
2(2bp+3θp)2(bs+θs)η1
(W 2η1−2S(S−T )(θp+bp))(η2(2bp+θp)−bs(bs+θs))
Hence if η2
η1
≥ (2bp+θp)(2bp+3θp)(bs+θs)
2(bp+θp)(2bp(bs+θs)+θp(2bs+θs))
= η¯ then sFFi ≥ sSSi and if η2η1 < η¯ then
sFFi < s
SS
i .
(3) The diﬀerence between the optimal demands in scenarios FF and SS is
DFFi −DSSi = (bp+θp)2αbs(2bp+3θp)(bp+θp)(2bp(bs+θs)+θp(2bs+θs))η2−αbs(2bp+θp)(2bp+3θp)
2(bs+thetas)η1
(W 2η1−2S(S−T )(θp+bp))(η2(2bp+θp)−bs(bs+θs))
Hence if η2
η1
≥ (2bp+θp)(2bp+3θp)(bs+θs)
2(bp+θp)(2bp(bs+θs)+θp(2bs+θs))
= η¯ then DFFi ≥ DSSi and if η2η1 < η¯ then
DFFi < D
SS
i .
Proof of Proposition 11.
We consider the impact of  on the optimal proﬁts of a duopolist in scenario SS.
We have sign(
∂πSSi
∂
) = sign((+ η)((2bp + θp)θs − bs(2bp + 3θp)) + bs(bs + θs)2).
Recall that we have imposed the following condition on θs to exclude positive ex-
ternalities of retailer i’s service on retailer j’s demand: θs >
bsθp
2bp+θp
.
We let 1 =
bs(bs+θs)2+η(2bp+θp)θs−bs(2bp+3θp)
bs(2bp+3θp)−(2bp+θp)θs and examine the following cases:
Case 1. If bsθp
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and  ≥ 1 we have ∂π
SS
i
∂
≤ 0.
Case 2. If bsθp
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and  < 1 we have
∂πSSi
∂
> 0.
Case 3. If θs ≥ bs(2bp+3θp)2bp+θp we have
∂πSSi
∂
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 12.
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Let η1 = η and η2 = η + . Recall that in the case of equal costs (i.e., η1 = η2 = η)
πFFi > π
SS
i . Let 1 =
bs(bs+θs)2+η(2bp+θp)θs−bs(2bp+3θp)
bs(2bp+3θp)−(2bp+θp)θs . In order to ensure existence and
uniqueness of the NE in scenarios FF and SS we should impose the following condition
on η, η > max{2(bp+θp)S(S+T )
W 2
, (bs+θs)
2
2(bp+θp)
− } = nmax
Case a. If bsθp
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and η > max{ bs(bs+θs)2
bs(2bp+3θp)−(2bp+θp)θs , nmax} then
1 < 0 and hence from Proposition 11 we have
∂πSSi
∂
≤ 0. As a result we have πSSi < πFFi
∀  > 0
Case b. If θs ≥ bs(2bp+3θp)2bp+θp then from Proposition 11 we have
∂πSSi
∂
> 0. Hence,
then there exists a threshold ¯3 such that if  < ¯3 then π
SS
i < π
FF
i and if  > ¯3 then
πSSi > π
FF
i .
Note that πFFi − πSSi could be expressed as a second degree polynomial in terms
of . ¯3 is the positive root of that polynomial for the parameter setting under which
θs ≥ bs(2bp+3θp)2bp+θp .
Proof of Proposition 13.
(1) The diﬀerence between the optimal expected prices in scenarios FF and SS is
pˆi
FF − pˆiSS = − ηbs(αH+αL)θp(2bp+3θp)T2((2bp+θp)η−bs(bs+θs))(W 2η−2S(S−T )(bp+θp)) < 0
Hence, we have pˆi
FF < pˆi
SS.
(2) The diﬀerence between the optimal expected service levels in scenarios FF and
SS is
sFFi − sˆiSS = − η(αH+αL)θp(2bp+θp)(2bp+3θp)T2(W 2η−2S(S−T )(bp+θp))((2bp+θp)η−bs(bs+θs)) < 0
Hence, we have sFFi < sˆi
SS.
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(3) The diﬀerence between the optimal expected demands in scenarios FF and SS
is
Dˆi
FF − DˆiSS = −η(bp + θp) bs(αH+αL)θp(2bp+3θp)T2((2bp+θp)η−bs(bs+θs))(W 2η−2S(S−T )(bp+θp)) < 0
Hence, we have Dˆi
FF
< Dˆi
SS
.
(4) Recall, that in the deterministic demand case (i.e., u = 0) when η1 = η2 = η
the dominant strategy for a symmetric duopolist is to invest in the ﬁrst stage. We
now examine the impact of demand variability on proﬁts in order to characterize the
dominant strategy under stochastic demand.
∂πˆi
FF
∂u
= 2u(bp+θp)
(2bp+θp)2
> 0, ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
= uη(2η(bp+θp)−(bs+θs)
2)
(η(2bp+θp)−bs(bs+θs))2 > 0.
Recall that η > ηmax = max{2(bp+θp)S(S+T )W 2 , (bs+θs)
2
2(bp+θp)
} to ensure existence and unique-
ness of NE for the scenarios SS and FF . In addition, we have θs >
bsθp
2bp+θp
. Let
ηˆ = 2b
2
s(bp+θp)(bs+θs)
(2bp+θp)(bs(2bp+3θp)−(2bp+θp)θs) .
1. If bsθp
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and ηmax < η < ηˆ (i.e., quadrant 1) then
∂πˆi
FF
∂u
> ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
.
2. If θs >
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
(i.e., quadrant 2 and quadrant 4) then ∂πˆi
FF
∂u
> ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
.
3. If bsθp
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and η > max{ηmax, ηˆ} (i.e., quadrant 3) then ∂πˆiFF∂u <
∂πˆi
SS
∂u
. Hence,
i) if η and θs are in quadrants 1, 2, or 4 then
∂πˆi
FF
∂u
> ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
as a result FF will
always be a dominant strategy for those cases.
ii) if η and θs are in quadrant 3 then
∂πˆi
SS
∂u
> ∂πˆi
FF
∂u
. Hence, there will exist a
threshold u¯ such that if u > u¯ scenario SS is the dominant strategy and if u < u¯
scenario FF is the dominant strategy.
The expression for u¯ is u¯ =
√
C
−A , where C = η
2m2θp(2bp + θp)
2(2bp + 3θp)
4(bsθp −
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(2bp + θp)θs)
2(η(2bp + θp)
2(4bp + 5θp) − 2bs(bp + θp)(4bp(bs + θs) + θp(3bs + 2θs))) and
A = −η(2bp + θp)(bs + θs)(bs(2bp +3θp)− (2bp + θp)θs)+ 2b2s(bp + θp)(bs + θs)2. We next
prove that C > 0. C > 0 ⇔ η > 2bs(bp+θp)(4bp(bs+θs)+θp(3bs+2θs))
(2bp+θp)2(4bp+5θp)
. One can easily show
that ηmax >
2bs(bp+θp)(4bp(bs+θs)+θp(3bs+2θs))
(2bp+θp)2(4bp+5θp)
. Hence, C > 0. In addition, −A > 0 ⇔ θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
which holds in quadrant 3.
Proof of Proposition 14. The impact of demand variability on proﬁts under
monopoly for scenarios S and F is given below:
∂πˆi
F
∂u
= u
2bp
> 0, ∂πˆi
S
∂u
= uη
2bpη−b2s > 0. It can be easily shown that
∂πˆi
S
∂u
> ∂πˆi
F
∂u
.
The impact of demand variability on proﬁts under duopoly for scenarios SS and
FF is given below:
∂πˆi
FF
∂u
= 2u(bp+θp)
(2bp+θp)2
> 0, ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
= uη(2η(bp+θp)−(bs+θs)
2)
(η(2bp+θp)−bs(bs+θs))2 > 0. It can be easily shown that
∂πˆi
F
∂u
> ∂πˆi
FF
∂u
.
Hence, ∂πˆi
S
∂u
> ∂πˆi
F
∂u
> ∂πˆi
FF
∂u
. In Proposition 13 we showed the following:
1. If bsθp
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and ηmax < η < ηˆ (i.e., quadrant 1) then
∂πˆi
FF
∂u
> ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
.
2. If θs >
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
(i.e., quadrant 2 and quadrant 4) then ∂πˆi
FF
∂u
> ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
.
3. If bsθp
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and η > max{ηmax, ηˆ} (i.e., quadrant 3) then ∂πˆiFF∂u <
∂πˆi
SS
∂u
. Hence,
i) If η and θs are in quadrants 1,2, or 4 then
∂πˆi
S
∂u
> ∂πˆi
F
∂u
> ∂πˆi
FF
∂u
> ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
.
ii) If η and θs are in quadrant 3 then
∂πˆi
S
∂u
> ∂πˆi
F
∂u
and ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
> ∂πˆi
FF
∂u
.
Proof of Proposition 15.
Let 2 =
2b2s(bs+θs)(bp+θp)+η((2bp+θp)θs−bs(2bp+3θp))(2bp+θp)
(bs(2bp+3θp)−(2bp+θp)θs)(2bp+θp) .
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Next, we identify the impact of demand variability on the duopolist proﬁts for
scenario FF and scenario SS.
∂πˆi
FF
∂u
= 2u(bp+θp)
(2bp+θp)2
∂πˆi
SS
∂u
= u(η+)(2(η+)(bp+θp)−(bs+θs)
2)
(η+)((2bp+θp)−bs(bs+θs))2
sign(∂πˆi
FF
∂u
− ∂πˆiSS
∂u
) = sign((η + )(2bp + θp)(bs + θs)((2bp + θp)θs − bs(2bp + 3θp)) +
2b2s(bp + θp)(bs + θs)
2)
Case 1. If θpbs
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and  ≤ 2 then ∂πˆiFF∂u ≥ ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
.
Case 2. If θpbs
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and  > 2 then
∂πˆi
FF
∂u
< ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
.
Case 3. If θs ≥ bs(2bp+3θp)2bp+θp then ∂πˆi
FF
∂u
> ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
.
Proof of Proposition 16.
Since we have characterized some of the strategies for the deterministic demand
case under diﬀerent costs we will use this as a guidance for the stochastic demand case.
(a) If θs ≥ bs(2bp+3θp)2bp+θp then from Proposition 15 we have ∂πˆi
FF
∂u
> ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
. Hence, if
 < ¯3 then πˆi
SS < πˆi
FF . If  > ¯3 then there exists a threshold u¯1 such that if u < u¯1
then πˆi
SS > πˆi
FF and if u ≥ u¯1 then πˆiSS ≤ πˆiFF .
b) If θpbs
2bp+θp
< θs <
bs(2bp+3θp)
2bp+θp
and η > max{ bs(bs+θs)2
bs(2bp+3θp)−(2bp+θp)θs , nmax} then from
Proposition 15 we have ∂πˆi
FF
∂u
< ∂πˆi
SS
∂u
. As a result, there exists a threshold u¯2 such
that if u < u¯2 then πˆi
SS < πˆi
FF and if u ≥ u¯2 then πˆiSS ≥ πˆiFF . Note that πˆiFF − πˆiSS
can be expressed as a second degree polynomial in terms of u. u¯1 and u¯2 are the
positive roots of that polynomial for the respective parametric regimes. Recall, that
nmax = max{2(bp+θp)S(S+T )W 2 , (bs+θs)
2
2(bp+θp)
− }
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